



POLICY BRIEF ON POPULISM
IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS:
WHAT, WHEN, WHO, AND SO WHAT?*

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WHAT IS POPULISM?

Populist forces are on the rise in democracies everywhere. Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned about the potentially negative consequences populism may have for democratic institutions and the post-war global liberal order. Given these high stakes, we want to know who is populist, what is causing this increase in populist politics, what are the consequences for democracy, and what if anything should be done.

Multiple Definitions Are a Problem

The first obstacle to answering these questions is the lack of agreement over what populism is. Many commentators associate it with specific issue positions, such as opposition to immigration or support for redistributive economic policies, or they use it as a laudatory or a pejorative label.

The problem with these approaches is that they do not explain or understand populism itself. Issues associated with populist forces vary by region, with leftist positions dominating in Latin America and Southern Europe, and rightist positions holding sway in the rest of Europe and North America. Presumably, populism is distinct from these issue positions or there would be no need for a separate word to

capture it. If populism is going to be more than a pejorative, we must identify the common features of all parties and movements that we deem populist.

Populism is Defined in Terms of Ideas

The best solution to this definitional problem is an ideational one. Scholars from across Europe and the Americas have identified a core set of ideas at the heart of every populist force. They call something populist if it expresses **the belief that politics embodies a struggle between the forces of good, understood as the will of the common people, and the forces of evil, associated with a conspiring elite.** Thus, populism is a polarizing (Manichean) discourse that is people-centric and anti-establishment.

Consider this quote from Donald Trump's (United States) inauguration speech from January 2017:

For too long, a small group in our nation's Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost...The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.¹

Trump speaks about **ordinary people as the bearers of democratic virtue**, the source of the one true way of running government. Just as important, he juxtaposes them with the **powerful elements of society who have betrayed the people** and conspired to serve their selfish interests.

Populism is Distinct from Other Democratic Discourses

Populism contrasts with other ways of talking about democratic politics. **The most common alternative is pluralism.** Pluralists see democracy as a more fluid process of representing multiple interests and avoids demonizing opponents, preferring instead to refer to impersonal causes of problems. **Another alternative is elitism**, a view that

¹<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/>

celebrates the virtues of experienced politicians, experts and power brokers.

Issue Positions Define Subtypes of Populism

Research shows that **populist ideas are held by parties with very different issue positions**. For example, two of the most populist parties in Greece, SYRIZA and ANEL (partners in government), have different positions on social issues such as ethnic minority rights. But this does not mean we should ignore the issue positions of populist forces. **Issue positions also determine who voters support and what populist forces do in office**. Because of this, it is helpful to refer to ideological subtypes of populism, such as radical right populism.

What an Ideational Definition Gets Us

Not every scholar or policymaker will define populism solely in terms of this set of ideas. Some scholars prefer to add additional conditions, such as the presence of charismatic leadership. However, separating issue positions from the ideas of populism allows us to carefully determine why certain subtypes are more common in different contexts – for example, why populists in Latin America and Southern Europe often adopt redistributive policies. It also allows us to explore the unique impact of populist ideas, independent of issue positions, and to identify common causes of populism across regions or even across time. As we show in this policy brief, **the impact of populist ideas on democracy is significant**, and there are common mechanisms underlying the emergence of populism that provide useful lessons for mitigating its effects.

WHY POPULISM MATTERS

The rise of populism worries many of us because of its potential impact on policies and institutions. There is, for example, still a widespread sentiment that populism

harms the economy. An equally prevalent notion is that it undermines democracy because of its tendency to restrict civil liberties and concentrate government powers in the executive branch. At the same time, some observers affirm populism's positive consequences, arguing that populism enhances the representation of voters who have been ignored by their politicians. Which of these arguments are correct?

New Research Demonstrates that Populist Ideas Have Consistent Effects on Democracy

Populism in power may have very different consequences from populism as a challenger force. Most obviously, populist challengers cannot directly determine government policy. Hence, most current research focuses on the potentially greater effects of populism in government.

First, research shows that populism in government, measured by the strength of the leader's populist language, does not have any clear effect on economic growth. Populism does not favor any one approach to economics, except the very general idea that the economy should be at the service of the people and reflect their sensibilities. This means there can be very different economic policies and consequences under different populist forces. For example, in some countries "the people" consists of impoverished workers in the informal sector, who have much to gain from radically redistributing wealth, in others it consists of a middle class that enjoys property rights and seeks to protect them through market-friendlier policies.

Second, populism has beneficial consequences for some forms of representation and political participation. Populists not only dignify forgotten sectors of the population, they also engage in concrete efforts to incorporate these citizens in politics through voting and other forms of democratic participation. Scholars think this effect is more likely among left populists, because of their stronger inclusionary appeal to native populations of Latin America, racial and sexual minorities, and the

poor, but there are reasons to expect it from all types of populism because of how they reach out to disaffected voters.

Research shows that populism in government has a modest, positive effect on voter turnout. Indeed, because populists rely on electoral legitimacy, a common strategy is a strong voter registration and get-out-the-vote drive for their supporters.

Third, populism's privileging of majority rule harms central institutions of liberal democracy, including civil rights, electoral quality, and the separation of powers. Liberal democracy protects individual freedoms and minority rights from the potential threat of electoral majorities. Populist ideas encourage politicians and their constituents to see their opponents in diabolical terms that justify curtailing their rights, as a way of protecting the people from a conspiring, parasitical class. These ideas also make politicians and voters value elections for their ability to express the will of the people, rather than adjudicate competing interests – hence, rules can be bent. And, to the degree that populists come to power under charismatic leaders embodying the popular will, they are willing to concentrate power in the chief executive.

Research demonstrates a noteworthy decline of about 10% in press freedom and the separation of powers for highly populist leaders. Importantly, this negative effect exists for populist leaders on the left *and* right.

Populism Can Contribute to Long-term Erosion of Democratic Norms and Social Cohesion

The deliberate polarizing strategy of populists may also have long-lasting impact on social cohesion. In particular, the identification of some groups of citizens as “good” and others as “evil” transforms political sympathies into social identities. In this form of “political tribalism,” societies divide into camps of “Us” and “Them” that favor and trust their in-group of like-minded persons, and distrust and disparage the out-group.

In the extreme, these polarizing dynamics lead the populist and the anti-populist

camp to each view their opponents as a threat to the nation and their way of life. The populist supporters may justify the erosion of democratic norms in order to stay in power. Populism's challengers may see populists as such a threat that they justify extra-constitutional actions to remove them from power, or prevent them from accessing power in the first place.

Populism Can Reveal Weaknesses in Liberal Democracy

All of these findings suggest that populist ideas themselves, and not just the issue positions they attach to, **are a significant concern.**

Focusing on populist ideas also helps us see the potential weaknesses in liberal democracy, especially the failures of representation that create populist grievances. **Politicians responding to populism need to examine their own parties** for ways to address these needs, not merely look for ways to condemn populism's illiberal excesses.

WHO IS POPULIST?

Populism combines people-centric and anti-elite ideas with a polarizing worldview. Populist forces are not only political leaders. **Parties, politicians at all levels of government, social movements, and individual citizens can subscribe to and express these ideas to varying degrees.** Understanding populism's causes and consequences requires identifying who (and what) is populist. Hence we must measure the levels of populism across citizens and political actors.

Identifying Populist Citizens

Populist individuals exhibit populist attitudes. We can identify populists by their answers to three sets of questions, typically included in public opinion surveys.

Asking individuals whether politicians should...

- ...always listen closely to the people.
- ...spend time with the people.
- ...prioritize the will of the people.

indicates their level of **people-centrism**.

Asking individuals whether politicians...

- ... sell out to special interests.
- ... look out only for themselves.
- ... are crooked.

indicates their level of **anti-elitism**.

Asking individuals whether they see their political opponents as...

- ... bad.
- ... evil.
- ... misinformed.

indicates their level of **polarizing outlook** on politics.

Populist individuals express high levels of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and a polarizing outlook. These attitudes can be summed into an index for comparison across individuals and countries.

Research with this scale and others like it suggest populist attitudes are widespread and that average levels differ little across countries. This is true regardless of levels of development, region, and whether populist leaders and/or parties have succeeded electorally.


Identifying Populist Political Actors

Three main tools have been developed to measure populist ideas among political actors: surveys of populist attitudes among elected representatives, content analysis of party manifestos and leader speeches, and expert surveys on political messaging.

Surveying politicians. We can uncover populist attitudes among elected representatives by asking them a set of survey questions similar to the ones asked in public opinion surveys.

Greece is one of the few countries where this approach has been used. As **Figure 1**

Figure 1: Populism Index by Political Party – Greece 2015.




shows above, both left-wing SYRIZA and right-wing ANEL (Independent Greeks) score highly on an index of populist attitude questions. Members of parliament from traditional parties (PASOK and New Democracy/ND) score much lower.

Analyzing what political actors say. Parties and their candidates may employ populist language in efforts to win votes. Thus party manifestos and leader speeches may contain populist elements. **Human coding** and **artificial intelligence** methods can detect and quantify the degree of populist content in both.

Measuring the degree of populism in political actors' public statements allows us to observe how populism relates to ideology. **Figure 2** arrays party manifestos and party leader and candidate speeches from Western Europe along a left-right issue dimension, then measures the strength of populist ideas expressed by these parties and leaders. Strong populists are labeled with their acronym. As can be seen, there are prominent cases of populism on both sides.

Surveying experts. Academic experts have specialized knowledge about party politics in a given country. They can reliably score parties and leaders on populism as well as their stances on their left-right ideological position.

Figure 2: Parties' and Leaders' level of populism along Left-Right Ideological Spectrum in Western Europe, 2010–2015.



Abbreviations: SYRIZA = Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece); Linke = Die Linke (Germany); IU-UP = Izquierda Unida-Unidad Popular (Spain); NPD = Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Germany); PVV = Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands); ANEL = Independent Greeks (Greece); SVP = Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland); Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria).


Figure 3 orders presidents in Latin America from Left (bottom) to Right (top) and contrasts this with their level of populism. Expert assessment shows an overlap between populism and ideological leftism among presidents in the region. Prominent examples include Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and Rafael Correa (Ecuador).

However, the experts place some Latin American populist forces (parties and presidents) on the ideological right. **So while in some regions populists are more successful on one side of the ideological spectrum, this does not rule out their success across the spectrum.**

From Measurement to Analysis

Identifying how strongly citizens and political actors espouse populist ideas is a critical first step toward a global understanding of populism. **Each method described here**

Figure 3: Expert Scores of Latin American Presidents on Populism and Left-Right Ideology, 2015



contributes a piece of the larger puzzle of populism.

Public opinion surveys illuminate the influence of populist attitudes on decisions to vote for populist forces. Expert surveys permit us to assess how populist forces combine their rhetoric and issue stances to attract populist voters. Party manifestos and leader speeches indicate the range of populist options for voters. And surveying elected representatives reflects the success of populist parties. Below we build on these measures to take up these questions.

WHERE DO POPULISTS RISE TO PROMINENCE OR POWER?

Populism is a **global phenomenon** that can be witnessed in both newer and long-established democratic political systems, from Hungary and Venezuela to Switzerland and Austria. The election of Donald Trump in the United States is just the latest and most visible example of a populist gaining access to executive power in the West.

Research indicates that the rise of **populism in national politics follows a common pattern** across time and space.

Populism Requires a Sense of Grievance

Commentators often focus on economic or other policy failures as the source of support for populism. However, this is not enough. Populist forces rise to power when citizens perceive that policy failures result from **the intentional acts or indifference of their representatives**. This creates a sense of grievance. Common grievances today include the sense that representatives are technocratic and deaf to voters' concerns about social and economic inequality (prevalent in Latin America) or immigration and government regulation (prevalent in Europe). Corruption scandals reinforce these concerns.

Although necessary, a context of grievance is still insufficient for populism – **populist political actors play an essential role in highlighting neglected issues and framing them in a populist way**. For example, while populist parties took advantage of the economic crisis in Greece to mobilize voters, populist messages were not pushed on the agenda in Ireland or Portugal in a similar context.

Political Institutions Play a Role in Constraining the Rise of Populist Forces

Populist forces almost always rise to power within democratic structures. Democratic political institutions in a country determine how easy it is for populist forces to enter the

legislative and executive branches of government. Two institutional structures are especially important. For one, **a country's electoral rules determine how open a political system is to newcomers** (both populist and non-populist).

The **type of executive is another crucial institutional factor**. It determines if voters elect their government directly (i.e. presidential systems) or if the government is responsible to a parliamentary majority, and hence, voted into office indirectly (i.e. parliamentary systems). More specifically, **presidential systems offer two distinct electoral routes to power** – the legislative and the executive branch. Unlike in parliamentary systems, the direct election of the executive offers populist contenders a chance to gain executive power even without a majority in the legislature, as Rafael Correa did in Ecuador in 2007 or Hugo Chávez did in Venezuela in 1999.

In **parliamentary systems**, however, populist parties may enter governing coalitions with established political parties, like the Freedom Party in Austria (FPÖ), the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands or the Danish People's Party (DF). In other cases, populist parties have gained majority control of the parliament on their own, like the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary.

Established Political Parties Play an Important Gatekeeping Role

Through their nominating rules, parties can determine whether or not populist candidates easily rise from within their ranks. At the same time, these same rules determine how readily parties can adapt their electoral appeal and address populist grievances. If established parties fail in their role as gatekeepers, populist forces may sometimes emerge from within them. This can happen when the leader of an established party, such as Fidesz in Hungary, transforms the party, or when an outsider captivates and transforms an established party, like Trump and the Republican Party in the United States.

The Media Play a Role in Amplifying Populist Messages and Polarizing Society

Like other politicians, populists rely on the media to transmit their messages to citizens. Media have traditionally played a gate-keeping role in politics by informing citizens and interpreting political events and political messages. However, three features of modern media have transformed that role and amplified the ability of populists to communicate their message. The first is **traditional media's** willingness to **engage in sensationalism to win market share**. If the country's media is concerned with viewership, they may try to exploit the attention that populist forces generate by amplifying populist message dissemination.

Second, **social media provides a tool for direct communication** that allows populists to work around gatekeepers in traditional media. Finally, the multiplication of media sources allows **citizens to choose news sources that confirm their prior beliefs**, a factor that facilitates social polarization and makes it difficult for traditional politicians to reach out to populist voters.

WHO SUPPORTS POPULISTS AND WHY?

As noted above, **populist attitudes are widespread among citizens and independent of the presence of populist forces in a country**. There is, however, little to no relationship between the potential demand for populism among the masses and the amount of populist supply offered by politicians, parties and movements.

At the same time, within countries with relevant populist forces, we find that **people with populist attitudes support and vote for populist politicians and engage with populist parties and movements**. Hence it is important to understand who supports populist forces and why.

Demographics of Populists are Dramatically Different from Radical Right Supporters

Unlike radical right sentiments, populist attitudes are **equally strong in men and women**, and are **unrelated to age, income or education**. Populism is only associated with **authoritarian personality, and anti-immigrant or xenophobic sentiments**, when **attached to the radical right**, making these topics prevalent issues of the political discourse. **These are not essential populist issues** and are only associated to the radical right character of some, but definitely not all, populists.

Ethnic Minorities Are Less Populist

The **majority ethnic group** in a country is **not necessarily more populist**, due to the diversity of opinions within this group. However, **ethnic minorities** are less likely to identify with the people-centric component of the populist message, and are **less likely to be populists**. The main exception is those who harbor **secessionist goals** (e.g. Scotland, Catalonia, or Quebec) where anti-elitist messages against the national government resonate.

Psychological Profiles of Populist Voters

Populist attitudes are also strongly associated with:

- **Lower personal life satisfaction;**
- **Conspiratorial thinking;**
- **Dissatisfaction with how democracy is working** (a perceived democratic deficit);
- **Feelings of being treated unfairly by the state and society** (relative deprivation);
- **Other grievances** which vary across social and national contexts.

Essentially, **psychological characteristics and social identity** seem **more important** in explaining populist attitudes **than demographics**.

Blame and Emotional Appeals Trigger Populist Attitudes

Since populist attitudes are present in societies independent of economic development, region, and the presence of populist forces, researchers explore the less obvious causes of how and when populist attitudes express themselves.

Political elites trigger populist attitudes in the masses using communication techniques. For example, **blaming problems on the actions of specific groups or individuals** rather than on impersonal events or circumstances, leads people to express more populist attitudes and support populist candidates. **Emotional triggers** that capitalize on **anger, fear and resentment also resonate**. Packaging political messages with these cues makes populist individuals **more likely to support both populist forces and their proposed policy solutions**.

Countering Populism with Positive Discourse

Can anything counterbalance populist attitudes? Ongoing research hones in on two possible counterweights: **positive emotional frames** (care, gratitude and happiness) and **mutual recognition of the others' views and their legitimacy or affirmation**. While we are optimistic that these factors may partially mitigate the expression of populist attitudes, psychological research suggests they will not fully outweigh negative triggers.

HOW DO WE RESPOND TO POPULISTS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT?

Traditional political parties, social movements, civil society actors and international organizations have responded to the populist challenge with a variety of strategies, both constitutional and extra-constitutional. In assessing these strategies, we need to consider contexts when a populist leader or party has been elected to executive of-

fice (Incumbents) versus when they are an emerging or growing party with some representation but not yet holding executive office (Challengers).

Constitutional Responses Emphasizing Engagement Rather Than Containment Are Most Successful

Engagement to respond to voter complaints. The first message is that **engagement with voters is the most successful strategy to counter populism, whether the populists are in or out of power**. Non-populists should proactively mobilize voters by acknowledging voter grievances and constructing their positive alternative, without succumbing to the temptation to copy the divisive appeal employed by populist forces. A tit-for-tat strategy of vilifying and dividing simply deepens the polarization.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (United States) exemplifies the engagement strategy. While using a less-polarizing discourse, he proposed massive social programs to address citizen concerns in the Great Depression in order to co-opt the radical populist appeals of politicians like Louisiana's Governor Huey Long.

Coalition-building to mobilize voters. Once in power, populist forces have demonstrated that they represent at least a plurality, if not a majority, of voters, and they persistently appeal to that mandate to enact their policies and reforms. **A counter-mobilization of voters therefore often requires a broad coalition of parties** both to challenge populist forces at the ballot box, and to challenge any behavior that restricts civil liberties and minority rights. The Venezuelan opposition coalition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) successfully challenged the Chavista's legislative dominance when they united to use the very electoral formulas enacted by Chávez to favor the majority party: in 2015 they won a two-thirds legislative majority. In contrast, fragmented oppositions in Hungary, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in 2016-18 election cycles failed to present credible challenges to populist governments.

Containment through legal limits on pop-

Political Responses to Populists In and Out of Government.

	Populist Incumbent	Populist Challenger
Constitutional Actions	Mobilize voters	Engagement: address voters' grievances with non-divisive messages
	Build a broad coalition	<i>Cordon sanitaire</i> : domestic containment
	Legal accountability: Impeachment or indictment	Third-party action: international containment
	Third-party action: Mediation, Incentives, Sanctions	
Extra-constitutional Actions	Electoral Boycott	Electoral coup: disqualifying parties or candidates
	Ousting the incumbent: Military or societal coup	
	Ousting the incumbent: Questionable impeachment	

ulist parties or candidates. In contrast to an engagement approach which proactively mobilizes voters, a **containment approach uses constitutional methods to limit the electoral or legal viability of the populist party or politician.** For example, judicial or legislative actions to indict or impeach a populist incumbent for cause can eliminate, at least temporarily, his/her viability. Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Melo was impeached in 1992 for corruption, and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was disqualified from running for office after indictment for tax fraud in 2013. This strategy, however, may not be long-lasting. We also note it is a favorite strategy of some populist incumbents, although often on dubious constitutional grounds, such as Maduro's disqualification of opposition candidates in Venezuela.

Containment through exclusion – a risky strategy. When populist forces are emerging as viable contenders, some countries take a *cordon sanitaire* approach to containment,

treating populist forces as a pariah. An example is how Austria's main parties treated the right populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) before 2000. **The risk of such ostracizing strategies is that they play into the populist message of an establishment political elite** excluding a significant sector of the population, and thus may increase the electoral appeal of the excluded party. Indeed, the FPÖ grew in size until it was included as junior partner with the conservative Austrian People's Party in a new moderation-through-inclusion strategy in the 2000 government coalition. The subsequent implosion of the FPÖ should not be taken as a sign of successful moderation-through-inclusion, however. Instead, the party fractured and the more radical wing that opposed moderation regained strength to again join the government as junior coalition partner in 2017.

Third-party international roles as supporting actors. Some longer-governing populists have expanded executive authority

and weakened accountability mechanisms. In these cases, it is a daunting task for domestic actors alone to challenge them. Third-parties are then called on to help mediate improved electoral conditions or to provide incentives and disincentives to dissuade the incumbent's abuse of power.

However, international attempts at containment also contain risks. Again in Austria, the European Union acting as third-party attempted to contain the FPÖ by a coordinated diplomatic sanctions strategy that pressured the dominant party to moderate the populist FPÖ. But foreign condemnation also caused a rally-around-the-flag effect within Austria.

The lesson for third party action is that it should play a supporting, rather than dominant, role to domestic actors, and that its effectiveness depends on the leverage enjoyed by the third party. A demoralized Venezuelan opposition, for example, counted on international leverage through sanctions and mediation to force President Nicolas Maduro to negotiate fair election conditions in 2018. When that failed, they divided over whether to participate in the unfair electoral process, and Maduro confirmed another six years in power. On the other hand, the coordination of the EU's leverage and the opposition strategy in Macedonia forced Gruevsky to improve electoral conditions and step down in 2016.

Extra-constitutional Responses Are Risky and Often Backfire

Extra-constitutional responses betray democratic principles and play into the hands of populists by confirming their fears about nefarious politicians conspiring against the people. Questionable impeachment processes by Congress or joint civil-military action to remove an unpopular incumbent can backfire in terms of public confidence in democratic institutions. The Honduran Supreme Court's secret order to the military to remove President Manuel Zelaya from power in 2009 resulted in a protracted constitutional conflict and eventually to international criticism and mass protests against Juan Or-

lando Hernandez's controversial re-election in 2017.

Electoral boycott is also a risky strategy. In unusual circumstances of sufficiently organized domestic opposition and international leverage, they may succeed in forcing an incumbent to improve electoral conditions, as when the Macedonian opposition threatened a boycott and the EU mediated new conditions for the 2016 election. But in general it is better to participate even in flawed elections and to force the government to compete than to allow it to win with no effort. Organized vote monitoring that unmasks fraud, in turn, can provide leverage to demand a change in the larger political rules of the game.

Failed opposition boycotts are exemplified in Venezuela. In the 2005 legislative elections, the opposition boycotted despite mediation by the Organization of American States (OAS) and EU to improve electoral conditions, thus paving the way for Chavez's complete control for the next decade.

Extra-constitutional responses may also threaten democracy itself. Repeated mass mobilizations by the "yellow-shirt" urban, middle-class protests in Thailand against Thaksin and Shinawatra eventually ended in 2014 with a coup that installed the military in power and that continues to block democratic elections today.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON POPULIST CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR MITIGATION

Several current research projects are assessing **additional consequences of populist attitudes and governments**. These include, but are not limited to, political polarization and tribalism, radicalization, citizen support for the erosion of core democratic institutions and for centralization of power in the hands of a populist executive.

The role of social movements and civil society organizations is also understudied, whether they may serve as gatekeepers or

are newly created as parallel sets of organizations in the polarized context of populism.

We need to better understand the **interaction of economic and cultural forces in creating the anxieties that feed populism**, including economic inequalities and declining mobility, or fears of diffusion of cultural values or group status in a society.

We also hope to find **institutional arrangements, interventions, communication and discursive strategies that mitigate** either populist attitudes or, more importantly, the **expression of these populist attitudes** in individuals who are susceptible to populist messages.

While unexplored to date, once the effects of populism set in and society polarizes greatly, **reconciliation strategies used in ethnic conflict, civil war or human rights atrocities** could be used to regain social cohesion in such contexts.

Finally, **populist foreign policy coordination** (such as the ALBA countries organized by Venezuela, or the Polish-Hungarian coordination in the EU) and their role in international relations are being studied.

TEAM POPULISM

Team Populism brings together renowned scholars from Europe and the Americas to study the causes and consequences of populism. We seek to answer why some populist parties, leaders or movements are more successful than others.

Our general argument is that populism is best understood as a combination of individual and contextual issues (“demand side”) and the availability of successful leaders (“supply side”).

We expand on this broad framework by studying multiple levels of analysis, and we draw on different methodological tools, including experiments, surveys, and comparative analysis. To facilitate this work, individual teams are organized around functional tasks.

FURTHER INFORMATION

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