Measuring Populism using Expert Surveys

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Populism is a phenomenon that has accompanied the study of Latin American and Western European politics for decades. The term itself has been broadly applied to disparate phenomena of movements, political parties or individual leaders. Conceptual diversity within and across continents, often reflecting scholars' emphasis on contextual specificities, has meant that empirically scholars have approached populism predominantly with single case or small-N studies (e.g. the edited volume of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Otjes and Louwerse 2015) or tended to concentrate on specific party families (De Lange 2008, March 2011). Yet, a lot of remaining puzzles regarding populism are comparative in nature. Why are populist parties more successful in some countries compared to others? What makes right populism more prominent in some countries and left populism more prominent in others? Do profiles of citizens voting for or feeling close to populist parties differ across contexts?

Collecting expert judgments can provide the means to create a comparative data set covering parties and party systems in Europe and Latin America to be able to answer such questions. Expert surveys provide information on some objective or subjective state of the world based on a review by persons with comprehensive and authoritative knowledge of the area in question. The use of expert surveys, the results of which are typically aggregated into some form of mean or consensus opinion, is especially useful to provide information on complex phenomena (Benoit and Wiesehomeier 2009). Hence, expert judgments can render information on quantities or qualities which are deemed real, but are difficult to observe directly, such as policy positions of political actors in a given country or their degree of populism. The resulting data can then be used to explore both, individual level questions by for instance linking survey data to party positions and questions about party systems at the aggregate level. In addition, the expert survey method combines speed and economy of deployment, while at the same time providing the possibility of covering a large number of

parties, a feature that is especially attractive in contexts in which party manifestos may be difficult to obtain or we encounter rather fluid situations — both not uncommon in Latin American politics.

The underlying assumption of expert surveys is of course that the key substantive issues on which judgments are sought can be identified in advance, based on the substantive understanding of these issues by those conducting the research. Respondents are then presented with these predefined questions or scales and asked to use their best judgments in answering these questions or placing given actors, issues, or events on the predefined scales. Hence, using expert surveys successfully requires that each scale deployed in the surveys is given a precise title, and is anchored at each end with two precise substantive definitions of the scale endpoints. This not only requires a careful weighing of the pros and cons of generality against more detailed phrasing of the endpoints, but also – and especially in the case of a concept such as populism – a solid theoretical foundation.

In the following I will report results of two waves of expert surveys done in 2011/2012 and 2015 in Argentina and Brazil soliciting judgments from academics with a high degree of specialized knowledge about party politics in their own national contexts. These surveys employed different strategies to measure the degree of populism of a total of 31 parties and two presidents. Both studies are based on a minimal conception of populism as a 'thin-centered' ideology (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). However, while the earlier study specified the endpoints of the populism scale as a higher-level dimension in more detail and thus set out to measure populism as a single dimension, the second study disaggregated these endpoints to measure positioning of political actors on three constituting elements of populism separately. Although this means, of course, that both approaches do not differ significantly in their substantial understanding of populism, they differ in how they structure the metrics on which expert judgments are sought. In addition, the second wave used an alternative operationalization of populism based on the saliency of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric.

Combined both studies allow to test whether all three elements are part and parcel of populism, how populism relates to the general left-right ideological dimension, and whether populism understood in terms of saliency differs from populism understood as a 'thin-centered' ideology.

POPULISM

In recent years conceptual discussions surrounding populism have coalesced around dominant conceptions of it as a thin-centered ideology, a discourse or a strategy. Weyland (2001), for instance, defines populism as a political strategy used by leaders to appeal to a heterogeneous electorate, emphasizing a personalistic relationship. Mudde (2004: 543) argues that populism should be understood "[…] as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté general* (general will) of the people" (see also Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). As Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) points out, conceiving of populism in this way is ultimately rooted in a discursive approach (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Equally Hawkins and Riding (2009) highlight that the idea of populist discourse is the underlying logic that actually unites the different conceptualizations of populism that have been put forward so far.

Defining populism as a 'thin-centered' ideology and acknowledging its discursive elements provides a fruitful basis for the comparative study of this phenomenon. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2011) and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) argue, reduced to its constituting elements, such a conceptionalization detaches populism from normative connotations and thus facilitates empirical studies on its causes and consequences. It acknowledges that the opposing poles of "the people" vs. "the elite" can be framed in different ways by political actors. This not only means that such accounts are likely to be context specific, but also that, as a thin-centered ideology, populism is likely to become manifest in combination with ideologies we commonly locate on the general left-right dimension. Thus, populism constitutes an orthogonal cleavage to the dimension of the general left-right, a separate dimension with endpoints defined by populists vs. anti-populists (Ostiguy 2009).

This minimal conception allows us to treat populism as a continuum and to capture degrees of populism, moving away from a simple categorization of parties and leaders as populist or not. However, exploiting the full range of the dimension 'populism' begs the question of how to define its opposing pole. It is commonly argued that populism has, in fact, two opposing poles, elitism and pluralism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). While elitism effectively reverses the morality attached to "the people" and "the elite", pluralism acknowledges the different groups that constitute the social fabric of a country, favors the diffusion of power, and emphasizes deliberation and consensus. In the context of political competition, most parties adhere to the pluralist worldview as part and parcel of liberal

democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p.153). Hence, I treat populism as a continuum with two opposing endpoints of populism vs. pluralism.

MEASURING POPULISM:
HIGHER-LEVEL VS. LOWER-LEVEL DIMENSIONS

Expert surveys constitute an explicit *a priori* approach to measuring political phenomena of interest which present respondents with predefined scales. This *a priori* nature gives the researcher complete flexibility of perceiving the policy space as low or high-dimensional and detaches the researcher from any posterior interpretation of the dimensions, an interpretation that is not unambiguous as it risks being influenced by the researcher's own interests and perspectives. Yet, the questions of interest must be clearly identified and phrasing of the endpoints must be carefully chosen to elicit valid responses on these questions.

Parting from the idea that populism is a continuous dimension, the first wave of expert surveys aimed at capturing the complexity of populism as a higher-level bundle of attributes combined in a single metric. The challenge thus consisted in devising substantive definitions of the scale endpoints that were sufficiently precise to capture the constituting elements of populism and its opposing pole pluralism. Through a process of revisions in consultation with leading scholars in the field of populism[1], the final wording deployed asked country experts to locate political parties and presidents along a 20-point scale, where 1 indicated the populist end defined as

- "Highlights the interest of the people, with reference to the sovereign will of the majority. Condemns the ruling class and interest groups. Emphasizes personal authority, capable of leadership and a decisive resolution of problems. Uses an informal style and slang." (1)

and 20 indicated the pluralist position defined as

- "Highlights the interests of citizens, with references to civic or republican values. Recognizes the ruling class and interest groups as legitimate. Emphasizes impersonal authority, the formality of procedures and separation of powers. Uses a "well educated" style and more formal language." (20)

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[1] My thanks go to Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Kirk Hawkins (and two anonymous students) and Pierre Ostiguy for feedback and discussions.

The definitions of the endpoints thus contrast the different elements present in the substantive understanding of populism and their corresponding opposites of pluralism, adding the "high" and the "low" in politics in the sense of Ostiguy (2009). To explore how populism relates to other policy dimensions and whether in fact it constitutes an orthogonal cleavage to left-right, in addition, the surveys asked experts to also judge positions of political actors on up to 11 distinct policy dimensions, the general left-right axis, vignettes on left-right and the sympathy dimension. This first wave of expert surveys was deployed in Argentina in 2011 and in Brazil in 2012.

As the first approach uses definitions of endpoints that contain several constituent dimensions which are potentially separable, their bundling into a higher-level, single *a priori* dimension by the design of the survey makes it possible only to measure positions on these different elements together. The second wave of expert surveys therefore aimed at assessing populism on very specific, potentially separable dimensions and to devise more concise and straightforward wordings for the endpoints of these separate dimensions. The underlying idea here is of course that it may very well be possible for an actor to score high for populism on one of those elements, e.g. engaging in the use of informal language, but to exhibit pluralist tendencies on others. Measuring the constituting elements on separate dimensions therefore allows exploring potential variability in this data and how they relate to each other.

References to leadership qualities were considered no essential and dropped altogether. This left three elements that needed to be located on different dimensions. This was rather unproblematic in the case of the part capturing the "high" and "low" in politics. As a separate dimension, the wording of the opposite endpoints remained the essential same, in which a score of 1 indicates the populist endpoint and a score of 20 indicates the "pluralist" opposite.

- Uses an informal style and popular language. (1)
- Uses a "well educated" style and more formal language. (20)

It nevertheless proved to be more challenging to devise substantive definitions for the endpoints of the remaining elements that would be precise, yet neutral. Hence, the wording needed to avoid ambiguities while making sure that it would be capturing the essence of the two opposing camps of the pure people and the corrupt elite. The final wording is the result of several rounds of revisions, in which different versions of the wordings were tested in small

focus groups with students and staff at Brigham Young University and Swansea University. Additional feedback was again sought from experts in the field of populism.[2]

Terms such as "the will of the majority" or the "unified will of the common people", for instance, triggered confusion and were not interpreted by participants in an unequivocal way as signalling populism. This made it necessary to adapt the wording of this element that in its final version aims at capturing the degree to which the pure people, the heartland of the nation (Taggart 2000), are emphasized opposite a pluralist understanding of society.

- Identifies with the common people and celebrates their authenticity. (1)
- Refers more generally to citizens and their unique interests. (20)

In a similar vein, the expression "treating opponents as legitimate" appeared difficult to match to populist conduct and a reference to a "corrupt elite" was equally not unambiguous, regarding both, the question of who constitutes the elite and what would be considered as corrupt. Hence, the element trying to measure the degree of anti-elitism vis-à-vis the tolerance of divergent and dissenting opinions was adapted accordingly.

- Demonizes and vilifies opponents. (1)
- Treats opponents with respect (20)

In addition to these three elements the survey included a scale that aims at capturing populism in terms of saliency for the political actor in question.[3] The Chapel Hill expert survey version of populism asks respondents to judge how important anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric is to an actor, with a scale ranging from not important at all (1) to extremely important (20). As with the first wave before, in addition to these populism dimensions, the surveys asks experts to also judge positions of political actors on a number of distinct policy dimensions, the general left-right axis, vignettes on left-right and the sympathy dimension. This second set of surveys was deployed in Spring/Summer 2015.

It has to be pointed out that in both waves these dimensions were not presented to respondents as asking for their judgment of political parties and presidents on populism. As this term is still rather contentious, any mention of this term was avoided to not introduce any

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[2] Again, my thanks go to Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Kirk Hawkins and his students and colleagues and to my own students for feedback and discussions.

[3] Thanks to Gary Marks and Ryan Bakker from the team of the Chapel Hill expert survey project on party positioning on European integration

potential bias. Rather, the title of these dimensions indicated that the survey was eliciting judgments on political communication of political parties and the president.

RESULTS

We start our exploration with the results of the second wave. Figure 1 shows three different scatter plots contrasting positioning on the three dimensions 'common people', 'vilify', and 'style' for twelve parties and ex-president Cristina Kirchner in Argentina. The upper left pane clearly shows that identifying with common people and celebrating their authenticity goes hand in hand with vilifying opponents – both dimensions have a correlation of 0.97. Likewise we find a clear connection between using an informal style and the identification with common people and disrespecting opponents. The relationships, however, are not as strong. As the upper right pane indicates, the correlation between style and common people is 0.80, while the lower left panes shows a slightly weaker correlation of 0.70 between style and respecting or disrespecting opponents.

Ex-president Cristina Kirchner and her Peronist wing *PJ – Frente para la Victoria* (PJ-FPV) can be considered the most populist actors within the Argentine political system, scoring low on all three dimensions. *Propuesta Republicana* (PRO), the party of the current incumbent Mauricio Macri populates the other end of the scale, together with a mix of moderate left-wing, centric and conservative parties. However, on the dimension of style *Coalicion Civica para la Afirmacion de una Republica Igualtaria* (CC-ARI) seems to be a clear outlier within this mix of parties, as it is judged to be using a rather informal style and popular language.

Figure 2 shows the results for Brazil. Similar to the results for Argentina, with a correlation of 0.85, positioning of 18 parties and president Dilma Rousseff shows a clear positive relationship of identifying with the common people and disrespecting opponents. However, the figure also indicates that overall the political system is governed by a more respectful tone as the regression line is lying above the cross-lines indicating the midpoints of both dimensions. In general, political actors in Brazil appear to use a rather informal style of communication as the upper right and the lower left panes indicate. Only the *Partido Verde* (PV) and the *Partido Popular Socialista* (PPS) barely stray across the line indicating the dimension's midpoint and are thus judged to exhibit a more educating style. Contrary to Argentina, the president and her party are judged to be further apart from each other on each dimension and overall the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) appears to have larger populist tendencies than president Dilma Rousseff.

Figure 1: Argentina, contrasting three constituting elements of populism, wave 2015

Figure 2. Brasil, contrasting three constituting elements of populism, wave 2015

As we are interested in capturing populism as a single dimension and to compare it to the measurement of populism based on saliency, the general left-right dimension and of course to the indicator of populism measured as a higher-level dimension obtained from the first wave, we can use these three separate elements to construct an additive index. Unsurprisingly, in the case of Argentina Crohnbach's alpha for this index is with 0.92 quite high. In the case of Brazil, the inclusion of the dimension of the dimension of 'style' leads to a still reasonable alpha of 0.64.[4]

Figure 3 shows the results of the comparisons for Argentina. The upper left hand pane highlights that the populism index and the saliency measure of anti-elite rhetoric are indeed related. Political actors that are judged to be populist on the combined index also tend to attribute a high importance to anti-elite rhetoric. With -0.61, the correlation is moderate though. Two parties, *Peronismo Federal* (PF) and *Frente Renovador* (FR), populate the lower off-diagonal quadrant, scoring higher for populism, but lower for anti-elite rhetoric. Anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, however, appears to be quite strongly related to the general left-right dimension, as indicated by a correlation of -0.78, although two moderate left parties, the *Partido Socialista* (PS) and *Generacion para un Encuentro Nacional* (GEN), are located in the lower off-diagonal quadrant, showing less proclivity of using anti-elite rhetoric, while one small centric party, the *Frente Civico por Santiago* (FCS), sits in the upper off-diagonal quadrant, judged to be enganging more in anti-establishment rhetoric than its ideological equals. Contrary to the pattern observed between the populism indicator based on saliency and the general left-right, the populism indicator constructed from the three constituting elements used in this survey does not show any relationship with the general left-right, a result that confirms the pattern observed in the first wave of expert surveys.

Figure 4 highlights similar patterns for Brazil. Although a trend is visible, with a correlation of -0.57, the upper left hand pane shows a weaker relationship between the populism index based on all three elements and the saliency measure.[5] The results also indicate that this relationship is predominantly driven by three parties, the *Partido Comunista do Brasil* (PC do B), the *Partido Socialismo E Liberdade* (PSOL), and the presidential party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), that are perceived as both, being populist actors and to be emphasizing anti-elite rhetoric. The relationship between the general left-right ideological

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[4] Exluding this dimension from the index pushes alpha up to 0.91. For the sake of comparison I will present the results for the index using all three elements. The results presented in the following do not differ starkly from what is presented here when the style element is excluded.

[5] Excluding the element of informal style and popular language strengthens this relationship to a correlation of -0.73.

dimension and the saliency measure of populism is, in turn, very strong, and with a correlation of -0.91 even stronger than in the case of Argentina.


Figure 3: Argentina: Populism, anti-elite rhetoric and the general left-right

Figure 4: Brazil: Populism, anti-elite rhetoric and the general left-right

The relationship between the populism index and the general left-right is, however, much weaker. Yet, while the contrast of the higher-level populism dimension and the general left-right from the first round of expert surveys suggested that both dimensions are indeed orthogonal to each other, with a correlation of 0.45, the second round shows a positive relationship.[6] The same three left-wing parties highlighted as before are judged to be more populist in 2015 compared to 2012, while *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB), *Partido Popular Socialista* (PPS) and *Partido Verde* (PV) are perceived to have moved more towards a pluralist position. It is conceivable that these results of the expert surveys from 2015 highlight shifts in the Brazilian party system stemming from the legislative and presidential electoral contest of October 2014.

Figure 5: Comparison between both expert survey waves

Figure 5 may help to shed light on this possibility. The left part of the figure contrasts the results of the first and the second expert survey wave of positioning of political actors on the general left-right in Argentina and Brazil, while the right side contrast the measures of populism obtained by both rounds of surveys. Comparing these sets of measures that are trying to capture the exact same underlying quantity – in one case the location of political

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[6] Again, this correlation gains in strength when the style dimension is excluded from the index (0.69).

actors on a general ideological dimension of left-right, in the other case on a dimension of populism vs. pluralism – may help us to cross-validate our results and thus to increase our confidence in the results obtained.[7]

For both countries, the left-right scores of both sets of expert surveys match up almost perfectly. With 0.97 in the case of Argentina and 0.99 in the case of Brazil, both correlations are extremely high. As the upper right-hand pane shows, with a correlation of 0.98 the high-level and the low-level approach of measuring populism show an equally high correlation in the case of Argentina. Only the party *Coalicion Civica para la Afirmacion de una Republica Igualtaria* (CC-ARI) stands out as being judged as slightly more populist in 2015 compared to 2011. The comparison of both measures for Brazil, however, confirms previous patterns. Not only does it show a much less pronounced party system in terms of populism, but it also highlights the same three left-wing parties that emerge as outliers. Compared to 2012, the *Partido Comunista do Brasil* (PC do B), the *Partido Socialismo E Liberdade* (PSOL), and the presidential party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) appear more populist than in 2011. Hence, with 0.28 the correlation between both approaches is quite weak. Removing these three parties increases the correlation to 0.67.[8]

CONCLUSION

This paper has reported results of two waves of expert surveys applying two different approaches of measuring populism. It has highlighted the importance of carefully designing expert surveys, above all the careful weighing of the pros and cons of generality against more detailed phrasing of the endpoints, and the contrast of measuring populism on a single metric / high-level dimension and as low-level dimensions on separable elements. The results show that an informal vs. a 'well-educated' style, the 'high' and 'low' in politics according to Ostiguy (2009) does not necessarily form part of populism, while the identification with common people and demonizing the opponent, in turn, seem closely related. Both approaches, however, result in considerable agreement when it comes to locating political actors on a populism vs. pluralism dimension. Future iterations will have to probe in much detail into efforts of external validation, for instance with results obtained by the PELA project.

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[7] So far no direct external validation is available for these measurements.

[8] Equally, removing *Partido Popular Socialista* (PPS) and *Partido Verde* (PV) that are judged as more pluralist strengthens the correlation further (0.77).

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APPENDIX

Country	Year	Party Abbreviation	Left-Right Score	N	SD	Populism Score	N	SD
ARG	2011	SUR	4.72	25	2.59	9.90	20	4.42
ARG	2011	PS	5.73	26	2.38	14.87	23	4.24
ARG	2011	Encuentro	6.59	22	2.48	9.42	19	3.76
ARG	2011	GEN	7.91	23	2.64	13.95	20	3.68
ARG	2011	**FpV-PJ-K**	7.92	26	3.22	4.68	25	3.78
ARG	2011	**Christina Kirchner**	8.27	26	3.50	4.63	24	4.01
ARG	2011	UCR	10.36	25	1.32	14.79	24	3.45
ARG	2011	CC	10.38	26	2.23	14.46	24	3.90
ARG	2011	MPN	14.20	20	3.66	8.36	14	5.27
ARG	2011	Peronismo Federal	14.46	26	2.61	8.29	24	5.05
ARG	2011	PRO	15.46	26	2.64	12.73	22	4.60
BRA	2012	PSOL	2.86	21	3.26	10.57	14	6.64
BRA	2012	PC do B	4.33	21	3.73	10.71	14	5.66
BRA	2012	**PT**	5.43	21	2.91	10.29	14	5.65
BRA	2012	**Dilma Rousseff**	6.38	21	3.35	11.93	14	4.73
BRA	2012	PDT	6.71	21	2.63	7.71	14	4.56
BRA	2012	PV	8.16	19	3.08	9.93	14	4.76
BRA	2012	PPS	9.63	19	3.13	9.92	13	5.19
BRA	2012	PMDB	10.65	20	2.56	9.36	14	4.20
BRA	2012	PSDB	12	21	3.02	12.5	14	4.24
BRA	2012	PTB	13.6	20	4.26	8.69	13	5.15
BRA	2012	PR	14.7	20	2.56	9.69	13	5.45
BRA	2012	PSC	15.83	18	3.37	8.29	13	5.87
BRA	2012	PP	16.52	21	4.70	9.77	13	5.26
BRA	2012	DEM	16.71	21	2.63	10.86	14	5.63

Table 1: Populism as high-level dimension. Mean scores for populism and left-right dimension, Standard Deviation (SD) and Ns. President and president's party in bold.

Country	Party Abbreviation	Common people	N	Standard Deviation	Vilify opponent	N	Standard Deviation
ARG	FIT	11.25	20	4.38	11	18	5.29
ARG	SUR	10.26	19	4.85	9.5	18	4.78
ARG	PS	14.74	23	4.50	14.15	20	4.04
ARG	Encuentro	11.29	17	3.48	10.06	17	3.63
ARG	GEN	14.65	23	3.04	14.3	20	3.40
ARG	**FpV-PJ-K**	4.87	23	2.58	4.33	21	2.67
ARG	**Christina Kirchner**	6.04	23	3.14	4.43	21	3.08
ARG	FCS	7.2	10	3.71	6	9	4.15
ARG	UCR	13.91	23	2.95	14.05	20	3.00
ARG	CC	13.86	21	4.53	11.43	21	4.04
ARG	FR	9.35	23	4.03	6.65	20	4.64
ARG	Peronismo Federal	7.35	23	3.43	5.95	20	3.47
ARG	PRO	12.70	23	3.75	13.48	21	6.03
BRA	PSOL	6	14	4.11	9.71	14	6.79
BRA	PC do B	6.8	15	4.46	9.07	14	7.27
BRA	**PT**	6.93	14	4.01	8.92	13	6.68
BRA	**Dilma Rousseff**	10.27	15	5.85	11.85	13	6.57
BRA	PDT	7,47	15	3.89	8.5	14	5.89
BRA	PV	14	13	4.58	13.7	10	5.48
BRA	PPS	14.21	14	4.90	14.46	11	4.01
BRA	PMDB	12	15	4.50	12.71	14	6.04
BRA	SD	11.25	8	6.25	9.86	7	6.64
BRA	PSDB	16.2	15	4,65	16.61	13	3.62
BRA	PTB	9	14	5.32	10.83	12	6.33
BRA	PROS	9.89	9	5.75	13.13	8	5.77
BRA	PSD	13.9	10	5.86	13.13	8	6.42
BRA	PRB	11	6	5.29	10.57	7	5.88
BRA	PR	11.75	12	4.41	15.91	11	4.7
BRA	PSC	15.17	12	5.29	14.09	11	5.8
BRA	PP	12.93	15	5.66	13.62	13	6.23
BRA	DEM	14.6	15	5.12	16.14	14	4.62

Table 2: Populism as low-level dimension, elements 1 and 2. Mean scores for populism and left-right dimension, Standard Deviation (SD) and Ns. President and president's party in bold

Country	Party Abbreviation	Informal	N	Standard Deviation	Anti	N	Standard Deviation
ARG	FIT	7.33	21	5,72	15.7	20	5.93
ARG	SUR	8.4	20	5.13	14.63	19	4.50
ARG	PS	15.43	23	3.50	8.2	20	4.56
ARG	Encuentro	9.4	20	5.58	13.88	17	4.96
ARG	GEN	14.83	23	3.35	9.05	20	3.89
ARG	**FpV-PJ-K**	3.87	23	3.33	15.90	21	5.35
ARG	**Christina Kirchner**	2.96	23	2.55	16.05	21	6.10
ARG	FCS	8.78	9	6.72	12.78	9	6.18
ARG	UCR	13.61	23	4.76	8.57	21	6.00
ARG	CC	6.95	21	5.48	7.37	19	5.64
ARG	FR	9.61	23	4.21	6.63	19	4.62
ARG	Peronismo Federal	8.13	23	3.62	7.85	20	4.28
ARG	PRO	12.30	23	6.09	6	21	6.84
BRA	PSOL	7.42	12	6.39	17.69	16	3.05
BRA	PC do B	8.42	12	6.07	16.36	14	4.92
BRA	**PT**	6.69	13	4.48	14.13	16	6.25
BRA	**Dilma Rousseff**	10.54	13	6.40	11	15	6.05
BRA	PDT	9.25	12	4.69	9.2	15	5.52
BRA	PV	11.44	9	5.79	8.31	13	6.33
BRA	PPS	11.73	11	5.75	9.79	14	6.00
BRA	PMDB	9.58	12	4.62	4.81	16	4.46
BRA	SD	5.17	6	4.40	5.57	9	5.43
BRA	PSDB	9.67	12	6.26	3.75	16	3.49
BRA	PTB	9.45	11	4.78	7.92	12	6.27
BRA	PROS	8.29	7	6.45	7.78	9	5.87
BRA	PSD	6.86	7	6.36	4.4	10	5.08
BRA	PRB	4.67	6	4.41	4.22	9	3.90
BRA	PR	6.44	9	5.61	4	14	3.98
BRA	PSC	5.86	8	4.73	6.15	13	6.73
BRA	PP	6.55	11	5.09	4.4	15	4.88
BRA	DEM	6.42	12	4.69	3.31	16	3.72

Table 3: Populism as low-level dimension, element 3 and Chapel Hill question. Mean scores for populism and left-right dimension, Standard Deviation (SD) and Ns. President and president's party in bold

Country	Party Abbreviation	Left-Right 2011/12	N	Standard Deviation	Left-Right 2015	N	Standard Deviation
ARG	FIT	-	-	-	1.83	23	1.30
ARG	SUR	4.72	25	2.59	4.05	22	2.59
ARG	PS	5.73	26	2.38	6.58	24	2.73
ARG	Encuentro	6.59	22	2.48	4.45	22	2.39
ARG	GEN	7.91	23	2.64	8.04	23	2.57
ARG	FpV-PJ-K	7.92	26	3.22	7.08	24	2.95
ARG	Christina Kirchner	8.27	26	3.50	6.96	24	3.16
ARG	FCS	-	-	-	11.1	10	3.41
ARG	UCR	10.36	25	1.32	11.38	24	2.89
ARG	CC	10.38	26	2.23	11.43	21	4.04
ARG	MPN	14.20	20	3.66	-	-	-
ARG	FR	-	-	-	14.35	23	3.72
ARG	Peronismo Federal	14.46	26	2.61	14.78	23	3.64
ARG	PRO	15.46	26	2.64	16.46	24	2.45
BRA	PSOL	2.86	21	3.26	2.78	18	3.80
BRA	PC do B	4.33	21	3.73	3.67	18	4.12
BRA	PT	5.43	21	2.91	6.22	18	3.67
BRA	Dilma	6.38	21	3.35	6.22	18	3.54
BRA	PDT	6.71	21	2.63	8.5	18	2.71
BRA	PV	8.16	19	3.08	9.13	15	4.78
BRA	PPS	9.63	19	3.13	10.13	16	4.26
BRA	PMDB	10.65	20	2.56	11.72	18	2.30
BRA	SD	-	-	-	12.71	14	4.68
BRA	PSDB	12	21	3.02	13.83	18	4.12
BRA	PTB	13.6	20	4.26	13.19	16	4.35
BRA	PROS	-	-	-	13.5	12	5.74
BRA	PSD	-	-	-	13.62	13	4.59
BRA	PRB	-	-	-	15.92	13	4.35
BRA	PR	14.7	20	2.56	16.56	16	4.08
BRA	PSC	15.83	18	3.37	17.25	16	2.62
BRA	PP	16.52	21	4.70	16.94	18	4.01
BRA	DEM	16.71	21	2.63	17.59	17	2.87

Country	Language	Total number of dimensions	Targeted Experts / survey	Number of parties
Argentina	Spanish	16	126	12
Bolivia	Spanish	17	61	7
Brasil	Portuguese	16	95	18
Chile	Spanish	16	62	10
Colombia	Spanish	16	66	10
Costa Rica	Spanish	16	53	8
Ecuador	Spanish	17	64	11
El Salvador	Spanish	17	30	6
Guatemala	Spanish	17	35	12
Honduras	Spanish	17	24	7
Mexico	Spanish	17	114	8
Nicaragua	Spanish	17	51	7
Panamá	Spanish	16	30	6
Paraguay	Spanish	17	37	8
Perú	Spanish	17	52	12
Rep. Dom.	Spanish	17	35	5
Uruguay	Spanish	16	37	6
Venezuela	Spanish	16	102	12
		Total	**1074**	**165**

Table 4: Survey details for 2015 round, 18 Latin American countries