

**THE POLITICAL LONGEVITY OF EVO MORALES AND MAS: A TEST OF  
THEORIES OF POPULISM**

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## *I. Introduction*

In October 2014, Evo Morales achieved a rare feat in modern politics in Latin America. He was re-elected for a third consecutive presidential term. The result was less than surprising but illustrates the leader's continued command and dominance of a political system that allows for free and relatively fair elections. The 61.4% of votes that Morales received, and a striking victory margin of 37%, are the products of a confluence of factors—economic considerations, positive evaluations of government performance, ethnicity, and the significant electoral advantages incumbency conferred.

In this paper I examine the underlying motivations of Bolivian voters by analyzing individual-level data culled from the Americasbarometer surveys, and draw on information obtained from semi-structured interviews from fieldwork in May and June 2015. Generally speaking, I find that citizens who had positive retrospective evaluations of the economy and favored a more nationalized economy, believed that the government was combatting corruption, had stronger beliefs that government improved citizen's security, felt that government protected the environment, and who self-identified as indigenous were more likely to vote for Morales.

The paper progresses in the following manner. I offer an overview of Morales' electoral success; I provide a literature review that develops hypotheses aimed at explaining why Bolivians voted for Morales over time; I employ quantitative methods to analyze survey responses and assess my hypotheses; then I examine evidence to confirm that these explanations affected the electoral contest; and I conclude with a discussion of Morales's electoral strategy and evolving base of support.

## *II. Description of Morales' Electoral Success and Populist Politics*

Evo Morales and his MAS party first emerged in Bolivian politics in the early 2000s but swept to victory in 2005 with 53.7% of the national vote, becoming the first president in Bolivia's post-authoritarian era to claim a majority. Morales' ascent to power was the product of strong support among coca growers and indigenous groups in Bolivia and other disillusioned middle class voters who embodied high levels of resentment toward the Bolivian established and traditional political order (Shifter 2004; Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005). He campaigned in 2005 by framing his political discourse around the issue of indigenous identity and crafted his rhetoric in such a way as to appeal to the historically excluded sectors of Bolivia (Haarstad & Andersson 2009). However, Morales was careful to not exclude or polarize potential white or mestizo voters, and employed inclusively ethnic and populist appeals (Madrid, 2012). During his time in office, Morales has continued to make direct appeals to the masses (Carrion 2009, Kohl 2010) and generate ethnic appeals (Madrid 2008).

Table 1 below illustrates Morales' vote share in presidential elections for 2005, 2009, and 2014. There is a clear picture of national and increasing electoral dominance for Morales, as he progressed from winning 6 out of 9 national departments in 2005 to winning 8 in 2014. Additionally, his national vote share increased from 53.9% in 2005 to a high of 63.9% in 2009, it dropped to a still remarkable 61% in 2014. The table below also illustrates Morales' vote share disaggregated by national department, indicating that he lost significant electoral ground in 2014 in the traditional MAS strongholds La Paz and Oruro, while continuing his drastic electoral

advancements in the opposition's stronghold—the eastern Media Luna—of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija.

**Table 1: Vote Share for Evo Morales in Presidential Elections, 2005-2014, by Department**

Department	2005	2009	Change (Vote Share/ Victory Margin)	2014	Change (Vote Share/ Victory Margin)
Chukisaca	54.2	56.1	+1.9/ -0.8	63.4	+7.3/ +24.7
La Paz	66.6	80.3	+13.7/ +23.1	68.9	-11.4/ -17.4
Cochabamba	64.8	68.8	+4.0/ +4.5	66.7	-2.1/ +3.0
Oruro	62.6	79.5	+16.9/ +32.4	66.4	-13.1/ -18.4
Potosí	57.8	60.6	+2.8/ +41.9	69.5	+8.9/ -23.4
Tarija	31.6	51.1	+19.5/ +26.5	51.7	+0.6/ +12.3
Santa Cruz	33.2	40.9	+7.7/ -8.1	49.0	+8.1/ +20.9
Beni	16.5	37.7	+21.2/ +14.3	41.5	+3.8/ +5.5
Pando	20.9	44.5	+23.6/ +17.7	52.1	+7.6/ +17.7
National	53.7	63.9	+10.2/ -2.9	61.0	-2.9/ -0.7

Sources: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Significant academic research has focused on explaining MAS and Morales' emergence (Madrid 2008, 2012; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Zuazo 2008; to name a few) in the early 2000s. In this paper, I focus on the factors that help explain the political longevity of Latin America's longest currently and continuously serving executive. Additionally, the case of Morales is interesting from a study of populism perspective, as the 2014 election presented a unique challenge for the president—after nearly a decade in office, he could no longer portray

himself as a populist outsider challenging the corrupt and deficient political establishment. He was now viewed as the political establishment.

### *III. Explaining Morales' Electoral Success*

In attempting to explain why voters may have voted for and continued to vote for Evo Morales, I develop hypotheses from the populism literature. Many of these explanations were aimed at explaining populist emergence. In line with what other scholars have argued, the processes of emergence or electoral breakthrough and governance are distinct, and may not have the same explanations (Mudde 2007, 202; Kaltwasser 2014, 187), especially for a leader who has won three successive elections. Therefore, I try to modify them to account for why Bolivians may continue to support Morales. Additionally, I draw on the broader voting behavior literature and consider certain national events specific to Bolivia to account for why citizens may (not) continue to support him in office.

The outcome that I explain in this paper is citizen voting intention and behavior, thus I examine demand-side explanations. I assess some of these factors—the incumbency advantage, the role of corruption, low citizen trust in public institutions, socioeconomic performances by government, the presence of populist ideas among citizens, environmental concerns, and demographic variables.

#### *I) Incumbency Factor*

As a study on voting behavior in Latin America, I start with the consideration that an incumbent is seeking re-election. The hyper-presidential systems of Latin America provide a

very favorable electoral environment for incumbents. These leaders are the most visible political figures to the public as media campaign coverage centers on them, and allows for the possibility that the candidate may utilize state resources that can be distributed in a patrimonial fashion for electoral gain. Since 1995, when free and fair elections started to become routine in Latin America, only one president has lost a bid for re-election: Hipólito Mejía in the 2004 Dominican contest. Within the specific Bolivian context, Evo Morales has been in office since his first electoral victory in 2005, and is without doubt the face of his political party, and arguably the political system of the country. Although tough to measure the impact on voting behavior directly, one should witness certain observable implications of the advantage: namely, media coverage of Morales should dwarf that of the other candidates, and Morales' use of public resources and public office for electoral gain.<sup>1</sup>

## *II) Perceptions of corruption*

Corruption has long been a feature of Latin American societies. Most countries (with the exceptions of Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay) score poorly on International Governmental Organizations' (IGOs) annual rankings (Transparency International's annual corruption perceptions indices and the World Bank's World Governance Indicators).<sup>2</sup> More broadly, Weyland (1998) demonstrated that corruption in Latin America has increased since the shift

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<sup>1</sup> Since this is not a cross-national study, I do not include a specific variable in my models to account for the incumbency factor. For an excellent review on the effects of incumbency that enhances the clarity of the concept, see de Ferrari (2014). However, later in the paper I examine specific aspects of Morales' incumbency advantage: the disproportionate media coverage in his favor, the practice of launching government projects during the campaign, and specific electoral rules that handicap the opposition.

<sup>2</sup> Using the World Bank's "control of corruption" measure, only Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay score in the top 50 percentile of countries in the world from 1996-2011 ([http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc\\_chart.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp), accessed 5/30/2013).

from military to democratic rule; while Seligson (2002, 2006) persuasively argues that citizens' experience with corruption has decreased the legitimacy of political systems in some Latin American countries.<sup>3</sup> Amid corruption scandals and negative IGO reports painting national governments in a bad light, political actors are increasingly likely to act in a populist fashion.

The populist narrative emphasizes that popular government has been subverted by a conspiring minority who seek to advance their own personal interests at the disadvantage of society (Hawkins 2010). From 2002 to 2005, Morales denounced traditional political parties and elites, accusing them of rampant corruption, and ran a campaign on a pledge to reform the political system once elected (Madrid 2012, 39). Due to the fact that Morales successfully campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, one would expect that voters were hopeful that corruption would decrease during his time in office. Failure to comply with this electoral promise during his tenure would likely erode citizen confidence in him, possibly enticing voters to seek out alternatives. In line with other recent studies on Latin American voting behavior (Carreras 2012; Seawright, 2012), I would expect that that citizens would gradually punish Morales as his time in office continued, if they perceived corruption to be widespread and that the government was not doing enough to combat it.

### *III) Mistrust in political institutions*

Similar, and likely correlated, to corruption, widespread loss of faith and confidence in political institutions create a fertile environment for politicians, eyeing an upcoming election, to publicly denounce and distance themselves from these organizations. To win elections, populist

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<sup>3</sup> Seligson (2002) conducted interviews in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. In his 2006 article, he added Ecuador to the analysis.

candidates need to appeal to voters and convince them that they offer a different avenue than the political mainstream and are more likely to represent the common peoples' interests (Roberts 1995, Barr 2003). This task is much easier when levels of public trust in public institutions are lower and fiery rhetoric is likely to resonate much more with publics that have lost confidence, if not complete faith, in public institutions. In an examination of 18 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2008, Doyle (2011) finds significant support for this hypothesis—that higher levels of distrust in the traditional political institutions of liberal democracy in a given country increases the probability of support for populist candidates during a given election.

As mentioned above, Morales utilized an anti-establishment discourse to convince a majority of Bolivians to support his political ascendancy. After reaching office, one would expect that, at some point in time, Morales and his political colleagues would be viewed as what they originally campaigned against, the establishment. In considering which institutions to examine, Doyle (2011) constructs an index of citizen trust in the national parliament/congress, in political parties, and the judiciary. In my analysis, I examine each of these institutions separately to see whether any one institution has a stronger effect than the other two. Additionally, citizens' levels of trust in these institutions vary over time and do so for the different actors (Seligson 2006), and Morales' ability to exert control over, and therefore be connected to, these institutions varies considerably. As with corruption, I expect that voters would initially tolerate poor performance from these institutions, and perceptions of them would not influence voting behavior considerably, in any direction. However, over time, as Morales' party gained control of the national congress, I would expect that higher levels of trust in the congress should be associated with a higher probability of voting for the incumbent president.



#### *IV) Economic performance by governments*

A prominent and recurring explanation in the literature for the electoral success of populist leaders is that they capitalize politically on periods of great socioeconomic inequality and abysmal economic conditions (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Weyland 1999). Latin America is a region that for the past few decades has been the most unequal in the world (Weyland 2003), constantly suffers through economic disasters, and continues to be beset by high levels of poverty. Large swaths of the population perceive that traditional political parties and institutions insufficiently address, let alone fulfill, the socioeconomic needs of their constituents (Carrion 2009). These periods of socioeconomic turmoil tend to generate an enormous need for a national savior; especially a leader with an inclusive discourse that also promises to incorporate previously excluded and marginalized citizens in the economy.

Again, as with the above arguments, I would expect citizens to tolerate (relatively) poor economic performance during the embryonic stages of Morales' regime. His promises and fulfillment of major structural economic changes are likely to have been viewed as necessary to usher in improved socioeconomic equality for all Bolivians. Thus, early on in his rule, I would expect citizens to grant some leeway to Morales in the economic sphere, as the culpability of economic torpidity would still be unclear. Following de Ferrari (2014), I posit that as Morales' tenure in office continued, citizens would be able to more clearly identify him as the politician to be evaluated in the election, increasing the degree of performance-based voting among the electorate. There is a wealth of research on Latin America which finds the expected relationship that people are more likely to vote for the incumbent or government candidate when the

economy performs well and to punish when the economy is not performing well (Barr 2003, Benton 2005, Echegaray 2005, Remmer 1991, Stokes 2001, Weyland 2003). However, scholars continue to debate whether individuals make retrospective (comparing their present situations to 12 months before) or future, sociotropic (the country's economic situation) or pocketbook (individual) economic decisions when voting. Lewis-Beck and Ratto (2013) find significant support for sociotropic retrospective economic effects on the incumbent vote; while Singer and Carlin (2013) show that, in Latin America, prospective voting tends to be more likely earlier in the electoral process, while retrospective behavior occurs nearer the election date.

Improving macro- and microeconomic conditions may also affect citizen support for Morales in that there will likely be an interactive and positive effect with citizens who strongly support a more nationalistic economy and accompanying government projects. Remmer (2011) finds that, across Latin America, an expanding economy allows leaders to make campaign promises of future poverty reduction projects, increased government spending, and more government control of the economic sector. Citizens, in turn, are more willing to pay for additional government programs, as they are more confident in the public sector's ability to address structural issues in the socioeconomic domain.

#### *V) Widespread populist attitudes*

One consideration that has been largely unconsidered in the literature is the presence of a set of populist "ideas" among the populace. Recently, scholars (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2014) have begun to test what they label an "ideational theory" of populism—that populist leaders and movements have increased success when citizens hold on

to a core set of beliefs in populist ideas. Recent work (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012) illustrates that populist ideas are prevalent among the general population, and these findings are consistent across space (in both Latin America and Europe). In contexts where citizens have a firm belief in popular sovereignty, this demand will be met with the supply of a political actor who advocates delegating more direct political control to the masses. I expect that Bolivian citizens who hold firmer populist ideas would be more likely to support Evo Morales throughout his tenure. Morales has consistently campaigned and governed with the pledge that he rules “by obeying” the will of the people (Anria 2013, 35).

#### *VI) Race and Ethnicity*

Both race and ethnicity are prominent features in Bolivian society that affect and shape social, political, and economic relations. In terms of voting and political behavior, many indigenous rights organizations helped establish political parties or purposefully forged formal linkages with existing parties (Yashar 2005, Van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012). Within Bolivia, these authors have documented the racial component—along indigenous lines—of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party and citizen attachment with Evo Morales. However, it is important to note and consider that racial and ethnic self-identification in Bolivia are “fluid and dynamic” and tend to change over time and in different political contexts (Moreno Morales 2012, 253). Since 2000, the share of the population identifying as white has continued to decrease, and those who regard themselves indigenous has increased. The mestizo category has also been increasing and represents an overwhelming (~75%) majority of citizens, which may actually capture the rural to urban migration in the country, and reflect the process of *mestizaje* (Madrid 2012). Given the

origins of MAS and that Morales was the country's first indigenous president, I expect that Morales will command significant support from those citizens self-identifying as indigenous.

### *VII) Environmental Concerns*

Although not a general theory of populism, environmental concerns are a major national issue in Bolivia, and it affects other independent variables. One caveat to the expected general support among Indigenous voters for Morales concerns the region in which the government proposed to build a controversial highway—the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). The plan first gained traction with Morales's public inauguration in June 2011 and sparked protests in August of that year, and talks and resistance have resurfaced periodically. The Moxeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré, and Chimáne peoples are concerned about deleterious environmental effects, ranging from deforestation to colonization from migrant settlers to possible resource exploitation by transnational oil companies (Achtenberg 2013). In short, they view the project as a direct threat to their survival. The government's response included extreme repression of environmental protesters and plans to construct the highway have continued. More broadly, it reflects a political tussle between those who prioritize environmental protections and those who view infrastructural megaprojects as vital to continued national economic growth. I expect that those citizens who more firmly believe that the government truly cares about protecting the environment will be more supportive of Morales.

The figure below provides an overview of the hypotheses that I will test:

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Expected Effect on Morales' Vote Share</b>
H <sub>1</sub> : Corruption	Over time, higher levels will decrease vote share

H <sub>2</sub> : Mistrust of Public Institutions	Over time, higher levels will decrease vote share
H <sub>3</sub> : Perceptions of the Economy	Over time, worse evaluations will decrease votes
H <sub>4</sub> : Populist ideas	Higher presence likely to increase vote share
H <sub>5</sub> : Indigenous Identification	Those who self-identify more likely to vote for Evo
H <sub>6</sub> : Environmental Protections	Higher agreement will likely increase vote share

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**Figure 1 Hypotheses and expected findings**

#### *IV. Data and Methodology*

My quantitative analysis testing the above hypotheses is based on the Americasbarometer survey and the unit of analysis is at the individual level. My dependent variable is *voting intention for Evo Morales*. Due to the nature of survey collection, most surveys are conducted either a few months before an upcoming election (2014), or several months after a presidential election (2006, 2010). Fortunately for the analysis, Morales in office has been a constant throughout the time period of examination. To investigate voter intention, I use the following question, “If the presidential election were next week, who would you would vote for?” Both questions are scored as dichotomous variables (1=Morales, 0=all other challengers). I use a logit regression model to estimate the odds that survey respondents will be more likely to support the incumbent.

#### **Operationalization and Measurement**

To test the citizens’ perceptions of corruption hypothesis, I include responses for questions asking respondents whether they believe corruption among public officials to be widespread. There are four possible answers: very widespread, somewhat widespread, not really

widespread, and not at all widespread.<sup>4</sup> As Morales' time in office progresses, I also include a question on whether citizens believe the government is actively combatting corruption. For the trust in political institutions hypothesis, I use a question that asks citizens to what extent they have trust in the various institutions (the judiciary, the national congress/parliament, and political parties). The scale allows for respondents to make an assessment from 1 to 7.

In testing the economic success hypotheses, I consider four survey questions: one that asks the survey respondent whether she believes the economic situation of the country has improved in the last 12 months, and whether she believes her individual economic situation has improved during the same period.<sup>5</sup> The responses include “better”, “the same”, and “worse” and I exclude the responses “don't know” and “no answer” from the analysis.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, in testing Remmer's theory, I include a question about the strength of citizens' desire for a more nationalized economy. In testing whether populist ideas are present in the population, I include three questions. One that asks respondents to what degree they agree the president should follow the popular will, one that asks whether the people should govern directly, and one that asks to what degree respondents believe the world is a struggle between good and evil. Unfortunately, these questions all featured in the 2008 version, but only the “govern directly” question remained in subsequent versions.

Lastly, I include control variables to account for variation in the gender, education, income, age, ethnic self-identity, maternal language, geographic location, and ideology of survey

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<sup>4</sup> For all variables, I have rescaled and recoded the variables to align to my theoretical expectations discussed earlier in the chapter.

<sup>5</sup> These and all full survey questions are available in the Appendix. Later surveys (post-2010) included only the retrospective questions.

<sup>6</sup> This was repeated for each variable throughout the analysis.

respondents.<sup>7</sup> Drawing on previous studies, I expect that respondents who are less educated, less wealthy, self-identify as mestizo and indigenous, live in a rural area, do not live in the Media Luna, and have a stronger leftist orientation should be more likely to vote for Morales (Anríia 2013, Doyle 2011, Ellner, 2003; Lewis-Beck and Celeste-Ratto, 2013; Remmer, 2011; Van Cott 2005, Weyland 2011).

## *V. Statistical Findings*

Table 2 gives the pooled logit regression results for surveys for the years 2008-2014. In this sub-section, for the sake of interpretability, I discuss my findings in terms of whether the variable led to an increase or decrease in the estimated odds that a respondent voted for Evo Morales, compared to all other electoral challengers. In doing so, I examine whether motivations for citizens to vote for or against the long-serving executive have changed over time. Lastly, I focus specifically on the factors that mattered most prior to the 2014 election.

Across models, and over time, there are several factors that consistently help explain citizens' intention to vote for Morales. Respondents' with stronger leftist political orientations, who self-identify as indigenous, do not live in the Media Luna region, who have more positive assessments of the state of the country's economy (both in a retrospective and current

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<sup>7</sup> For gender, "male" serves as the reference group; for education, years are treated continuously; for income, there are 10 levels which are adapted for country-specific factors, for race I have excluded mulatto, black, and other respondents as their quantity are insufficient for statistical models and treat those who responded "white" as my reference group; for ideology, a higher score represents a more leftist ideology, as determined by the respondent on a 10-point scale.

**Table 2: Logistic Analysis of Voting Intention for Evo Morales, 2008-2014**

	2008	2010	2012	2014
	B/(SE)	B/(SE)	B/(SE)	B/(SE)
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Education	-0.014 (0.03)	<b>-0.045** (0.02)</b>	-0.003 (0.02)	<b>-0.062** (0.02)</b>
Gender (female=1)	-0.090 (0.20)	0.001 (0.16)	-0.226 (0.16)	0.204 (0.18)
Income	<b>-0.169* (0.07)</b>	-0.066 (0.05)	-0.021 (0.02)	-0.043 (0.03)
Age	-0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	<b>0.012* (0.01)</b>	0.008 (0.01)
Leftist Ideology	<b>0.398*** (0.05)</b>	<b>0.350*** (0.05)</b>	<b>0.104** (0.04)</b>	<b>0.196*** (0.04)</b>
<i>Geography</i>				
Rural residence	<b>0.749** (0.25)</b>	<b>0.718*** (0.20)</b>	0.012 (0.18)	0.169 (0.20)
Media Luna (yes = 1)	<b>-1.296*** (0.22)</b>	<b>-1.189*** (0.18)</b>	0.088 (0.17)	<b>-0.907*** (0.19)</b>
<i>Ethnicity and Linguistic Factors</i>				
Race (indigenous)	<b>1.352** (0.50)</b>	0.122 (0.43)	0.736 (0.45)	<b>1.475** (0.47)</b>
Race (mestizo)	0.455 (0.39)	0.082 (0.33)	0.522 (0.40)	<b>0.948* (0.41)</b>
Quechua as maternal language	0.599 (0.32)	<b>1.556*** (0.30)</b>	<b>0.620** (0.23)</b>	0.483 (0.26)
Aymara as maternal language	<b>1.887** (0.79)</b>	0.784 (0.47)	-0.004 (0.35)	0.586 (0.48)
<i>Economic Perceptions</i>				
Individual economy today	0.129 (0.17)	0.002 (0.01)	0.222 (0.14)	
Country economy today	<b>1.396*** (0.16)</b>	<b>0.636*** (0.11)</b>	0.076 (0.12)	
Individual economy compared to a year ago				0.088 (0.15)
Country economy compared to a year ago				<b>0.458** (0.14)</b>



*Social Ills Perceptions*

Corruption is not widespread	0.101 (0.13)	<b>0.368***</b> (0.11)	<b>0.247*</b> (0.10)	0.155 (0.11)
Current crime level is not a threat	-0.053 (0.14)	0.083 (0.10)		
Civil rights are protected	<b>0.224**</b> (0.08)	0.102 (0.07)	0.038 (0.07)	0.014 (0.08)

*Trust in Public Institutions*

High trust in Judiciary	0.002 (0.08)	0.053 (0.07)	0.016 (0.06)	0.027 (0.07)
High trust in Congress	-0.113 (0.08)	<b>0.357***</b> (0.07)	<b>0.154*</b> (0.07)	<b>0.169*</b> (0.07)
High trust in Political Parties	-0.036 (0.08)	<b>-0.147*</b> (0.06)	-0.021 (0.06)	-0.011 (0.07)

*Populist Ideas*

President should follow popular will	-0.118 (0.07)			
People should govern directly	<b>0.159**</b> (0.05)	0.015 (0.01)	0.002 (0.05)	
Dominant class as major obstacle	<b>0.272***</b> (0.05)			

*Government Evaluations*

Support for nationalization	<b>0.172**</b> (0.06)	<b>0.231***</b> (0.05)	<b>0.163***</b> (0.05)	<b>0.260***</b> (0.05)
Government protects the environment			<b>0.387***</b> (0.06)	<b>0.230***</b> (0.07)
Government protects citizens' security				<b>0.174*</b> (0.09)
Government fights corruption				<b>0.327***</b> (0.07)

Constant	-8.806***(1.33)	-6.693*** (0.83)	-6.135*** (1.79)	-7.129*** (0.97)
N (Individuals)	937	1 189	960	1034
$R^2$ (ML)	0.776	0.705	0.722	0.724
McFadden's $R^2$	0.674	0.589	0.540	0.605

perspective), those who have stronger preferences for a more nationalized economy, who hold strong beliefs that the government is protecting the environment, citizens' security, and is actively combatting corruption.

I find strong evidence as well that those with stronger populist ideas favored Morales in 2008, but a lack of future data negates the possibility of testing this thesis in a much more robust manner. In general, I find some evidence to suggest that citizens' trust in public institutions, specifically the legislative branch, affected voting behavior as time progressed. As expected, and as the MAS wrested control of the legislative assembly, citizens who had higher levels of trust were more likely to intend to vote for Morales. The lack of statistical significance and negative association for citizens' trust in political parties likely illustrate the fact that the opposition has institutionalized itself in political parties, whereas MAS activists and candidates still consider their organization to be a "political instrument", not political party (Madrid 2012, Anría 2013). The lack of a statistically significant and positive association between trust in the judiciary and support for Morales likely reflect the unpopular and confusing judicial reform process that occurred with the 2011 judicial elections (Driscoll and Nelson 2013).

Over time, there are noticeable changes in some of the demographic factors. Earlier on (2008 & 2010) in the Morales tenure, rural, poorer citizens who spoke either Aymara or Quechua as a maternal language, were more likely to support the president. However, only one (Quechua speaker in 2012) of these explanations produced statistically significant associations in the latter survey rounds. The 2014 model suggests that citizens' evaluations of Evo Morales regarding corruption, the environment, and citizen security greatly affected their support, as did ethnicity,

regional dynamics, and economic considerations. Figure 2 below provides an overview of my theoretical findings. Several of my findings, when qualified by the incumbency status of candidates, offers significant support for recent work on voting behavior in Latin America. The incumbency status of candidates should be a central.

Hypothesis	Result
H <sub>1</sub> : Corruption Perceptions	Strong support for government evaluations, but not for broader society
H <sub>2</sub> : Trust of Public Institutions	Some support but varied directions
H <sub>3</sub> : Indigenous self-identification	Strong support, but less so for linguistic concerns over time
H <sub>4</sub> : Perceptions of the Economy	Strong support over time
H <sub>5</sub> : Populist ideas present	Strong support in years data available
H <sub>6</sub> : Environmental concerns	Strong support

**Figure 2 Summary depicting results of hypothesis testing.**

## *VI. Qualitative Assessments of Explanations*

As discussed above, I found strong statistical associations indicating that citizens who had positive retrospective evaluations of the economy and favored a more nationalized economy, believed that the government was combatting corruption, had stronger beliefs that government improved citizen's security, felt that government protected the environment, and who self-identified as indigenous were more likely to vote for Morales. I acknowledge that the survey data used in my 2014 regression analyses were conducted in April and May 2014, at least five months prior to the election. Part of this qualitative analysis aims to account for the disconnect in time, and ensure the continued political and electoral relevance of the explanatory variables.

I investigate whether these factors actually impacted citizens' voting behavior. In doing so, I examine whether any evidence can be found to suggest that each explanatory factor was a concern for citizens, whether the issue became politicized, and whether there is any information that would suggest the issue had an impact on the electoral contest, specifically whether it influenced citizens' vote choices. I acknowledge that many of these explanatory factors interact with others. When they do, I highlight these findings and consider how these interactions influence the outcome.

### *Incumbency advantage*

Although not included in any of the models, Morales' incumbency offered several significant advantages, some of which influenced other explanatory factors. In interviews with opposition deputies, all complained about an unfair electoral playing field. Specifically, they

decried the fact that the official electoral propaganda window was only 28 days and that Morales was allowed (after a favorable electoral court ruling) to inaugurate public works during this period.<sup>8</sup> The first condition, specified in Article 116 of the 2010 electoral code, limited the ability of electoral challengers to put forth critiques of the government in the media. Alternatively, it provided a major advantage for Morales, as there is no limit on the use of government communication in the media of proposed projects and future plans.

Regarding the second condition, throughout the campaign, Morales made ample use of the powers and capacities afforded to him as the incumbent. In his charge as chief executive, he used his political office to launch government projects on 27 occasions in the last month before election day.<sup>9</sup> As head of government, he inaugurated several government megaprojects throughout the country including oil refineries, hospitals and sophisticated medical centers, scientific citadels for research and discovery, the yellow line for the cable car in La Paz (teleférico), thermonuclear energy plants, a nuclear reactor in La Paz, and plans for highway megaprojects. In the traditional sense of populist electoral campaigning, Morales would also routinely stir up crowds, make promises of future investments in regions that he visited, while usually broadcasting these speeches and rallies on state (and many instances private) television channels. The government project under which his near daily inauguration of megaprojects was accomplished was fittingly titled “*Bolivia cambia, Evo cumple*”.

More broadly, these public inaugurations served two important functions. First, at most of these inaugurations, Morales made sure to remind the country that these projects were

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<sup>8</sup> Author interviews with congressional deputies from the Democratic Unity (UD), La Paz, 6/9/2015.

<sup>9</sup> Author’s calculation taken from all articles available online from *La Razón*.

possible because his government nationalized vital sectors of the economy. These events were covered in great detail on state television and reinforced the notion that economic growth and success were a result of nationalization. In an interview with a member of Morale's strategic communications team, the official acknowledged the high volume of public works during the campaign and discussed that the government wanted to show the people that it had a lot of public investment, that it was continuously conducting major governmental projects, and that these projects were a means to illustrate the government's commitment and obligation to the masses.<sup>10</sup>

Second, there was a strategic purpose in terms of regional focus with these projects. Santa Cruz, long a bastion of the opposition, received several visits from the president. Within this region, Morales, on state TV Bolivia, launched government natural gas refineries, several hospitals and medical clinics (specifically with the *Mi Salud en la Villa Primero de Mayo de Santa Cruz* program), and petrochemical plants. One speech illustrates his recurring behavior: on September 25, 2014, he publicly pledged a plan to spend \$405 million dollars to open power generating plants in the Chiquitania valley; iron industrialization centers in Mutún; a long distance train with an interurban train connecting the areas of Montero, Warnes, and Santa Cruz; and promised to construct three new airports in the department.

Morales' behavior, however, did not go unnoticed or unchallenged. Juan del Granado, the *Movimiento sin Miedo* (MSM) candidate, filed an official appeal before the high electoral court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). In the petition, he claimed that Morales's frequent inaugurations of government projects violated electoral law 119, which bans the use of electoral

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<sup>10</sup> Author interview, La Paz, 6/1/2015.

propaganda in the administration of public works (*La Razón*, 2014a). However, the TSE ruled against the claim on the basis that citizens had the right to information and no electoral propaganda had been introduced or handed out at these events. This decision was handed down and made public on September 13, nearly a full month ahead of the election. It seemingly emboldened Morales to fully capitalize on his ability to be present and launch government megaprojects.

### *Economic Concerns*

Since 2006, there have been remarkable economic gains for the country. The GDP has grown annually at an average of 5.1%; the national level of poverty has declined from 59.9% in 2006, to 39.1% in 2013; and wages (including increases to the minimum wage and the systematization of the annual bonuses, the *doble Aguinaldo*) have steadily increased.<sup>11</sup> Despite these laudatory achievements, many citizens still view economic affairs as the most serious problems facing the country. The LAPOP survey data illustrate that from 2006 to 2010, the most respondents judged an “economic crisis” the most serious problem facing Bolivia.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, significant amounts of participants identified unemployment, poverty, and inflation as the most serious.<sup>13</sup> Taken together, economic affairs are still seen as the vital issues that need to be addressed.

### *Corruption*

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<sup>11</sup> Data all come from the World Bank.

<sup>12</sup> In 2006, 25% of respondents chose it; in 2008, 18%; in 2010, 16.3%; in 2012, 23.8%.

<sup>13</sup> The aggregate sums of the four economic answer choices were: 59% in 2006, 46% in 2008, 44% in 2010, 58% in 2012, and 28% in 2014.

Morales first gained national electoral prominence in the 2002 presidential elections. Relying on an anti-establishment and anti-corruption discourse, among other things, he would eventually achieve electoral success in 2005. Central to his popularity was a belief by citizens that corruption would decrease during his tenure in office. However, in 2014, most Bolivians still had very negative views regarding societal corruption. In the 2014 LAPOP survey, roughly a third of respondents thought that corruption was very widespread, and, more importantly, of 40 topics to choose from, corruption was seen as the most serious threat to the country by the greatest plurality of participants.<sup>14</sup>

Although societal corruption remains a pressing issue, the government and opposition's responses to the issue seems to influence how the electorate and broader society evaluate the government's handling of it. Since his time in office, experts' corruption perceptions of the public sector, as measured by Transparency International's annual corruption perceptions index, have improved consistently and rather remarkably.<sup>15</sup> The increase in Bolivia's ranking partly stems from the MAS-dominated legislative assembly passing law 004 in March 2010, an effort to vigorously root out public cases of corruption and the illicit enriching of public officials. The results that I found in the 2014 model suggested that citizen perceptions of general corruption did not affect their vote choice, but their perception of how the government has handled corruption did. These findings are perhaps partially a result of the priority given to the issue by the

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<sup>14</sup> 15.8% of respondents chose corruption as the most serious threat.

<sup>15</sup> In 2002, Bolivia's country score was 22 and has steadily improved in a monotonic fashion through to 2014, in which the country received a score of 35. The scale is from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating less corruption. Although the index relies on fewer than 10 expert surveys, it does provide a barometer of the overall country climate when considering corruption.



campaign teams of both the government and opposition. The Morales team saw corruption as an issue that it had to confront:

“Of course, we have corruption. Of course, yes. However, we have made major public efforts to investigate it. It is not something that you can deny. If you deny it, you have less capacity to control the message and your response is really limited. We have many ministers who are investigated permanently; we have many who are in jail. The public sees that.”<sup>16</sup>

Beyond acknowledging their own government and party’s shortcomings, the MAS government program featured a section (MAS 2014, 72-4) highlighting its accomplishments in the battle against corruption. Additionally, campaign team also made an active effort well before and during the campaign to highlight the corruption of the opposition. By doing so, it negated its political opponents the opportunity to fully exploit general societal dissatisfaction with corruption. An interview with a strategist from the Doria Medina campaign revealed that the issue was not central to its message nor did they seek to highly politicize it:

“We did our research, using focus groups and surveys, corruption is a very important issue but the people are very accustomed to it. Here in Bolivia they have the idea that corruption comes in a package, it is part of politics. But, it’s not a factor that triggers their votes. Thus, it wasn’t a central focus or axis of our campaign.”<sup>17</sup>

### *Citizens’ security*

Although Bolivia ranks quite favorably in cross-national indices of crime levels in Latin America, many of its citizens believe that crime has increased in recent years, and a significant portion view it as a serious threat to the country. Over the last few LAPOP surveys, the

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<sup>16</sup> Author interview with member of Morales’ campaign communications and strategic planning team, La Paz, 6/1/2015.

<sup>17</sup> Author interview with member of Doria Medina’s campaign strategy team, La Paz, 6/3/2015..

significance of crime has increased for Bolivians. In 2010, 8.14% regarded it as the most pressing issue, placing it as the fifth most vital concern; in 2012, 17.4% did, making it the third most serious concern; while in 2014, 15.8% chose it as the most serious issue in Bolivia, receiving the same percentage as corruption.

Beyond salience and significance in public opinion surveys, the issue has recently become politicized. In August 2014, mass protesters including members of the Catholic Church and the politically powerful pro-Santa Cruz Council flooded the streets of Santa Cruz, motivated by growing dissatisfaction with violent crime in the city and region. The catalyst for the protests appeared to be the femicide of Sophia Calvo Aponte, a young biochemist from a well-known family (*El Deber*, 2014c). The high profile case sparked recurrent civil protests and even led to the national government's minister of government, Jorge Pérez, to urge the prosecuting authorities to immediately process the case (*El Deber*, 2014a). A few weeks later, the violent murder of a minor resulted in citizens blocking the highway route from Santa Cruz to Cochabamba (*El Deber*, 2014b).

In addition to motivating protesters, the issue of citizen security was one of the major themes the campaign team of Doria Medina exploited. Again, relying on focus group research and surveys of likely voters, the decision was made to craft a message targeting the government's lack of action and concern for citizen safety and rising crime:

“Citizen security was one of the pillars of our campaign. We had a very strong message of advocating for reform of the police and the judiciary...the problem in Bolivia is that both of these institutions are rotten.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Author interview, La Paz, 6/3/2014.

Although Morales' communications and strategic team did not prioritize citizen security in its campaign speeches or messages, in its official electoral documents, it did. The electoral program of MAS included details on its efforts and plans to modernize all political institutions in the country and to install video surveillance of major metropolitan centers (MAS 2014, 72).

### *Environmental Concerns*

A major and controversial environmental issue that occurred after the 2009 election included the government's inauguration of the construction of a highway leading to and through the TIPNIS region, in the department of Beni. The government's official position was that the road was necessary and vital to the country's continued economic development, and would provide a link between the Andean highlands and the Amazonian Beni region (Achtenberg, 2011a). Those who stood most to benefit from the project included Quechua and Aymara "colonists", former miners from the country's highlands, who had settled within the region after the large-scale privatizations of mines in the 1980s. These farmers, including cocaleros in Cochabamba and local civic and business groups, had improved the area's agricultural production but lacked national market access to sell their products. The plan's fiercest critics included indigenous community leaders who viewed the development as a major threat to the biodiversity of the area, inevitably leading to devastating ecological, social and cultural damage (Achtenberg, 2011b).

The government initiated construction of the highway to the north of the TIPNIS region in June 2011. As the development approached the protected area, indigenous groups mobilized blockades to halt encroachment toward the park and organized a 375-mile march from Trinidad

to La Paz. The proposed march served as a catalyst for both pro-protest and pro-government forces. Regarding the latter, scores of pro-MAS colonists with support from the federal police blocked a road, brutally suppressed protests (wounding dozens of marchers). The repression of indigenous protesters led to two government ministers resigning, and motivated the country's chief trade union federation, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB), to call for a national strike for several days, which temporarily crippled the economy (Achtenberg, 2011c). After months of publicly berating and belittling the indigenous community leaders, Morales suffered a major political setback. He publicly asked for forgiveness, suspended construction (delaying it until 2015) on the entire project and cancelled the portion that would extend through the protected zone, and called for a referendum on future plans in Beni and Cochabamba (Achtenberg 2011d).

The most immediate political consequences of the affair manifested in a dip in Morales' popularity. Polls conducted nationwide at the time the crisis reached its fever pitch showed that the president's approval ratings dropped to 37%, among the lowest of his time in office (Achtenberg 2011b). Amidst the planned march to La Paz by the TIPNIS protesters, Bolivia went ahead with its scheduled elections for several national high courts. These judicial elections, novel and unique for several reasons, may be best remembered for the high degree of "spoiled" and blank votes, and for noticeable abstention (~ 20%) in a country with mandatory voting. Of the votes cast, 43% were invalid, 15% blank, and only 42% valid (Driscoll and Nelson 2013, 2-4). Although the outcome was mostly the result of citizen concerns over the independence of the judicial branch (Driscoll and Nelson 2013), some viewed it as a referendum on the MAS government, and there were reports that several citizens invalidated ballots by marking them "TIPNIS" (Achtenberg 2011c).

As the conflict progressed, attention to the TIPNIS region reached most of the major cities, and marchers gained backing from workers, students, indigenous groups, and middle-class sectors across the country (Achtenberg 2011d). A poll administered in September 2011 illustrated that more than 80% of the respondents thought Morales was handling the issue poorly (Achtenberg 2011c). When examining 2014 survey data from LAPOP, a logistic regression yielded a strong correlation between those who claimed to have protested within the last year, and those who chose protecting the environment as more important than economic development.<sup>19</sup> In other words, those who favored environmental protections in a “tradeoff” over economic growth were still politically active and upset enough to protest in the streets in the twelve months prior to the 2014 presidential election.

The government and Morales’ campaign team took note of the lingering public disaffect resulting from the conflict. Beyond Morales’ decision to suspend the project until after the election, his campaign strategists concluded that the “rupture” caused by the TIPNIS affair severed many of its ties with historical bases of support, most importantly some of the indigenous groups that formed part of the Unity Pact (*pacto unido*).<sup>20</sup> In an interview with a member of Morales’ campaign communications and strategic planning team, the conflict weighed heavily in their approach to aggressively try and shore up what they deemed to be lost

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<sup>19</sup> The regression is included in table 3 of the appendix. The question asked respondents for a yes or no answer on whether they had participated in a protest or demonstration within the last year. The “tradeoff” question asked respondents whether they would rather: protect the environment; promote economic development, or both. I excluded those who responded both to allow for a direct comparison on this question.

<sup>20</sup> The protests and march towards La Paz were organized and sponsored by former staunch supporters and vital members of Morales’ and MAS’ broad coalition. These groups included the lowlands indigenous federations CIDOB, CONAMAQ, and other indigenous and environmental organizations (Achtenberg 2014).

support and aggressively convince supporters that the government has always protected the environment:

“One of the fundamental pillars of this campaign was centered on the environmental sectors, who had historically been our allies. The TIPNIS affair caused a major and serious rupture with these sectors. Additionally, we had a second rupture with the same environmental groups with our development of genetically modified foods in government geoplasma labs.”<sup>21</sup>

The government’s aggressive public relations campaign, aimed at improving its image on environmental affairs, seemed to pay dividends. In 2012, of those surveyed in the LAPOP sample, 20.3% of respondents stated that they had a lot of belief that the government was protecting the environment; in 2014, that number had increased to 26%.<sup>22</sup> However, in Beni, roughly only 20% held as strong a belief, while the median respondent scored a four on the scale with the national median as a five.

Perhaps the most direct impact the TIPNIS conflict had on the 2014 electoral contest was it provided motivation for one of the candidates, Fernando Vargas, to enter the race. Vargas served as president of the TIPNIS governing body, engaged in direct negotiations with the Morales government, led many of the protests in defense of the area, and even became a victim of police repression. In June 2014, the Green Party announced Vargas as its candidate for the presidential election. In an interview with the national newspaper *La Razón*, Vargas declared that he accepted the nomination because he saw it as necessary to continue the fight for the conservation of the environment, forests and wildlife, as well as respect for “Mother Earth” (*La Razón* 2014c). Although Vargas would receive only 2.65% of the national vote, his mere

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<sup>21</sup> Author interview with official, La Paz, 6/1/2015.

<sup>22</sup> I label responses as “a lot of belief” for scores 6 and 7. The scale ranges from 1 to 7, with 7 reflecting a lot.

presence ensured that environmental matters would continue to receive attention. Political dissatisfaction with the Morales regime would also manifest itself in the region most affected by the conflict, Beni. MAS had made considerable electoral inroads in the department since 2005, when it won only 7% of the presidential vote. The party improved its lot with its candidate Jessica Jordan capturing 44% of the vote share (although losing by 8%) in the special 2013 gubernatorial election. However, Morales dropped to 41.5% in 2014, and lost convincingly to Doria Medina by 8.9%.

### *Indigenous Self-Identification*

From its inception, the MAS and Evo Morales have been global symbols of the political inclusion of indigenous people. However, since his re-election in 2009, Morales has made certain political decisions that have destabilized his original coalition of indigenous and rural peasants. Although it is true that those who self-identify as indigenous are still more likely to vote for Morales than other ethnic groups, the geographical location of support among indigenous voters has shifted. As mentioned above in the discussion of the TIPNIS conflict, indigenous community leaders in the department of Beni fiercely protested against the government's decision to go ahead with construction of a highway that would have intersected sacred land. More importantly, many in the community were aggrieved that the government did not follow the constitution and consult them prior to its contract with a foreign firm (Achtenberg 2011b). More broadly, the plan pitted the government's extractive development policy against those seeking to protect indigenous cultural ways of life (Hindery 2013, 158), but also illustrated a continuously growing rift within MAS' coalitions (Webber 2011), and demonstrated the government's favoring of

cocaleros in Chaparé ahead of other lowland indigenous people. When taken into consideration, indigenous voters in Beni were less likely than indigenous voters elsewhere (in the other 8 departments) to support Morales. Table 4 in the appendix provides regression results demonstrating this effect.

### *MAS and Morales' Evolving Base of Support*

As a whole, the regression models in table one and my within-case analysis yields a few insights that suggest that MAS' base of support has continued to evolve. Initially, MAS' support centered on rural coalitions and its ties to indigenous organizations (Madrid 2012, 36). However, seeking to increase its vote share and solidify its electoral dominance, the MAS began to appeal to a wider constituency. Madrid (2008, 475) described the MAS as an “ethnopolulist party” that used inclusively ethnic discourses with populist electoral strategies. As the MAS expanded geographically and became a national movement, it developed both a rural and urban social base, and relied increasingly on indigenous support in the country's largest cities, La Paz and El Alto with rural and urban social bases, as well as a growing presence in Bolivia's largest cities, like La Paz and El Alto (Anrí 2013).

Several of the government decisions discussed above accelerated the continuing heterogenization of its supporters. In short, it seems as if its core group of supporters have been realigned and now includes an alliance of rural peasants and small to medium-sized agricultural producers, an urban-rural “popular business” bloc, and elements of the national entrepreneurial sector, including some conservative elites in the *Media Luna* (Achtenberg 2015). In my interview with Morales' campaign strategist, the official confirmed that the party, prior to the



campaign, and the team, during the campaign, targeted certain demographics to mobilize: middle-class citizens in urban areas who they tried to remind had been helped out of poverty by government policies, and conservative elites in Tarija and Santa Cruz who had benefitted from years of economic expansion. Morales' courting of eastern business elites was well publicized, especially noticeable when he shared public dinners with the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs (CEPB) and inaugurated the business fair Fexpocruz in Santa Cruz in mid-September 2014 (La Razón 2014a, La Razón 2014c).

## *VII. Conclusion*

In this paper, I have reviewed past and current theoretical explanations for why citizens may vote and continue to vote for Evo Morales, I have provided survey evidence to suggest why citizens did so in the 2014 election, and I examined evidence of how these factors became politicized and may have affected the electoral contest.

In examining LAPOP surveys over time, I found considerable evidence that citizens who had positive retrospective evaluations of the economy and favored a more nationalized economy, believed that the government was combatting corruption, had stronger beliefs that government improved citizen's security, felt that government protected the environment, and who self-identified as indigenous were more likely to vote for Morales. The regression models also indicated that the president's support base no longer comes exclusively from rural or indigenous supporters, but rather includes a strong urban and mestizo element.

Taken together, these events demonstrate a likely shift in MAS and Morales' core electoral constituency. Morales' nationalistic economic agenda of heavy state investment and public infrastructural megaprojects, which relies on continuously extracting natural resources, allowed the president and party to establish a new coalition of support which incorporated previously unsupportive citizens in urban centers, conservative members of the national entrepreneurial sector. However, the government decisions to go ahead with national economic development projects at all costs, disregarding the importance of indigenous protected lands, led to a political "rupture" of some its traditional allies—namely, indigenous organizations in the Beni province and those opposed to the current extractive economic model. In short, it seems as if their core groups of supporters have been realigned.

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## APPENDIX

Table 3: Logistic Analysis of Citizen Inclination to Protest

	Model 1 Beta (SE)	
Education	-0.013	(0.02)
Gender (female= 1)	-0.254	(0.15)
Income	-0.006	(0.02)
Age	0.000	(0.00)
Leftist Ideology	-0.022	(0.04)
Mestizo (yes = 1)	0.607	(0.41)
Indigenous (yes = 1)	<b>0.991*</b>	<b>(0.43)</b>
<i>Independent variables</i>		
Favorable country economic perceptions	-0.033	(0.11)
Government protects citizen rights	0.053	(0.07)
Government is combatting corruption	0.014	(0.06)
Strong preference for nationalization	0.002	(0.04)
Environment > Economic development	<b>0.469**</b>	<b>(0.17)</b>
Constant	-2.175***	(0.64)
N (Individuals)	1	374
*P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < 0.001		

**Table 4: Logistic Analysis of Support for Evo Morales in 2014**

	Model 1 Beta (SE)
Education	<b>-0.092***(0.03)</b>
Gender (female= 1)	-0.054 (0.13)
Income	-0.025 (0.02)
Age	0.000 (0.00)
Beni (yes = 1)	-0.472 (0.23)
Indigenous (yes = 1)	<b>0.847** (0.28)</b>
Large City	<b>-0.195***(0.05)</b>
<b>Interactions</b>	
Beni*Indigenous (yes = 1)	<b>-0.160* (0.48)</b>
Large City*Indigenous (yes =1)	0.144 (0.08)
Constant	2.114***(0.32)
N (Individuals)	1 383
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001	
<b>R<sup>2</sup> (ML)</b>	0.384
<b>McFadden R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.305

Survey questions used (Americasbarometer project):

I. Dependent variable (vote intention):

VB20: ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted?

II. Independent variable (corruption perceptions):

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está:

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales combate la corrupción en el gobierno?

III. Independent variable (trust in political institutions):



B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

IV. Independent variable (economic perceptions):

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

ROS1. El Estado boliviano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

V. Independent variable (race and ethnicity)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originaria, negra, mulata, u otra?

BOLETIDNEW. Como boliviana o boliviano, ¿se considera usted perteneciente a alguno de los pueblos indígenas u originarios de Bolivia?

VI. Independent variable (populist ideas)

POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?

VII. Independent variable (environmental concerns)

BOLN16. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que el Gobierno promueve y protege los derechos del medio ambiente o de la “madre tierra”?

ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: proteger el medio ambiente o promover el crecimiento económico?

VI. Control variables (education), (gender), (income):

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Quechua (3) Aymara

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte):

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo la ayuda económica del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:

(1) Ciudades eje (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural

ESTRATOPRI: (1001) La Paz (1002) Santa Cruz (1003) Cochabamba (1004) Oruro (1005) Chuquisaca (1006) Potosí (1007) Pando (1008) Tarija (1009) Beni