

Populism in Brazil's 2018 General Elections: An analysis of Bolsonaro's campaign speeches^{1,2}

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1. Introduction

With a long history of populist leaders and movements, Latin America is often considered by scholars to be the land of populism (de la Torre, 2017). In Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, populism dates back to the middle of the 20th century, being one of the primary expressions of the predominant personalism in the politics of the region.

However, in recent years, populism has not attracted much attention from Brazilian scholars. Despite the lack of scholarly attention, there is reason to suspect that the last general election in 2018 points to the resurgence of populism in Brazil, aligned with a global wave of rising populist politicians, such as Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Órban in Hungary, Recep Erdogan in Turkey, the "Five Star Movement" in Italy, or Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines.

When it comes to the success or failure of populist leaders, the literature tends to divide explanations into two dimensions: demand and supply. Understanding the demand for populism is a crucial task if we want to understand how citizens become more likely to accept and defend populist ideals and, hence, elect populist leaders and parties. However, the populist attitudes present in a population only have behavioral effects in specific contexts, where leaders operate as a "catalyst in the activation of populist attitudes" (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018b: 15).

The present study focuses on the supply side, leaving the analysis of populist attitudes in Brazil for a later paper. The study aims to answer the following question: To what extent is Jair Bolsonaro, the winning candidate of the Brazilian general election of 2018, a populist politician? Among scholars, journalists, and politicians, there is no

³ This paper is part of the research "Has Demand for Populism Met Supply? An Analysis of Brazil's 2018 General Elections" carried out within CECOMP (Center for Political Behavior Studies) at UFMG (Federal University of Minas Gerais).

consensus on this issue. We intend to answer this question through an analysis of his campaign speeches.

Preliminary results indicate that Bolsonaro's campaign speeches presents a mix of populist with patriotic and nationalist traits. His average score on populism in the campaign (and even during his first months in office⁴), is higher than that of the other Brazilian presidents over the past 20 years. But it does not reach the level seen in other countries with highly populist leaders because elements of patriotic discourse crowd out the populism in most of his speeches.

The data used for the speech analysis were collected as part of an effort led by *Team Populism*, a team of scholars from Europe and the Americas. The speeches were collected and coded by one of the authors (Eduardo Tamaki) with the assistance of Caio Marques, a student from IE University, Spain. The present analysis was enriched by Kirk Hawkins' comments during the coding process.

The paper proceeds as follows: the first section briefly defines populism according to the ideational approach; the second section describes the methodology; and the final section presents our findings and analysis of Bolsonaro's speeches, starting with an analysis of scores and complemented by a qualitative analysis of Bolsonaro's discourse.

2. Populism: Ideational Approach

Populism is not something new. According to authors Norris and Inglehart (2019) "its historical roots can be traced back to the Chartists in early-Victorian Britain, Narodnik revolutionaries in late-nineteenth century Tsarist Russia, Fascist movements in the inter-war decades, Peronism in Argentina, and Poujadism in post-war France" (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 4). In modern days, as a political phenomenon, populism has been receiving attention with the rise of political figures like Trump in the US, Viktor Órban in Hungary and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in México. Indeed, in 2017 the Cambridge Dictionary elected 'populism' the word of the years.

⁴ Research conducted by Team Populism together with The Guardian where we coded speeches for Bolsonaro's first month in office.

⁵ <https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press>

However, even though the concept has gathered a lot of attention over the past year, as the literature points out, it still lacks a consistent definition. Driven by the recent reemergence of populist forces, scholars around the world have shifted their focus towards trying to understand populism from its core ideas (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018b). According to this approach, all forms of populism share one similar element: seeing the world as a Manichaeian and moral struggle between the good (the people) and the evil (the conspiring elite).

According to Mudde's definition (2004), populism frames the world as being ultimately separated into two different and morally antagonistic groups, “*‘the pure people’* versus *‘the corrupt elite’*, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Therefore, populism is born of three necessary and sufficient conditions: (i) a Manichaeian and moral cosmology; (ii) the creation and defense of ‘the people’ as a homogenous and virtuous community; and (iii) the framing of an ‘elite’ as a corrupt and self-serving entity (Aguilar and Carlin, 2017: 2; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018b).

As a thin-centered ideology, populism “necessarily appears attached to... other ideologies” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 6). According to this idea, there is not a pure manifestation of populism, only subtypes. By uniting itself with other full ideologies (like socialism and nationalism), populism would result in the creation of ramifications, which depending on the host, could take different forms. The main difference between these subtypes would be whom the movement portrays as “the people” and “the corrupt elite,” as they are malleable and can change according to the context (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015; Müller, 2016; van Kessel, 2016; Aguilar and Carlin, 2016; Reinemann et al., 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018b).

3. Methodology

Bolsonaro's speeches were analyzed using a method of textual analysis known as *holistic grading*. Unlike other methods of textual analysis, *holistic grading* asks coders to interpret whole texts instead of counting content at the level of words and phrases. As Hawkins (2009) writes: “a holistic approach works by assessing the overall qualities of a

text and then assigning a single grade without any intervening calculations” (Hawkins, 2009: 1049).

After designing a rubric, or a simplified guide for the evaluation of speeches, the coding process and analysis is conducted by two to three coders, with reliability tests being made along the way to ensure that the results are not the product of luck (Hawkins, 2009). For Bolsonaro’s speeches, Team Populism assigned two coders, both having gone through training with 44 other coders from *The Guardian*’s “The New Populism” project⁶. The group had a high level of intercoder reliability, with correlations around $r = 0.8$.

The rubric produced by Team Populism grades the speeches on a scale that goes from 0 to 2⁷. 0 is a speech that uses few if any populist elements, and 2 is a speech that is extremely populist, being very close to the ideal populist discourse (Hawkins, 2009: 1062). A newer version of this scale presented on the project made by Team Populism in partnership with *The Guardians*, classifies 0 as “not populist”, 0.5 as “somewhat populist”, 1.0 as “populist”, 1.5 as “very populist” and leaves 2.0 open for what we will call “perfect populist.”

Regarding the sample of texts, we selected speeches from both official events and Facebook live streams. With the exception of July (that did not have enough official discourses), we chose at least two speeches per month: two from August, three from September, one before the attack against Bolsonaro's life, two after, and four from October, the month of the elections⁹.

4. Results: Quantitative Analysis

We begin by looking at Bolsonaro's score on the populism scale, then we provide a qualitative analysis of his speeches. Before moving forward, we will briefly discuss the reliability of the process using Krippendorff's alpha.

⁶ A project that coded speeches from leaders around the world and produced the “Global Populism Database”: the “most up-to-date, comprehensive and reliable repository of populist discourse in the world” according to the Guardian website: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/06/how-we-combed-leaders-speeches-to-gauge-populist-rise>

⁷ For the complete classification and the rubric, see the appendix at the end of the paper.

⁸ The Guardian Project which produced the “Global Populism Database”

⁹ For access to the data, ask one of the authors

Krippendorff's alpha is a coefficient developed to measure the agreement between observers, and works to show that the results obtained are not just a product of chance. According to Krippendorff (2011), "perfect reliability" would be indicated by an $\alpha = 1$, and the absence of any reliability by $\alpha = 0$. We chose this method because it applies to any number of observers, categories, scale values or measures, and can also use nominal and ordinal data, as well as intervals (Krippendorff, 2011)¹⁰.

For the campaign speeches, we obtained an $\alpha = 0.88$. According to Krippendorff, for the social sciences, we should only rely on variables that present reliability above $\alpha = 0.8$. Variables with reliability between $\alpha = 0.667$ and $\alpha = 0.8$ should be used only for "drawing tentative conclusions" (Krippendorff, 2004: p. 241). Since our α is higher than 0.8, we can assume that our data and analysis are not a product of luck, and therefore are trustworthy.

Table 1 Speech Scores

Date	Coder A	Coder B	Average / Final Score	Title
July 7, 2018	0.4	0.5	0.5	1- PSL conference: Official launch of his candidacy for President
August 23, 2018	0.6	0.5	0.6	2 - Bolsonaro's speech at Araçatuba
August 31, 2018	0.1	0	0.0	3 - Bolsonaro's speech at Porto Velho, Roraima
September 6, 2018	0.3	0.2	0.3	4 - Speech at the Business and Commercial association at Rio de Janeiro
September 16, 2018	0.3	0.3	0.3	5 - Speech after being stabbed
September 30, 2018	0.5	0.3	0.4	6 - Speech at Avenida Paulista (September)
October 6, 2018	0.3	0.2	0.3	7 - Speech one day before the first round of elections

¹⁰ For more information on Krippendorff's alpha, see Krippendorff, K., 2011.


October 16, 2018	0.7	0.6	0.7	8 - Speech right after the first round of elections
October 22, 2018	1	0.8	0.9	9 - Speech at Avenida Paulista (October)
October 27, 2018	0.8	1	0.9	10 - Speech the day before second round elections (Live on Facebook)
Total Average	0.5	0.44	0.5	

Source: Author calculations; the sources of the speeches are in the Appendix.

Table 1 presents the individual score given to each discourse, by each coder, and their average score. A quick analysis shows that Bolsonaro's speeches present a growing level of populism. His campaign begins with an average populist score of 0.5 and ends with an average of 0.9, an increase of 100%. As shown above, his discourse becomes more populist as elections approach (between the seventh and eighth speech). The graphic below helps illustrate this progression.

Graphic 1

Progression of Populism on Bolsonaro's Campaign Speeches



Source: Research “Has demand met supply? An analysis of Bolsonaro’s speeches in Brazilian elections”

In addition, there is a turning point in his speeches, highlighted by the red line, which is the first round of the elections. In this case, we can see that after the first round of elections (October 7) his discourse became gradually more populist going from an average 0.3 on October 6, to a 0.9 on October 27, one day before the second round.

Table 2, on the other hand, exhibits the average scores of other Brazilian presidents over the past 24 years, as well as other international leaders.

Table 2

Leaders	Term	Average / Total Score
Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva	2003 – 2011	0.3
Dilma Rousseff	2011 – 2016	0.2
Michel Temer	2016 – 2018	0
Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1995 – 2003	0

<i>International Leaders</i>		
Hugo Chávez	1999 – 2013	1.8
Donald Trump	2017 – today	0.8

Source: Data produced by Team Populism

Unlike past presidents Michel Temer, Dilma Rousseff, Lula, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Bolsonaro articulates stronger populist elements and uses them more often; he is the first, in over 20 years, to score at least 0.5. His predecessors' average scores vary from 0 to 0.3, not enough to be considered populist.

In reference to Lula, with an average score of 0.3, Hawkins (2009) writes:

... none of his speeches have much in the way of a Manichaeian quality. Instead, Lula tends to focus on narrow issues and avoids any kind of cosmic proportionality or the mention of historical figures. He consistently emphasizes consensus and negotiation and, while briefly criticizing some individuals or opposition groups (e.g., former president Cardoso and wealthy Brazilians), he avoids characterizing these as evil. He does make brief mention of a popular will in some of his speeches, reminding the audience of his own working-class origins and telling them that he understands their needs (Hawkins, 2009: 1056).

Dilma's speeches, with an average score of 0.2, focus on specific issues, and most of the time do not frame her opponents as being the evil. However, by the end of her second term, during the process of impeachment, she starts to make constant references to enemies that might be conspiring against her, subverting the system, and usurping the power that the people gave to her. Temer and Cardoso, with an average score of 0, do not require any detailed analysis since their scores are a clear indicator of the absence or insignificant presence of populist elements in their discourses.

The second part of table 2 (international leaders) allows us to compare Bolsonaro's score with Hugo Chávez and Trump, other leaders considered to be populist. In contrast to them, Bolsonaro's levels of populism are low. We believe that this is due to the strong presence of patriotic and nationalist traits in his speeches, which we will explain in the next section.

Chávez, with an average score of 1.8, presents an actively populist discourse. It comes close to what is considered the "perfect populism." It displays a moral and Manichaeian division between the good and the evil with cosmic proportions. It praises

the popular will and the "people" as the true sovereigns and frames the elite as being the enemy responsible for subverting the system and harming the people.

Trump presents an average score of 0.8, closer to Bolsonaro's score. Although he displays a Manichaeian vision of politics and the world, praises the "people", and is consistently against the political elite that were in power before his election, he is inconsistent, as Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) and a recent article published by The Guardian¹¹ reveals.

It is necessary to highlight that the present research works only with campaign speeches, not Bolsonaro's speeches in office. Also, the campaign speeches selected were given at different places, on different platforms, and to different audiences, so they might present different framing effects that one should take into account.

Even with our analyses being limited to the campaign, Bolsonaro speeches bring to the political scene something that has been missing from Brazil for a very long time: populism. Nonetheless, Bolsonaro's average score indicates that he is not a perfect or pure populist. In the next section, we present passages from his campaign speeches that sustain our affirmation and show elements from patriotism that prevents him from scoring higher. We will also show some of his nationalist traits, but not classify him as an "ethnopolitist," as we will explain.

5. Qualitative Analysis: The Populism on Bolsonaro

The qualitative analysis focuses on the three principal dimensions of the ideational approach (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018b): (i) the praise of the popular will or the "people"; (ii) the framing of an elite as corrupt and selfish; and (iii) a Manichaeian vision of politics and the world. Here we illustrate each dimension with a few passages from Bolsonaro's speeches; however, we would like to highlight that, as we utilize the *holistic approach*, discourses are analyzed as a whole, not dividing them into separate parts. Subsequently, we highlight elements of nationalism and patriotism in his speech, further explaining why these traits are incompatible with populism in the case of Bolsonaro.

¹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/07/the-teleprompter-test-why-trumps-populism-is-often-scripted>

The People, The Good

One of the main dimensions of populism is the belief and praise of popular sovereignty. The “popular will” is the highest principle possible and should be respected and followed above all.

*We are indeed different from those who ruled over us over the past 20 years – PT and PSDB. With us, you will be in the first place; you will be our bosses! Together we can change Brazil; we won't have another opportunity!*¹²

Nevertheless, the “people” which populism refers to is something malleable; it is a group that changes and reshapes according to the context (Reinemann et al., 2017). In Bolsonaro’s campaign, he builds “people” from a cultural perspective, from values and traditional religion.

*Brazil is ours, “good citizens”, workers, right-wings, Christians that preserve family values; that don't want gender ideology in classrooms; that want Brazil doing business with the entire world, without an ideological bias*¹³

He uses the words “we” and “our” to highlight his identification with popular ideas mainly among his supporters, which in principle, could reflect an attempt to build on a populist homogeneous people and their “imagined community.” However, the “people” occupies a secondary position in Bolsonaro’s discourse. Its use is inconsistent and most of the times implicit, playing a supporting role to other preferred terms (e.g., “Brazilians,” “our country,” “our nation,” “(our) Brazil”). Therefore, the “people” ends up overshadowed by other elements that do not suit this people-centrism, which we will soon discuss.

The Elite, The Enemy

Besides people-centrism, in order to classify someone as a populist, it is necessary that their speech frames an elite as being morally evil and responsible for conspiring against the people to usurp their power. This elite is a group characterized as the source of all “evil,” being selfish and corrupt. According to Hofstadter (1996): “this enemy is

¹² Bolsonaro (2) – Araçatuba, 2018

¹³ Bolsonaro (9) – Av. Paulista (October), 2018

clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving” (Hofstadter, 1996, as cited in Hawkins, 2009: 1044).

In his campaign discourses, Bolsonaro openly acknowledges the opposition (the left and PT) as being his enemies. He frames the PT government as corrupt, inefficient, and responsible for executing a plan to spread its ideology while in power. In addition, Bolsonaro holds PT accountable for the undermining of the traditional family and its values. Bolsonaro uses belligerent language when addressing PT and becomes more aggressive as the elections approach. He even defends non-democratic means to defeat his political enemy.

*Petralhada,¹⁴ you will all go to the **edge of the beach**¹⁵, you won't have any more shots in our homeland, because I will cut off all of your luxuries. You won't have any more NGO's to satisfy your hunger for mortadella¹⁶. It will be a purge never seen in the history of Brazil!¹⁷*

At times, populists might build “the enemy” in a certain way that ends up not being explicit. However, it might be possible to identify “the enemy” by analyzing the communicative context (Reinemann et al., 2017). In the following example, it is possible to determine that the enemy is the PT:

No one is going to leave this homeland, because this homeland is ours [and] not from this gang that has a red flag and “brain-washed” [sic]¹⁸

Manichaeian Division

Praise of popular sovereignty and identifying an enemy are both necessary characteristics of populism, but not sufficient to classify someone as a populist. A populist speech also depends on the presence of a framing that divides the world into two morally opposed poles: the good and the evil.

¹⁴ Reference to people affiliated to PT, a wordplay with the words “Metralha” from Brothers Metralha (mobsters) + Petista (member of PT)

¹⁵ Reference to a place where political prisoners were taken during the military dictatorship

¹⁶ Leftists activists are also called “bun with mortadella”

¹⁷ Bolsonaro (9) – Av. Paulista (October), 2018

¹⁸ Bolsoarno (9) – Av. Paulista (October), 2018

*But right now is polarized: it's us and the PT; it's the Brazil green and yellow, and them, that represent Cuba, represent the Venezuelan government, with its flag that is red with a hammer and scythe on top of it. Let's change Brazil!*¹⁹

For Bolsonaro there is a moral distinction between those who “defend the traditional family and values” and those who oppose it.

*After all we are left with only two paths: the one of prosperity, liberty, family, of being by the side of God, by the side of those who have a religion and those who do not have, but are also competent [sic]; and the other we are left with the Venezuelan way. We don't want that for our Brazil. The other candidate [the one from PT], we know who surrounds him and who he seeks advise with and where. We don't want the return of that kind of people to the Palácio do Planalto [The Presidential Palace]*²⁰

Even when Bolsonaro does not talk explicitly, his use of certain expressions (e.g., “our side and their side,” “good citizens”) denotes the existence of a moral division:

*The other side is the return of the past, is the corruption, the lies, the contempt of family, is the approximation of dictatorships*²¹

He sees and treats the opposition as the enemy of the people, and there is no in-between: either you are with them, or you are against them.

*You, Petralhas, will see a Civil, and Military police with legal rearguard to make the law to uphold law on your back. Bandit from MST²², bandit from MTST²³, your actions will be typified as terrorism; you will not spread more terror the countryside and the cities! Either you fit in and fall in line or you will keep company to the “drunkard” in Curitiba!*²⁴

¹⁹ Bolsonaro (7) – One day before first round, 2018

²⁰ Bolsonaro (8) – Right after the first round of elections, 2018

²¹ Bolsonaro (10) – Day before second round of elections, 2018

²² Homeless Movement

²³ Homeless Workers Movement

²⁴ Bolsonaro (9) – Av. Paulista (October), 2018

Although it is present, the Manichaeic division is not constant. At times, likely as a reaction to critics to his campaign, his speeches highlight the unity of the Brazilian society:

Let's unite white and black, straight and homo, also Trans, there is no problem, everyone does whatever it wants, be happy [sic]. Let's unite northeasterners and southerners, we are going to silence these small separatist movements that we see in Brazil, unite rich and poor... Let's unite employers and employees, not boost the discord between them. Indeed, one needs the other²⁵

Patriotism and Nationalism

Although it contains the main elements of populism, Bolsonaro's discourse does not score high on the populism scale. This is mainly because his speech also contains patriotic and nationalist traits that are not consistent with his populism. Patriotism and nationalism are not necessarily incompatible with populism; it is possible to identify subtypes of populism that derive from interactions among these discourses. Norris and Inglehart (2019), for instance, classify Trump's populism as an *authoritarian populism*. That is not the case for Bolsonaro. His patriotism and nationalism do not combine but compete with populism, leaving considerably less room for the "people" in his discourse.

Both patriotic and populist speeches can present a Manichaeic vision of the world and politics, and they both may present anti-elite rhetoric. The main difference is that patriotism, unlike populism, emphasizes the state. As Hawkins, Amado, and Cranney (2010) state: "The state has an existence that is more independent of the individuals in it. We must all revere the state, and the state in turn protects and blesses us, but no one of us is a bearer of the state in the same way that we are the bearers of our national identity" (Hawkins, Amado, and Cranney, 2010: 14). As O'Donnell (1979) writes, the state stands above society. In short, nothing is above the state (Hawkins, Amado, and Cranney, 2010). It goes beyond territory and institutions and rather has to do with traditions, values, and symbols like the national anthem, the flag, and its colors. Not coincidentally, Bolsonaro's campaign motto was "Brazil above everything, God above all."

²⁵ Bolsonaro (1) – Official launch of his candidacy for President, 2018

Overall Bolsonaro's campaign does not claim to be the agent of the people or the guardian of the popular will, but rather the savior of Brazil, the protector of the nation and the state against the enemy that has been in power for ten years. However, it is not clear whether he is talking about "the nation" or "the state" - sometimes it can be either. According to Jenne, Hawkins, and Castanho Silva (2010), nationalist discourse, restricts the boundaries of a sovereign ethnos to that of the group considered the national dominant. Thus, "when political actors utilize national rhetoric, this has the effect of re-inforcing or adjusting these boundaries in the public imagination" (Jenne, Hawkins, and Castanho Silva, 2019: 8).

Drawing from these ideas and the nationalism rubric of Jenne, Hawkins, and Castanho Silva²⁶, we identified the presence of patriotic and nationalist traits in Bolsonaro's speeches. First, there is subtle praise of the virtues and distinctiveness of what he identifies as the "core nation":

*We the Brazilian people (Brasileiros) say that there is something more, way more important than our lives: our freedom! Because men or women arrested, have no life! With your strength, let's make Brazil! I am here because I believe in you, you are here because you believe in Brasil, this Brasil is ours! Our flag is green and yellow! [sic]*²⁷

*And what I want, if that's God's will, is from next year's January, not to be a captain of the army anymore, but to be a soldier of our Brazil [sic]*²⁸

*I'm here because I believe in you, you are here because you believe in Brazil!*²⁹

Table 3 helps illustrate this difference:

Table 3

	Populism	Patriotism	Nationalism
The greatest value	The people	The State	The nation

²⁶ For the complete classification and the rubric, see the appendix at the end of the paper.

²⁷ Bolsonaro (1) – Official launch of his candidacy for President.

²⁸ Bolsonaro (2) – Araçatuba, 2018

²⁹ Bolsonaro (9) – Av. Paulista (October), 2018

The leader is	Agent of the people	Protector of the State	Savior of the Nation
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Source: author's elaboration

Ultimately, the core element of Bolsonaro's speeches is not the people, but the state and the nation. Terms like "Brazil," "our flag," and "nation" are repeatedly used, leaving comparatively less room for the "people". "We" and "the people" are interchangeable with "the nation." Bolsonaro also makes repeated references to the name of the nation, "Brazil." It is worth mentioning that we believe that he does that mostly because words like "people" are heavily linked to the left, to the PT - his main opposition - so this might be a strategy to distance himself from what he frames as the "enemies."

I know what is at stake in this approaching moment: is the destiny of this great nation called Brazil.³⁰

[Voting for Bolsonaro] You are saving mine, yours, our Brazil!³¹

We are only one country, one homeland, only one nation, only one green and yellow heart. Together we can really make Brazil a great nation [sic]³²

There is also the presence of a rhetorical frame that argues for protecting the status of the national group to save the whole nation (Jenne, Hawkins, and Castanho Silva, 2019). The group he references, as we could see in the previous quotes, is not currently the politically dominant, but the real Brazilians who are, in a profoundly conservative way, in favor of the traditional family.

We have fought against fascism, and we are fighting PT now, which is a fascist party. They lie and try to blame me for things that are their faults [sic].³³

As shown, there are a few nationalist and patriotic elements in his discourse. However, even though they coexist with populism in his discourse, they do not combine to form something like "ethnopolitism" or "patriotic populism." This does not mean that

³⁰ Bolsonaro (1) – Official launch of his candidacy for President.

³³ Bolsonaro (1) – Official launch of his candidacy for President.

populism is absent from Bolsonaro's campaign speeches. On the contrary, scoring 0.5 means he is "somewhat populist," for making use of all the populist elements, even though at times he uses them inconsistently or with low intensity. We classified Bolsonaro as "somewhat populist" because, even though the populist elements are present in his speeches, "people-centrism" is inconsistent, as illustrated by our analysis.

6. Concluding Remarks

In light of all the data analyzed, is it possible to say that Bolsonaro is a populist leader? The analysis indicates that, besides presenting a low average populist score of 0.5, Bolsonaro's campaign speech presents all three main dimensions constitutive of populism. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) state, the peculiarity of populism as a set of ideas lies precisely in the combination of these three elements.

However, Bolsonaro is far from being a "perfect populist". The patriotic and nationalist elements in his discourses eclipse the "people", thus his populist score ends up being lower than one might expect.

It is also important to highlight that the analysis that we made here is limited to his presidential campaign and should not be used to draw any final profile regarding his ongoing term as president. As Hawkins, Amado, and Cranney (2010) argue, campaign speeches may present more populism than do speeches in government and vice versa, since both frame conditions and external contexts are prone to change. We also believe that discourses given on different platforms may present different levels of populism since they have been designed for different audiences and therefore may have been written for different purposes (Wiesehomeier, 2018).

Our research is still in its initial stages. The next step would be to expand our analysis to cover Bolsonaro as president³⁴. Initial research by Team Populism and *The Guardian* revealed that he maintained a score of 0.5 even after elected, so, compared with other Brazilian presidents (Temer, Dilma, Lula, and Cardoso), it is possible to see that, in his first months in office, he already scores higher than that of his predecessors.

³⁴ Which is already being made, for more details email the authors.

Finally, we believe that examining Bolsonaro's speeches is the first step towards a better understanding of what happened in Brazil in the polarized 2018 general elections. Brazil might be a case in which demand for populism meets supply, but this can only be understood by comparing the supply of populists with the demand for populism among voters; this will require an analysis of public opinion data. We hope that our research can contribute to the debate about populism and its different manifestations both in Brazil and in the rest of the world.

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Appendix 1

Populist Speech Rubric

Country:

Leader:

Title of Speech:

Date of Speech:

Category:

Grader:

Date of grading:

Final Grade (delete unused grades):

2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note, that even if a speech expresses a Manichaeian worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
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<p>It conveys a Manichaeian vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, “right” or “wrong,” “good” or “evil”) The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.</p>	<p>The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on narrow, particular issues. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.</p>
<p>The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing cosmic proportions to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of “history.” At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to national and religious leaders that are generally revered.</p>	<p>The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.</p>

<p>Although Manichaeic, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the “voluntad del pueblo”; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.</p>	<p>Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable “will.” The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.</p>
<p>The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the “oligarchy,” but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.</p>	<p>The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.</p>
<p>Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as “revolution” or “liberation” of the people from their “immiseration” or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.</p>	<p>The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of “differences” rather than “hegemony.”</p>

<p>Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.</p>	<p>Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.</p>

Source: Team Populism

Appendix 2

Criteria for Selecting Speeches

Generally, we need a speech that is at least 2-3 pages long, or about 2,000 words, in order to have enough text to analyze. We will use an extremely long speech (>5 pages) if it is the only one available in the category or is clearly the right speech for that category (as in the case of a famous speech), but given a choice, we prefer something shorter to make our work a little easier. We will also use an extremely short speech (1 page or less), but only if it is the *only* speech available. When the leader has been in office several years (for example it is the last year in a 6-year term) and there are a variety of speeches available for a category, we generally prefer the most recent ones because they are the easiest to find. To ensure comparability of coding across speeches and leaders, we need to have transcriptions rather than video recordings.

Campaign

Here we ask for a speech given during this chief executive's latest campaign for office. Keep in mind the above criteria, especially length. Campaign speeches are often the hardest to find because they were given before the person was elected, and so they are usually not recorded on any government website. Be prepared to call the political party or the office of the chief executive to speak to someone who was involved in the campaign. If it is impossible to get a speech for the person's own campaign, we will take a speech that he/she gave for some other candidate's campaign (for example, for members of the legislature during a mid-term election). If several speeches are available, we prefer the closing speech of the campaign to the opening speech, and a speech given to a large public audience over one given at a party convention.

Ribbon-cutting

This is a speech given at some kind of public ceremony dedicating a government building or project, typically a road, park, or building. You will likely find a number of these on the government website. Given a choice, look for a speech that is given to a small, local

audience rather than a national one, and to a domestic audience rather than an international one—we prefer something obscure in order to see whether the chief executive uses a populist discourse in settings with little apparent significance. If you have a lot to choose from, pick the most recent.

International

Here we are looking for a speech whose primary audience, or a significant part of the audience, consists of citizens from other countries—leaders, diplomats, or even ordinary people. There will be quite a few international speeches available, including on non-government websites. For consistency, we encourage you to look for a speech given outside the country, with as small of a domestic audience as possible. UN speeches are especially good as long as they are long enough.

Famous or most popular

In this category, we seek for a speech that is widely regarded as one of the best-known and most-popular speeches given by this leader. Of course, some leaders don't give very popular speeches, but we at least want one of their best-known speeches. As someone who knows this country well, you are in a good position to pick what you think is a particularly appropriate speech. We encourage you to contact the office of the chief executive or the political party and ask them for a recommendation. They will often suggest an inaugural speech (when the chief executive actually took office) or an annual report to the nation, but not necessarily. You should not feel obliged to use one of these particular speeches if you know of another one that is more famous (or notorious). Talk to a couple of people if you feel unsure.

Source: Team Populism

Appendix 3

Source from Bolsonaro's Speeches

Data	Discurso	Fonte
July 7, 2018	1- PSL conference: Official launch of his candidacy for President	Youtube (Link to be included)
August 23, 2018	2 - Bolsonaro's speech at Araçatuba	Youtube (Link to be included)
August 31, 2018	3 - Bolsonaro's speech at Porto Velho, Roraima	Youtube (Link to be included)
September 6, 2018	4 - Speech at the Business and Commercial association at Rio de Janeiro	Youtube (Link to be included)
September 16, 2018	5 - Speech after being stabbed	Youtube (Link to be included)
September 30, 2018	6 - Speech at Avenida Paulista (September)	Youtube (Link to be included)
October 6, 2018	7 - Speech one day before the first round of elections	Facebook Live (Link to be included)
October 16, 2018	8 - Speech right after the first round of elections	Facebook Live (Link to be included)
October 22, 2018	9 - Speech at Avenida Paulista (October)	Facebook Live (Link to be included)
October 27, 2018	10 - Speech the day before second round elections (Live on Facebook)	Facebook Live (Link to be included)

Source: author's production. Links will be included in next versions, for now, if there is a need, request the files from the authors

Appendix 4

Nationalism Speech Rubric

Country:

Name of speaker:

Title of Speech:

Date of speech:

Type of speech:

Place of speech:

Year of Election:

Grader:

Date of Grading:

Grade:

1. _____ Elevate the “National Self” (0, .5, 1);

2. _____ Defend against “National Others” (0, .5, 1)

_____ Final Grade (add scores on above two components)

A score of 1 on either element means all or most of that element of nationalism is present in the speech; a score of 0 means none or almost none of that element is present in the speech; .5 implies a mix of the two.

Nationalism	Cosmpolitanism/ Multiculturalism/No Nationalism
<p>ELEVATE OR PROTECT THE “NATIONAL SELF”</p> <p>The discourse of nationalism or dominant nationhood extolls the virtues and distinctiveness of the core nation and proclaims their past triumphs and victories, and/or prioritizes its health and future well-being. There may be considerable sentimentality associated with these claims.</p> <p>Nationalist discourse is often peppered with family metaphors like “brothers,” “motherland,” “homeland” or “founding fathers.” References may be made to the historical pain and trauma caused by national defeats. There may be references to national heroes or key turning points in national history.</p> <p>Calls for restoring the nation to its rightful position, at home and abroad (ethnic kin).</p> <p>May be references to importance of national sovereignty and self-determination.</p>	<p>No references to pain or trauma of the nation, nor to lost glory. No elevation of the special virtues and importance of the nation.</p> <p>No calls for status reversal.</p> <p>Minimal references to national heroes or legacy.</p> <p>There may be a complete absence of “nation talk” except insofar as “nations” are taken to mean states. If the “we” or “self” is the global community, this is particularly non-nationalist.</p> <p>Little focus on sovereignty concerns.</p>

<p>DEFEND AGAINST “NATIONAL OTHERS”</p> <p>This discourse is focused on the purported threat posed by minorities or “national others” outside or inside the state</p> <p>Externally, threats may take the form of foreign (sometimes “enemy”) nations, international organizations (UN or EU) or anti-national elites perceived to be aligned against the nation. Anti-colonialist rhetoric (“colony,” “empire,” “subjugation”) may feature here, but the perceived threat must be framed in national terms.</p> <p>Nations and groups may be stereotyped.</p> <p>In more extreme versions, the discourse may focus on threat to the nation posed by migrants, immigrants or refugees or on threats posed by historical minorities with a long history in the state. Some minorities may be framed as potential fifth columns or Trojan Horses for hostile outside actors. “National others” may also include disloyal citizens or traitors, who serve as a conduit for the influence of hostile outside forces.</p>	<p>Few if any negative references to national others. No overriding conceptualization of world as patchwork of nations.</p> <p>Problems in foreign affairs are rarely framed as conflicts between antagonistic nations. Problems can be solved by capitalizing on common global interests, possibly through international organizations.</p> <p>Ethnic and national stereotyping should be low.</p> <p>No dominant nation with subordinate status for minorities. No identification of threats to national integrity. There may be calls to integrate minorities, accept deserving immigrants and/or work together with nations around the world.</p>

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Source: Jenne, Hawkins, and Castanho Silva, 2019.