

THE ACTIVATION OF POPULIST ATTITUDES: EVIDENCE FROM CONTEMPORARY CHILE AND GREECE

Kirk A. Hawkins, Associate Professor, Brigham Young University

(Kirk_Hawkins@byu.edu)

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Associate Professor, Universidad Diego Portales

(cristobal.rovira@udp.cl)

Ioannis Andreadis, Assistant Professor, Aristotle University

(john@polsci.auth.gr)

Abstract

Most studies see demand for populist forces driven by broad sociological factors that make certain issues salient among specific constituencies. However, this argument is normally not tested at the individual level and, when it is, it is tested through proxy measures of populism. In this paper, we propose and test a more nuanced theory of populist voting. Our theory argues that populist attitudes are themselves important predictors of voting, independent of ideological position. Nevertheless, the activation of these attitudes is highly dependent on contextual factors. We test this theory through a comparison of voting during the 2013 presidential election in Chile and the January 2015 parliamentary election in Greece. We find that despite similar levels of populist attitudes across both countries, these attitudes explain much more of the vote in Greece than they do in Chile.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Populist forces have been making headlines in the last few years. This is particularly true in Western Europe, where the populist radical right has become a new party family that is present almost all over the region (Mudde 2013; Mudde 2014). Moreover, with the advent of the Great Recession, new populist forces with a strong Eurosceptic discourse, such as SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) and the Five Star Movement in Italy (Bobba and McDonnell 2015), have obtained a significant amount of votes. At the same time, Latin America's recent turn to the left has manifested itself in some countries in the rise of radical leftist populist leaders, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, who have been more damaging than beneficial for democracy (de la Torre and Ortiz 2015; Hawkins 2015; Levitsky and Loxton 2013).

Because of the growing relevance of populist forces across the world, an increasing number of scholars have been studying the reasons for the electoral success of different variants of populism. However, little attention has been paid to the question of whether people with populist attitudes are prone to vote for populist leaders and parties. Do populist sentiments themselves explain the support for populism? The dearth of scholarly attention for this question can be explained by two main reasons. First, empirical studies on populism have so far been focused more on measuring the supply-side than the demand-side of populist politics. Second, and in close relationship to the previous point, scholars have been inclined to employ proxy measures of populism, such as anti-immigration in Western Europe or political trust in Latin America, to explain why specific constituencies vote for populist forces.

In this paper we advance a more nuanced theory of populist voting, one that incorporates attitudinal measures at the individual level. Our theory builds upon previous research, which has shown the importance of taking into account both demand- and supply-side factors. The main novelty lies in the fact that we reexamine the demand side of populist politics and offer a new account of how these operate at the individual level. Relying on a relatively new inventory of survey items that seek to measure populist attitudes, we show that populist sentiments among the population can indeed explain varying support for populist actors in different countries: Chile and Greece. In discussing these results, we aim to draw some lessons for those who are undertaking research on populism and to propose a general theory of populist voting that can be tested by further studies.

The paper is structured as follows. We begin by providing a clarification of the concept of populism and by advancing our own theory of populist voting. Next, we explain the Chilean and Greek cases and present our measures for populist supply. After this, we show measures of populist attitudes in both countries and the results of a vote-choice model to examine the impact of populist attitudes amongst voters on their support for presidential candidates in the 2013 election in Chile and for parties in the January 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece. Finally, we close our paper by discussing the relevance of our findings for those interested in the empirical study of populism in particular and in the current state of democracy in these two countries.

2. CONCEPT AND THEORY

Our theory of populist voting draws from an ideational definition of populism. Rather than conceiving of populism as short-sighted economic policymaking or as a particular combination of charismatic leadership, movement organization, and mass appeals, we define it as a set of ideas, namely, *a discourse that sees politics in Manichaeian terms as a struggle between the people, which is the embodiment of democratic virtue; and a corrupt establishment*¹. Populist ideas may be present to a lesser or greater extent in a policy or organization – it is not a dichotomous phenomenon – but it is the presence of these ideas that allow us to characterize something as (more or less) populist.

Scholars who agree with this conceptualization have proposed two additional terms that should be seen as the opposites of populism: elitism and pluralism (e.g. Hawkins 2009; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014a). Elitism shares the Manichean distinction between “the people” and “the elite” but inverts the morality of these groups. Whereas the former is seen as an irrational and thus dangerous mob, the latter is depicted as few individuals who due to their intellectual and moral superiority should be in charge of government. In contrast to populism and elitism, pluralism argues that because society is composed by a variety of individuals and groups, it is crucial to develop institutional arrangements that allow for the representation of different ideas and interests (Plattner 2010). Pluralists indeed are inclined to think of popular sovereignty as an open-ended process rather than a fixed and unified will of the people (Näsström 2007; Ochoa Espejo 2011).

¹ For a detailed explanation of this conceptual approach and its differences with other definitions of populism, see Hawkins (2009); Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014b).

Relying on this conceptual approach, scholars have started to develop different techniques for measuring the supply side of populism by studying its presence in, for example, party manifestos (e.g. Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), television programs (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave 2007), newspaper articles (e.g. Rooduijn 2013) and speeches of political actors (e.g. Armony and Armony 2005; Hawkins 2009). This kind of scholarship is extremely valuable as it helps to demonstrate which political leaders and parties do employ the populist set of ideas. Today we know that the populist discourse is being used mostly by some very specific electoral forces, such as populist radical right parties in Europe (Bornschieer 2010; Mudde 2007; van Kessel 2015), radical populist leftist actors in Latin America (de la Torre and Arnson 2013; Hawkins 2009), and more recently a small number of populist leftist forces in Southern Europe such as SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Seeing their similarities in rhetoric across regions and even time, not to mention their association with radical policies of the right and left, reinforces the claim that populist ideas represents something distinct and politically important.

However, this insight about the distinct qualities of populist ideas has generally not been applied to the study of populist demand. Until now, scholars focused on the question of the electoral support for populist forces explain this *not* by considering the level of populist attitudes among voters, but rather by relying on proxy measures of populism such as support for restrictive immigration and asylum policies (Ivarsflaten 2008), employment sector and exposure to economic globalization (Oesch 2008), or levels of trust in the traditional political institutions of liberal democracy (Doyle 2011). These studies are helpful in that they identify why voters support particular sub-types of populism, especially radical right vs. radical left. We agree that any study of populist voting that ignores the impact of the parties' and the voters' issue positions is incomplete, but the point of the ideational definition of populism is that there is an additional layer of ideas that politicians are expressing and that voters may respond to.

To capture this added ideational element at the level of individual voters, we introduce the concept of populist attitudes. We call populist ideas at the mass level "attitudes" because there is no claim that voters speak them, although there is tentative evidence elsewhere (plus our own everyday experience) which suggests that populist rhetoric is also a mass-based phenomenon (Michailidou, Trenz, and de Wilde 2014). But we also refer to them as attitudes because of how they are measured and how they causally operate. A few studies have begun to use public opinion surveys to empirically assess the extent to which the populist set of ideas is widespread in society and how these correlate with actual preference for populist forces (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014;

Elchardus and Spruyt forthcoming; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Stanley 2011). Typically these are inventories of populist-sounding statements capturing key components of the discourse: a Manichaeian outlook, the virtue of ordinary citizens, anti-elitism. No claim is made that survey respondents actually use these statements in their political conversation, only that respondents agree with them when they hear them. What these studies find is that populist attitudes cohere sensibly (i.e. there is set of “populist” attitudes distinct from related discourses such as pluralism and elitism); that they are widespread, shared by anywhere from 50 to 75 percent of the population; and that they correlate with support for populist parties and movements.

Taking advantage of this insight, we argue that voting for populist parties depends not only on the congruence of traditional issue positions of populist politicians (supply) and voters (demand), but also on the populist rhetoric of politicians (supply) and the populist attitudes of voters (demand). Whereas the connection between issue positions of voters and parties is fairly direct, the relationship between populist attitudes and support for populist politicians depends on two factors: whether populist attitudes are present among citizens, and whether there is a context to activate them. The main reason for adding this additional step is that – to reinforce a point we have left implicit – the populist set of ideas should not be seen as a consistent ideology or a coherent programmatic position. Unlike classic ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, or socialism that represent conscious attempts to articulate comprehensive political programs, political discourses such as populism are *not consciously articulated* and consequently have *limited programmatic scope*. Voters are at least vaguely aware of what it means to be conservative or liberal and how these apply to a wide variety of issues, but they are much less unaware of their (populist) discourse or its programmatic implications beyond a general argument for radicalism and a certain view of democracy. Thus, populism and other political discourses such as pluralism or elitism are usually combined with and orthogonal to political ideologies. This is one of the reasons why a number of scholars using the ideational approach to populism refer to it as a “thin-centered” ideology, as opposed to a “thick” or classical one (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stanley 2008).

Furthermore, because populism is so thin in terms of programmatic content, it can coexist in the minds of voters and politicians with other discourses. The activation or expression of the populist set of ideas depends not simply on whether they exist in the mind of the voter, but whether there is a political context that makes them salient. The argument that certain attitudes are only active in certain contexts is an increasingly common one in the political psychology literature and has been made with regard to Big Five personality traits (Mondak et al. 2010), authoritarian

personality (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; McCann 2009; Stenner 2005), and of course framing (Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). The core of this general argument is that certain attitudes constitute *dispositions* whose effective presence depends on external triggers; the less consciously articulated these ideas are, the more likely they are to have this quality and require activation.

We argue that the context which is most likely to activate populist attitudes and make the populist message of politicians' sensible is one in which there are major failures of democratic governance that can be attributed to intentional elite behavior. Policy failures such as economic recession can help provide this context, but they are usually insufficient and may be unnecessary. For instance, Flanders, Northern Italy, Norway and Switzerland are European territories with high economic prosperity and low unemployment, yet populist parties not only exist here but obtain a significant number of votes (Mudde 2007). Moreover, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) have recently shown that the Great Recession has had an ambivalent impact when it comes to generating a fertile soil for the emergence of populist forces in Europe. Instead, the ideal context for the activation of populist sentiment is one in which policy failures can be attributed to elite collusion. This type of failure undermines the democratic legitimacy of the political class and makes populism a sensible response to the community's problems. The condition is most clearly fulfilled when there is widespread corruption. The explosion of scandals showing systemic corruption reveal that an important section of the elite – if not the whole of it – has been acting in a fraudulent manner; consequently, an important part of the population will feel that the moral foundations of the democratic order are under threat. But this condition may be fulfilled to a lesser degree by political unresponsiveness, i.e., by a distancing of political elites from the policy concerns of their constituents. This distance paves the way for the alienation of citizens from established political actors, who are increasingly viewed as anything but the genuine representatives of 'the people'; however, the lack of intentionality makes it more difficult to frame this distance in populist terms.

This theory makes sense of some of the patterns that scholars have long noted in the historical study of populism (Conniff 1999; Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Kazin 1998) as well as in more contemporary contributions on populism (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Mudde 2010; Navia and Walker 2010; Rooduijn, Lange, and van der Brug 2012). Generally, populist forces more frequently win control of government and stay in power in underdeveloped countries; in developed countries, populist forces instead express themselves as third-party movements and upstart parties, which sometimes persist but secure relatively smaller portions of the vote. Yet citizens of both sets of

countries generally have democratic dispositions that are not remarkably different from each other. The explanation is that citizens in developing countries are not necessarily more populist in their outlook, but that their populist predispositions (which are fairly constant across all democracies) are activated more frequently by a context characterized by political unresponsiveness and the recurrent disclosures of systemic corruption.

Hence, in a country such as Venezuela in the 1990s, the context (one of a collusive two-party system involved in a series of corruption scandals coupled with economic mismanagement) combined with the supply of a strong populist leader (Hugo Chávez) produced massive electoral support for populist forces (Hawkins 2010). Probably a similar situation has been occurring in Greece since the Great Recession. By contrast, in countries such as the United States and the Netherlands, a somewhat weaker context in recent years (economic slowdowns in the midst of generally better democratic governance) combined with a smaller supply of populist forces (leaderless grassroots movements in the U.S. and a relatively small populist parties of the Left and Right in the Netherlands) has produced episodic populist movements and “third parties”, which do alter the political landscape in important aspects but do not win absolute control of government as in Venezuela under Chávez.

Our explanation complements older arguments emphasizing the issue positions of populist forces as a determinant of electoral support. Populist attitudes do not replace issue positions and other traditional factors in voting behavior models, such as candidate qualities or political identity; they coexist with them. Our argument *does* stand in opposition to a perspective that sees populist attitudes as ephemeral views generated by short-term experiences and the rhetoric of politicians. While populist attitudes may be “constructed” in the technical sense that all ideas are, we do not see them as *generated* by the immediate political context—they are *activated*. Populist attitudes preexist the current political conversation. As other theorists have argued, populist attitudes are likely rooted in beliefs about democracy and popular sovereignty, not to mention deeper personality traits that lend themselves to a dualistic cosmology. They are inherent in any democratic culture and predictably distributed across populations (Arditi 2007; Canovan 1999; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014a). We think this is the only way to make sense of survey findings that populist attitudes are widespread even in wealthy democracies.

3. CASE SELECTION

If our theory is correct, then we should find that voters' populist attitudes are important correlates of their support for populist parties and movements, but that these will be complemented by (and hence, partially independent from) issue positions. This effect will be most visible in countries where the context for populism is only weak or moderate, since populist attitudes and their correlation with key demographics and issues will be widespread, but their activation and connection to actual populist forces will be restricted to a limited amount of voters.

Based on this theory, we think that Chile is an ideal negative case study – a country where populist sentiments should be widespread but largely dormant. Compared to the rest of Latin America, Chile is a country that is characterized not only by its political stability but also a successful process of economic modernization. Since the end of Pinochet's authoritarian rule in 1989, Chile has been governed by established political parties and well-known political leaders; although some outsiders with a populist discourse have been presidential candidates from time to time, they have never obtained a sizeable share of the vote. Moreover, the economy has been growing continuously and an impressive decline in poverty has taken place. In addition, Chile is one of the least corrupt countries of the world; Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Chile as 21st out of 177 countries in 2014, together with Uruguay. Not by chance, Navia and Walker (2008) maintain that post-transition Chile has been immune to populism because of sound economic and social policies, strong institutions and a stable party system.

That said, a number of studies indicate potential problems of political unresponsiveness in the country. Bargsted and Somma (2013) have recently demonstrated that a process of de-alignment is taking place as there is a decreasing association between the political preferences of Chilean voters and their socioeconomic origin, religion and attitude toward the Pinochet regime, i.e. the main issues that have structured the political system since the transition to democracy in 1989. Moreover, Luna and Altman (2011) have shown that the party system is frozen at the elite level and increasingly disconnected from civil society. It is not a coincidence that the country has seen the emergence of massive waves of protests and the appearance of strong social movements in the last few years (Donoso 2013). In addition, Chilean citizens show very low trust in key institutions such as political parties and the congress, decreasing levels of voter turnout, and declining identification with the existing political parties and coalitions (UNDP 2014).

We agree that all these worrying signs indicate that Chilean democracy is increasingly under stress, which can potentially lead to rise of populist forces. Thus, contemporary Chile represents a unique case in Latin America, in which populism is not a dominant force but shows traceable signs

of its emergence. To use the language of Goertz and Mahoney, the case selection of our paper relies on the possibility principle, which states “that negative cases should be those where the outcome has a real possibility of occurring” (Goertz and Mahoney 2006, 179). In other words, the Chilean context is not very different from that of countries such as the U.S. and Netherlands, where there are no major failures of democratic governance, but political unresponsiveness and economic slowdown have led to growing political dissatisfaction with the existing political parties, facilitating the emergence of populist forces that alter the political landscape in important aspects and yet do not (yet) win absolute control of government.

That said, we also think it is important to establish a baseline for comparison, an “easy” case where populist attitudes are not only likely to be widespread but clearly connected to vote choice for electorally important parties. Here Greece is an ideal case. The country was heavily affected by the recession that hit Europe and other OECD countries starting in 2008. Because of a large fiscal deficit and low economic productivity, in 2011 the country was required by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—the so-called Troika—to undergo a series of painful fiscal adjustments in exchange for a bailout loan. The adjustment resulted in a severe decline in economic output, widespread unemployment, and a banking crisis. At the same time, the traditional parties were well known for patronage and corruption, whose fiscal mismanagement was a key contributor to the crisis. For several years, the country was ranked by Transparency International’s (CPI) as the most corrupt country in Western Europe, in 94th place globally as of 2012, roughly on a par with other countries in the Balkans.

Not surprisingly, Greeks blamed their economic crisis on the traditional parties and the Troika. Although a small slate of populist parties had competed in politics since the end of World War II (most notably the Communist Party, or KKE), a number of new populist parties emerged on the left and the right that framed the crisis on an elite conspiracy against the Greek people. The January 2015 election was called when the members of parliament, divided in their opinions about the bailout, were unable to elect a President of the Republic. While some of the disagreement was around a more traditional dimension based on socio-cultural issues, the most significant fault line concerned how Greece should interact with its international creditors. As the results of the election made clear, most voters supported the anti-bailout, anti-Troika parties. A new governing coalition was formed between two newer anti-bailout parties, SYRIZA and ANEL. Although these parties represented opposite views on the social dimension, both were regarded as highly populist.

4. THE SUPPLY OF POPULISTS

We start our analysis by clarifying which parties in each country can be considered populist and thus whether there was a ready supply. While the existence of such a supply may be thought of as an initial test of whether populist attitudes are active, in practice this is not a crucial test since there are usually populist parties available on the fringes of every electoral market. This is certainly the case in Chile and Greece, where at least one or two small populist parties have competed with traditional governing parties in elections since these countries' transitions to democracy.

Unfortunately, our analysis of Greek parties is ongoing and so we cannot report any final results (initial results suggest that the impressionistic labels are correct, with the KKE, ANEL, Golden Dawn and SYRIZA all using strong populist discourse). For Chile, however, we do have final results. Reporting these will give a sense of how this part of our research works.

In Chile, we measure the level of populist discourse among the top presidential candidates for the 2013 presidential election by performing a textual analysis of speeches and other documents from five of these candidates. These include the top four from the first round of the election – Michelle Bachelet, Evelyn Matthei, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, Franco Parisi – as well as Roxana Miranda. Miranda garnered a very small vote share in the election (just over 1 percent) and was not favored by more than a minuscule set of respondents in the survey, but because she is a shantytown activist with a notoriously fiery, we thought her discourse was very likely to be populist and could provide a helpful reference point.²

For every candidate except Miranda, the sample includes four texts: (1) their opening campaign speech (the one in which they announced their candidacy, always a written transcript), (2) their closing campaign speech (also a written transcript), (3) their participation in one of the televised presidential debates (the Anatel debate of 30-31 October 2013; only a video recording), and (4) their campaign platform (written text). For Miranda, her opening campaign speech was unavailable. Copies of all of these texts are available on request, except the Anatel debate which we viewed in its entirety on YouTube.³

² The four other candidates were Marcel Claude (Partido Humanista), Alfredo Sfeir (Partido Verde Ecologista), Ricardo Israel (Partido Regionalista de Independientes), and Tomás Jocelyn-Holt (independent). None of these received more than 3 percent of the vote in the first round, and texts for these candidates were often unavailable.

³ Anatel is the “Asociación Nacional de Televisión”, a professional association for all of the Chilean broadcast television stations with a national audience; it has hosted presidential debates since 1999. Because the 2013 debate was long (held over two days), there are multiple YouTube links.

The technique we use for analyzing these texts is the same used in our previous work (c.f. Hawkins 2009). Known as holistic grading (White 1985), it asks coders to read the text in its entirety, then assign a score based on their overall impression of its form and content. It requires a coding rubric and a set of anchor texts that match each possible score; the trick is to have a simple scale, one with no more values than there are distinguishable anchor texts. The technique is best suited for latent, diffuse attributes of the text such as tone, theme, or the quality of an argument. As in previous work, we have readers assign a score using an interval-level scale of 0=little or no populism, 1=moderate populism (specifically, a clear mention of the people in the populist sense, but with mention of other pluralist elements as well), and 2=strong populism (clear mention of the people, no countervailing pluralist elements). We use two readers and have both of them read each speech.⁴ Final scores for each candidate are an average of each coder's scores for all speeches in the set and range from 0 to 2.

Results for each candidate and party are found in Table 1 (again, Greek results are still in the works). Of the top four candidates in Chile, Enríquez-Ominami shows up as populist with a score of 0.9. However, he is only moderately so—Miranda shows up at a full 2.0. By way of comparison, the scores of Enriquez-Ominami are similar to the scores we gave in earlier work to the campaign speeches of Néstor Kirchner in Argentina and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, both of whom lost most traces of populism once they took office, and the scores of Miranda are similar to those of campaign speeches by Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa, who needless to say did not become less populist after entering government. The remaining candidates in Chile show only slight traces of populism, if at all. Parisi and Bachelet come in at 0.1 (a strong suggestion of populism appeared only in Bachelet's campaign platform and Parisi's closing campaign speech), while Matthei comes in last, without a trace of populism in any of her speeches or her platform.

(About here: Table 3)

As for the content of each populist candidate's discourse, coders note that both Enriquez-Ominami and Miranda tend to identify the traditional parties or coalitions as the elite that has subverted the will of the people, and they complain about the privileges of the rich and the problem

⁴ For this study we had undergraduate students perform the coding, one from Chile and the other from Mexico. The level of intercoder reliability was high, with 85 percent agreement between the coders, a Krippendorff's alpha of .82 (calculated for ordinal data) and a Cohen's kappa of .74.

of inequality. Where Enriquez-Ominami and Miranda differ is in the intensity of their discourse and in who they identify as the people. Miranda's discourse is much more emotional, with a uniformly angry and accusatory tone, as in the following text from her closing campaign speech:

Here we are, the nobodies, stepped on, soaked by the water cannon. They've thrown tear gas at us. They've called us criminals. They've accused us of being terrorists...But the dignity of the people is not for sale. The dignity of the people will not be surrendered! Not like they did 20 years ago...20 years ago they gave away the key resources of our country to transnational corporations! 20 years ago they kept us hidden beneath the rug... And that's how they've kept us divided, asleep, for more than 40 years since the coup, when they dared to murder our brethren, just because they dreamed of a different Chile. After 40 years, we are reborn.

In contrast, Enriquez-Ominami seems more reluctant to label his opponents as enemies and frequently resorts to subdued pleas for change, as in the following passage from his opening campaign speech:

The Alianza, the coalition, is today a coalition that doesn't believe in educational reform. That's obvious, because many of its ministers are the owners of the universities, and this government [of Sebastián Piñera] isn't going to attempt any serious reform. And the Concertación tells us that now they are going to do the things that they never did before. When they were united and energized they wouldn't do it, and now that they are tired and divided they tell us that they are going to. That's just not true. They can't do it because they don't believe in it.

Furthermore, for Miranda the people is constituted by the poorer classes, "the most humble," those she has tirelessly served as a shantytown activist. In a separate televised debate, she described these famously as "the nevers, the nobodies, the landless, the homeless, the toothless."⁵ And as the earlier quote indicates with its use of the first-person plural, she identifies personally with these groups. For Enriquez-Ominami, "the people" is a less well-defined category that sounds vaguely middle class and pluralist: "all Chile" or "the citizenry." Although he addresses many groups – workers in the formal sector, the extreme poor, college-age young adults (one of the key planks in his platform was free university education) – he uses the first-person plural only when he speaks to "the progressives," or those of his own movement.

5. MEASURING (LATENT) POPULIST DEMAND

⁵ From closing remarks in the ANP debate on 9 October 2013. Downloaded from YouTube on 20 April 2014 at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvnauvoaJpU>

Thus, in both Chile and Greece populist candidates and parties were readily available at the time of our study. The question raised by our theory is whether populist attitudes were widespread and whether these correlated with other politically relevant attitudes and behavior, especially a preference for the populist parties we have identified. In Greece, we expect both underlying attitudes and their connection to vote choice to be strong; in Chile, we also expect underlying attitudes to be strong, but we expect this demand to be latent and disconnected from vote choice for all but a handful of voters.

We start this part of our analysis by measuring the voters' underlying populist attitudes. We do this in Chile with the 2013 UNDP survey and in Greece with the January 2015 Hellenic Voter Study. The UNDP Survey in Chile is a nationally representative face-to-face survey conducted at the homes of respondents roughly at the time of the 2013 president election. 1,800 people were surveyed with probability proportional to population (ppt), using a sample that was stratified by region and zone (urban/rural); the resulting margin of error is 2.5% with 95% confidence, and the design effect is 1.15. The survey was in the field between 17 August and 9 October 2013 and was carried out by the firm STATCOM.

The Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study for the Greek Parliamentary elections of January 2015 is a web-based survey conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The recruitment process lasted from June 12 until July 16 using RDD (Random Digit Dialing). The respondents were asked to provide their email address in order to participate in a web survey conducted by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. For the mode of questionnaire completion, a mixed-mode survey design was used combining web (CAWI) and telephone interviews (CATI). The Web was the main mode of the survey and the telephone interview was used as an auxiliary method for the respondents who lacked Internet access and/or an email account (Andreadis, Kartsounidou, and Chatzimallis 2015).

To measure populist attitudes in each survey, we rely on an inventory developed by other scholars and us (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012), and which we translated into Spanish and Greek with the help of colleagues at the UNDP and at Aristotle University in Thessaloniki. Survey participants rated their level of agreement with a series of statements that capture populist discourse. Responses were gauged on a 5-point scale (1= very much agree and 5= very much disagree) and Table 2 presents the questions included in the two surveys in English (Spanish and Greek versions of the statements are listed in the Appendix).

(About here: Table 2)

Figure 1 reports the mean levels of agreement for all statements. Results for both countries are similar to each other, with up to two-thirds of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with each statement. For a few questions in Greece, results are somewhat weaker than in Chile, especially the “Ordinary citizen rather than experienced politician” statement. Generally, however, these results show that populist attitudes in both Chile and Greece are widespread. These results are quite similar to other results from U.S., Dutch, and Belgian surveys where levels of populist attitudes are also high (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Spruyt 2015).

(About here: Figure 1)

Thus, at first glance we get very similar results to what we find in other countries, suggesting that our conceptualization of populism works in Chile and Greece. But how do these individual statements hang together? In U.S. and Dutch surveys, factor analyses show that responses to these statements and a larger battery of statements designed to gauge other discourses cluster into roughly three dimensions that correspond to populism, pluralism, and elitism. Elsewhere, we report the results of a similar factor analysis for the Chilean results that shows the same pattern (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). Because the Greek survey includes only populist statements, we do not run any factor analysis here; however, Cronbach’s alpha for the populist statements in Greece is .75, and in Chile is .70; thus, the Greek results probably cluster as well as they do in Chile.

6. THE ACTIVATION OF POPULIST ATTITUDES

The strong presence of a coherent set of populist attitudes across both Chile and Greece (not to mention other countries such as the U.S. and Netherlands) is already important evidence for our argument. But the test is not really complete unless we can show that these attitudes are meaningfully connected to other politically relevant attitudes and behavior. Putting it another way, are these populist attitudes at least partially activated and playing a role in Chilean politics, and are they more fully activated and playing a stronger role in Greek politics? To complete this test, we perform a vote choice analysis for both countries.

Without making any use at all of our survey data, we have one fairly clear result already: a modest proportion of votes went to populist candidates in Chile, while a much larger proportion went to populist parties in Greece. In the actual first round of the 2013 election in Chile, Enríquez-Ominami was the third-place candidate; together with Miranda's vote share, this was at least 12 percent. In contrast, in Greece roughly 45 percent of the vote went to likely populist parties in 2012 (SYRIZA, ANEL, Golden Dawn, and KKE), while fully 53 percent went to these same parties in the January 2015 election; SYRIZA and ANEL then entered into a coalition government.

Nevertheless, we should avoid making too much of these results, which are only aggregate-level findings. To provide more convincing, individual-level evidence of the impact of populist attitudes, we statistically model Chileans' and Greeks' vote choice using the UNDP and Hellenic survey datasets. The dependent variable in each of these models is the presidential candidate (Chile) or political party (Greece) that the respondent preferred. In Chile this comes from a question (P107) that asks "who would you like to become the next president of Chile?" and is open-ended; we were able to code all but 3 percent of responses. In Greece, this comes from a two-part question (Q5LH-a. and Q1ELNES) that asks whether respondents voted in the January 2015 election and, if so, which party they voted for. The numbers in favor of each candidate or party are reported in Table 3, together with their actual percent of the vote from the first round. Looking just at the voters who express some candidate preference or who voted for a party (the next-to-last column in Table 3) we see that the vast majority of respondents in Chile favored Bachelet, with much smaller numbers mentioning Matthei, Enríquez-Ominami, and Parisi, in that order. In Greece, most voters preferred SYRIZA or New Democracy, with smaller numbers mentioning the remaining parties. These rank orders closely match the actual election results in both countries, although Bachelet, SYRIZA, and POTAMI received smaller percentages of votes in the first round than they received in their respective surveys, while Golden Dawn received a higher percentage.

(About here: Table 3)

As a quick initial take on our question, Table 4 shows how candidate preferences correlate with populist attitudes. We indicate only the top preferences because these are the only ones to generate enough responses to provide meaningful averages. In Chile, those preferring Enríquez-Ominami have the most populist attitudes, while Bachelet and "none" come in next; individuals preferring Matthei are the least populist. Likewise, in Greece those preferring SYRIZA, ANEL, GD,

and KKE have the most populist attitudes, while individuals preferring ND, PASOK, and POTAMI have the least populist attitudes. That said, populist attitudes are much better at distinguishing among the parties in Greece than in Chile. Among Chilean respondents, the range of populist attitudes by candidate preference is 0.5, while among Greek respondents the range is 0.8.

(About here: Table 4)

In our full models we use multinomial logit to model the likelihood of voting for each of these candidates and parties. Descriptive statistics for all independent variables are found in the Appendix. The main predictor of interest in all models is the populist attitude index. The models also include a standard array of controls for vote choice models, and which explore many of the issues favored in current studies of populist demand. These include measures of issue positions, assessments of government economic performance, partisan identity, and demographics (for more detail, see Appendix). In the models for Greece, we omit measures of partisan identity because the results of the survey question were highly correlated with vote choice (both of them ask about party choice). In Chile, we use support for Matthei as the baseline category because she was selected by a sizeable minority of respondents, and because she was clearly the least populist in her discourse; in Greece, we use New Democracy as the baseline for the same reasons, thus allowing us to compare coefficients in the Chilean models with the Greek ones more directly. Thus, coefficients indicate how each independent variable increases the probability of voting for another candidate versus Matthei or a party besides New Democracy.

Let us first look at the model for Chile. The results in Table 5 show that populist attitudes strongly affect support for Enríquez-Ominami. A number of issue positions matter as well, including environmental protection and constitutional change (positions on economic nationalizations also matter, but the coefficient is only marginally significant, at $p < .10$). Individuals who favor these positions are more likely to support Enríquez-Ominami, showing that his support is more left-leaning and supportive of systemic change. But populist attitudes are also significant predictors, even after controlling for these and other factors; indeed, they are more important for him than for any other top candidate. Other important controls include partisan identity (those who indicated support for the Alianza were much less likely to vote for Enríquez-Ominami than for Matthei) and sex (women are somewhat less likely to vote for him than for Matthei). Interestingly,

respondents who favor Enríquez-Ominami have a strongly positive outlook on their economic prospects for the next 10 years.

Although populist attitudes do not matter as much for the other Chilean candidates, a number of our variables are important predictors, and overall the models have small to moderate predictive power, similar to that found in other studies of this election (Morales Quiroga 2015). Partisan identity is an important predictor of support for almost all candidates, with those respondents favoring the Alianza being much less likely to vote for a different candidate than Matthei or to abstain or not express a preference. Economic issue positions and the desire for constitutional change do not distinguish support for the other main candidates from support for Matthei, although the desire for environmental protection does. Leftist economic views *do* make respondents more likely to not prefer any of the candidates or to not have a preference, suggesting that most of the main candidates were too economically centrist for a large segment of voters. Voters supporting Bachelet and Parisi tended to be younger than those supporting Matthei or Enríquez-Ominami. And less educated voters very clearly favored Bachelet over Matthei or the other candidate and options.

(About here: Table 5)

Table 6 presents the results of the Greek model. Here we find that populist attitudes are important predictors for all of the parties normally identified as populist, including KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL (the result for Golden Dawn fails to achieve statistical significance but is in the right direction). Interestingly, populist attitudes are also good predictors of a choice to abstain; to vote for one of the other, smaller parties; or to cast a blank/null ballot. Again, all of these are in comparison to the choice of New Democracy.

In terms of controls, there are few if any surprises. Voters for all of the populist parties tend to have more economically leftist views than those voting for New Democracy or POTAMI (those voting for PASOK are also slightly more leftist, although the difference is not statistically significant); in other words, economic ideology generally overlaps with the populist/non-populist dimension. In contrast, social issues (the GAL/TAN index) cut across economic ideology and populism, with voters for KKE, SYRIZA, and PASOK well to the left of New Democracy, and voters from ANEL and Golden Dawn roughly the same as or (in the case of Golden Dawn) well to the right of New Democracy. Retrospective evaluations of the economy generally fail to distinguish

any of these voters, except those of KKE (who are far more negative). And much as in Chile, the most positive prospective evaluations of the economy are associated with voters for one of the populist parties, KKE. In terms of other demographics, voters for KKE and PASOK tend to be older (these are in fact the two oldest parties in the list), while those for KKE and POTAMI tend to be better educated. Support for these parties is not distinguished by gender, except perhaps that of Golden Dawn, which has a large but statistically insignificant male direction.

(About here: Table 6)

Just how large is the effect of populist attitudes in these countries, especially in comparison to each other? The results of multinomial logit can be confusing if we look only at the coefficients, so to measure the substantive significance of this variable more precisely, we produce in Figures 2 and 3 a series of conditional probability plots for each of the candidates or parties. Each plot shows the probability of voting for the candidate—not in comparison with Matthei or New Democracy, but in comparison with all other options together—at different levels of the populist attitude index, with all other control variables set at their mean. The sample values of the populist attitude index are the mean and the one-standard-deviation intervals below and above this mean; 95 percent confidence intervals are shown around each estimate.

As can be seen, populist attitudes in Chile are positively associated with voting for Enríquez-Ominami, and, to a weaker degree, negatively associated with voting for Matthei and Parisi. For the other candidates and options in this country (including the option not to vote), the effect is not statistically significant. A shift from low to high levels of populism increases the probability of voting for Enríquez-Ominami by around 5 percent and decreases it for Matthei and Parisi by 2-2.5 percent. Considering that the actual percentages of people in the survey who said they would vote for these candidates (5.5, 9.2, and 4.4 percent, respectively), these are sizeable shifts. For Enríquez-Ominami in particular, populist attitudes are decisive for his support. However, most of Chileans' vote choice here is not affected by their populist attitudes. The choice of Bachelet, "don't know," "won't say," and "won't vote," which together accounted for 70 percent of the responses in this survey, are not really distinguishable in terms of this measure.

(About here: Figure 2)

In contrast, populist attitudes play a tremendous role in shaping the vote in Greece. Populist attitudes are clearly associated in a positive way with voting for SYRIZA; a shift from low to high populist attitudes increases the likelihood of voting for SYRIZA by a full 15 percent, 3 times the effect we find for Enríquez-Ominami in Chile. The next highest effect is for KKE and ANEL, where a similar shift in populist attitudes increases the likelihood of voting for these parties by around 1.5 percent; the effect for Golden Dawn is not noticeable. Again, considering the reported vote for these parties (46.5, 2.9, and 4.5 percent respectively), these are sizeable shifts. Furthermore, in Greece we find that populist attitudes also explain the negative vote for the pro-EU, non-populist parties. An equivalent swing in populist attitudes results in a 10 percent decrease in the probability of voting for ND, a 7.5 percent decrease for POTAMI, and a 3 percent decrease for PASOK. Given the actual percentages of respondents that said they voted for these parties (23.4, 15.3, 5.7), it makes sense to think of populist attitudes as having turned the results of this election.

(About here: Figure 3)

In summary, we find that populist attitudes are a modest predictor of the vote in Chile and a very strong predictor of the vote in Greece. While populist attitudes are widespread in both countries, they are highly active in determining vote choice in only one of them. This holds true even after controlling for a host of other factors, including issue positions, partisan identity, economic assessments, and demographics. This is not to say that populist attitudes are entirely dormant in Chile. They matter positively for at least one of the populist candidates (Enríquez-Ominami) and more weakly and negatively for two of the non-populist candidates (Matthei and Parisi)—precisely where we would expect them to. But they did not make enough of a difference to have turned the election. Were populist attitudes being activated among most of the voters, we would expect those attitudes to be better predictors of other options – voting for Bachelet, for example (suggesting that she was an appealing option for populists despite her own lack of populist discourse) or the decision not to vote (suggesting that the supply of populist candidates was inadequate to meet the growing populist demands of Chileans). Most of the vote in Chile hinged primarily on other factors traditionally included in vote choice models, such as issue positions, partisan identity, and judgments about economic performance.

Critics might argue that this is because the populist attitudes we are measuring are simply not important for political behavior. However, the results for Greece put the Chilean results in clearer

perspective, showing that populist attitudes can make an important difference for political behavior. In a context of rampant corruption and economic crisis, populist attitudes become important predictors of the vote for a wide range of parties, both populist and (in the negative) non-populist. This does not mean that other important predictors of vote behavior cease to be important—there are still important ideological and demographic differences among party supporters—but populist attitudes loom large.

7. CONCLUSION

Cross-regional and empirical studies of populism have started to gain traction in the last few years (e.g., de la Torre 2015; Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). This is of course a much welcome development. However, so far most research has been devoted to the measurement of the supply-side of populism. The few studies that have tried to consider the demand-side of populism work with proxy measures of the latter, such as anti-immigration in Western Europe and trust in political institutions Latin America. In other words, until now we do not know if the populist sentiments we find at the elite level are shared by the population and help explain their support for populist actors.

This paper begins to fill this research gap by measuring populist attitudes and analyzing the extent to which they explain voting behavior. Our findings demonstrate that this is the case. Relying on a vote-choice model with survey data for the 2013 presidential elections in Chile and the January 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece, we show that populist sentiments are positively associated with voting for populist forces: a candidate with a moderately populist discourse in the case of Chile (Marco Enríquez-Ominami, who obtained approximately 11 percent of the vote) and three parties in Greece that have been employing the populist set of ideas (ANEL, KKE, and SYRIZA, which obtained approximately 4, 6 and 36 percent of the vote, respectively). This finding gives support to the theory of populist voting developed in our paper. Populist attitudes are as widespread in Chile as in Greece, yet these attitudes are relatively dormant in the former and fairly active in the latter. To understand this difference it is crucial to take the political context into account.

The 2013 presidential elections in Chile were marked by a positive economic scenario and a fairly responsive political system. Not by chance, it is only a subset of the Chilean population that has activated these attitudes enough to support a populist candidate. By contrast, the January 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece were marked by an extremely negative economic scenario and a

major reshuffling of the political system as the once mighty Socialists of PASOK have almost disappeared and New Democracy has not been able to develop a convincing programmatic platform.

Yet, this paper has focused on only two countries, and in consequence, future studies could employ the techniques used here to test the validity of our theory of populist voting. It would be particularly interesting to advance large N comparisons, including cases from not only Western Europe and Latin America, but also Eastern Europe, North America and Scandinavian countries. By including a large a set of case from various world regions, we could better analyze the extent to which different contextual factors (e.g. economic performance, corruption levels, etc.) help us to explain the activation vis-à-vis latency of populist attitudes. At the same time, the analysis of more case studies could contribute to examine whether in countries where the populist attitudes are active, one could observe a competition between two orthogonal political conflicts: on the one hand, populism vs. anti-populism, and on the other hand, left vs. right. Finally, future research could try to show what voters with high levels of populist attitudes look like and what socializing forces generate their attitudes. And it could analyze the extent to which elitist and pluralist attitudes – the two logical opposites of populism – explain voting behavior.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1 Item Wording and Results of Populist Attitude Index

	2013 UNDP wording		2015 Hellenic wording	Chile Results (2013 UNDP)			Greek Results (2015 Hellenic)		
				N	mean	s.d.	N	mean	s.d.
P69a	Los políticos en el Congreso tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo	pop1	Οι πολιτικοί στο κοινοβούλιο πρέπει να ακολουθούν τη βούληση του λαού.	1,769	4.0	0.93	994	4.0	0.84
P69b	Las decisiones más importantes deberían ser tomadas por el pueblo y no por los políticos	pop2	Ο λαός, και όχι οι πολιτικοί, θα πρέπει να λαμβάνει τις σημαντικότερες πολιτικές αποφάσεις.	1,771	3.8	1.0	995	3.3	1.15
P69c	Las diferencias políticas entre la elite y el pueblo son más grandes que las diferencias que existen en el pueblo	pop3	Οι πολιτικές διαφορές μεταξύ της ελίτ και του λαού είναι μεγαλύτερες από τις διαφορές μεταξύ των επιμέρους ομάδων του λαού.	1,630	3.8	0.9	994	3.7	0.95
P69d	Preferiría ser representado por un ciudadano común que por un político experimentado	pop4	Ο λαός μπορεί να εκπροσωπείται καλύτερα από έναν απλό πολίτη παρά από έναν έμπειρο πολιτικό.	1,726	3.5	1.1	995	2.9	1.07
P69e	Los políticos hablan mucho y hacen muy poco	pop5	Οι εκλεγμένοι αξιωματούχοι μιλούν πάρα πολύ και κάνουν πολύ λίγα πράγματα.	1,761	4.3	0.8	996	4.2	0.78
P69f	En política se llama consenso a lo que realmente significa renunciar a los propios principios	pop6	Αυτό που οι άνθρωποι αποκαλούν "συμβιβασμό" στην πολιτική, στην πραγματικότητα είναι απλώς ξεπούλημα των αρχών εκείνου που συμβιβάζεται.	1,587	3.7	0.9	994	3.2	1.14

Table A.2 Independent Variables in Vote Choice Model for Chile

Variable	Label in survey	mean	s.d.
Populist attitudes (index of 6 populism items)	P69a-P69f	3.9	0.61
Economic issues I (index of attitudes towards public ownership of health, education, pensions, utilities and copper; 1=liberal 5=conservative)	P116a-P116b, P116f-P116h	1.4	0.32
Economic issues II (index of attitudes towards public ownership of media; 1=liberal 5=conservative)	P116c-P116e	1.2	0.20
Social issues (index of attitudes towards gay marriage, gay adoption, euthanasia, abortion, legalization of marijuana; 1=liberal 5=conservative)	P42a-P42f	3.1	0.91
Need for constitutional change (recoded so that 1=change not needed 2=undecided 3=moderate change 4=deep change needed)	P39i	3.5	0.88
Prioritizing protection of the environment (recoded so that 1=employment and economic growth should be prioritized, 2=don't know, 3=environment should be prioritized)	P122	2.5	0.85
Pocketbook retrospective (how they and their family live compared to 10 years ago, recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better)	P142	2.4	0.67
Pocketbook prospective (what the general situation of their family will be in 10 years, recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better)	P143	2.5	0.61
Measures of partisan sympathy , rendered as a series of dummy variables that include:	P108		
• Support for parties in the Nueva Mayoría		14.5% sympathize	
• Support for parties in the Alianza		6.8% sympathize	
• Support for all other parties or no party at all (baseline)		78.7% sympathize	
Sex (1= male 2 = female)	sexo	1.6	0.48
Age	P1	46.8	17.7
Education (1=elementary education incomplete 9=postgraduate)	P4	63.1% have complete secondary or higher	

Table A.3 Independent Variables in Vote Choice Model for Greece

Variable	Label in survey	mean	s.d.
<i>Populist attitudes</i> (index of 6 populism items)	pop1- pop6	3.6	0.66
<i>Economic ideology</i> (index of 5 items; 1=economic right 5=economic left)	eco1- eco5	3.0	0.83
<i>Social issues</i> (index of 12 items; 1=liberal/GAL 5=conservative/TAN)	tan1- tan12	2.9	0.65
<i>Retrospective evaluation of the economy</i> (How is your personal economic condition compared to 12 months ago? 1=Much better, 5= Much worse)	E9	3.9	0.93
<i>Prospective evaluation of the economy</i> (In regards to your personal economic condition in the 12 months to come, you would say that it will emerge ; 1=Much better, 5= Much worse)	E11	3.8	1.00
<i>Age</i>	age	44.7	13.48
<i>Sex</i> (1= male 0 = female)	male	0.6	0.50
<i>Education</i> (1=elementary education incomplete 9=postgraduate)	edu	15.1% have completed secondary or lower	

Tables and Figures

Table 1 Average Populist Discourse of Presidential Candidates and Party Leaders

Candidate (Chile)	Average Score
Roxana Miranda	2.0
Marco Enriquez Ominami	0.9
Michelle Bachelet	0.1
Franco Parisi	0.1
Evelyn Matthei	0.0
Party (Greece)	Average Score
SYRIZA	
New Democracy	
POTAMI	
ANEL	
Golden Dawn	
KKE	
PASOK	

Table 2 Items included in the 2013 UNDP and 2015 Hellenic surveys to measure populist attitudes (English translation)

UNDP question	Hellenic question	English wording
P69a	pop1	The politicians in [Congress/parliament] need to follow the will of the people.
P69b	pop2	The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
P69c	pop3	The political differences between the people and the elite are larger than the differences among the people.
P69d	pop4	I'd rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than an experienced politician.
P69e	pop5	Politicians talk too much and take too little action.
P69f	pop6	What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.




Figure 1 Populist attitudes in Chile and Greece

Table 3 Candidate Preferences in UNDP and Hellenic Surveys (P107 &)

Candidate	N	Percent	Percent (of those mentioning a candidate)	Percent in first round of election
Bachelet	612	34.9	60.5	46.7
Matthei	160	9.1	15.8	25
Enríquez-Ominami	96	5.5	9.5	11
Parisi	77	4.4	7.6	10.1
other	66	3.8	6.5	7.2
don't know	300	17.1		
won't say	315	18		
none	129	7.4		
Total	1,755	100	100	100

Party	N	Percent	Percent (of valid votes)	Percent in election
SYRIZA	341	34.13	44.23	36.3
ND	172	17.22	22.31	27.8
GD	13	1.30	1.69	6.3
POTAMI	112	11.21	14.53	6.1
KKE	21	2.10	2.72	5.5
ANEL	33	3.30	4.28	4.8
PASOK	42	4.20	5.45	4.7
Other	37	3.70	4.80	8.5
Invalid/blank	18	1.80		
No answer	140	14.01		
Abstention	341	7.01		
Total	999	100.0	100	100.0

Table 4 Populist Attitudes by Vote Choice in Chile and Greece

Candidate	N	Populist Attitudes
Bachelet	612	3.9
Matthei	160	3.6
MEO	96	4.1
Parisi	77	3.7
Claude	32	4.0
other	33	3.7
don't know	301	3.8
won't say	310	3.8
none	118	3.9
Total/mean	1739	3.9

Party		
SYRIZA	336	3.8
ND	166	3.2
GD	12	3.8
POTAMI	109	3.1
KKE	20	3.9
ANEL	31	3.9
PASOK	40	3.2
Other	37	3.7
Invalid	13	3.9
Refused	138	3.5
Abstention	68	3.7
Missing	13	3.5
Total/mean	998	3.6

Table 5 Model of Candidate Preference (P107) (Multinomial logit; baseline category is Matthei)

Variable	Bachelet		MEO		Parisi	
Populist Attitude Index	0.45	*	1.16	***	0.09	
Social ideology	0.10		-0.29		-0.19	
Economic ideology (Index 1)	-0.03		0.53		0.29	
Economic Ideology (Index 2)	-0.79		-1.63	+	-0.21	
Environmental Protection	0.38	**	0.46	**	0.40	*
Constitutional Change	0.13		0.41	*	0.10	
Pocketbook Retrospective	0.13		0.08		0.33	
Pocketbook Prospective	0.18		0.54	+	0.38	
Alianza	-4.35	***	-3.98	***	-5.35	**
Nueva Mayoría	15.33		13.57		11.22	
Age	-0.01	+	-0.01		-0.03	**
Sex	0.16		-0.57	+	-0.37	
Education	-0.63	***	0.02		0.10	
Constant	0.53		-5.02	*	-1.38	
Variable	Don't know		Won't say		None	
Populist Attitude Index	0.27		0.42	*	0.50	*
Social ideology	-0.10		0.22		-0.08	
Economic ideology (Index 1)	0.99	*	0.30		0.70	
Economic Ideology (Index 2)	-1.20	+	-0.74		-1.78	*
Environmental Protection	0.20		0.17		-0.12	
Constitutional Change	0.04		0.14		0.37	*
Pocketbook Retrospective	0.07		0.00		-0.12	
Pocketbook Prospective	0.20		0.42	+	0.14	
Alianza	-3.25	***	-2.85	***	-26.58	
Nueva Mayoría	13.47		14.59		13.15	
Age	-0.01		0.00		-0.02	*
Sex	-0.02		0.06		-0.12	
Education	-0.16		-0.17		-0.25	
Constant	0.10		-2.10		0.69	
Model statistics						
N	1,533					
pseudo R2	0.14					
+p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001						

Table 6 Model of Candidate Preference in Greece (Multinomial logit; baseline category is New Democracy)

VARIABLES	SYRIZA	GD	POTAMI	KKE	ANEL	PASOK
Populist Attitude Index	1.584***	1.022*	0.210	1.792***	1.390***	0.104
Economic ideology	-1.588***	-0.811*	0.0251	-1.825***	-1.555***	-0.469
GAL/TAN (TAN)	-1.567***	2.135***	-1.237***	-1.761***	0.459	-1.506***
Age	-0.00143	-0.0365	-0.00302	-0.0429**	0.0165	0.0249*
Retrospective evaluation of the economy	-0.169	0.0122	-0.107	-0.802***	-0.159	-0.0315
Prospective evaluation of the economy	-0.330**	0.0557	0.0994	0.610**	-0.193	0.0586
Education	-0.0935	-0.309*	0.124	-0.374**	-0.190	-0.186
Male	0.0386	0.766	0.0560	-0.400	0.355	0.128
Constant	7.317***	-8.141*	1.930	7.203**	-1.514	4.367*
N	914	914	914	914	914	914

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	Other	Invalid/blank	Refused	Abstention	Missing
Populist Attitude Index	1.276***	1.230***	0.985***	1.587***	0.0259
Economic ideology	-1.127***	-1.204***	-0.860***	-0.535**	0.168
GAL/TAN (TAN)	-1.635***	0.161	-0.983***	-1.653***	-2.632**
Age	-0.00481	0.00968	0.00337	-0.0381***	0.0338
Retrospective evaluation of the economy	-0.114	0.226	-0.0871	-0.252	-0.193
Prospective evaluation of the economy	0.440*	0.167	0.306**	0.0129	-0.347
Education	-0.0745	-0.00949	0.00271	0.0618	0.0882
Male	0.0974	0.911	0.401	-0.183	0.340
Constant	2.049	-5.599*	1.100	2.588	2.453
N	914	914		914	914

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Figure 2 Conditional Probabilities of Voting in Chile, by Populist Attitudes (95% confidence intervals)




Figure 3
Conditional Probabilities of Voting in Greece, by Populist Attitudes (95% confidence intervals)