

Authoritarianism and the Populist Within: Experimental Evidence from Chile*

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Two decades ago, three celebrated Latin American writers and public intellectuals published *Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot* (Apuleyo Mendoza, Montaner and Vargas Llosa 1997), to grapple with the persistence of populist-nationalist political leaders throughout Latin American history. While they reported a retreat from such leadership styles in the late 1990s, Vargas Llosa decried populism's reemergence in the region in *Foreign Policy* with "The Return of the Idiot" (2007). This caricature had at least some empirical grounding: several Latin American countries indeed witnessed a rollback of democratic freedoms and rights in the 2000s (Diamond 2008; Puddington 2007, 2010). Calling Latin American populists idiots does little to understand their success. Instead, we ask what kinds of individuals are attracted to populism.

By populism we mean a Manichaeian discourse that sees politics as a struggle between a reified "will of the people" and a conspiring elite. Accordingly, populism should be thought of as a moral discourse in which "the people," who have a clear and unified will, have been taken advantage of by the corrupt establishment "elites" (Hawkins 2009). As such, populism can be viewed as a latent ideational phenomenon. Although it lacks the conscious and programmatic articulation of an ideology, populism may contain some programmatic content (e.g., popular sovereignty) and latch onto "host" ideologies from across the political spectrum. Thus, populism can help justify a broad array of policy positions (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Hawkins et al. 2014). From the perspective of would-be leaders, this flexibility gives populism its appeal and its power.

Why do citizens support or reject populist leaders? One strand of scholarship claims populist attitudes can be measured and are widespread (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Hawkins et al. 2014). Like personality traits, populist attitudes are

theorized to become active only in contexts and issue frames that make populist discourses sensible. Hawkins (2010) suggests mere policy failures are not enough to spark populist attitudes. Rather a context of systematic corruption is needed to lend credence to frames suggesting malevolent leaders are responsible for the policy failures. Populist attitudes arise, as Hawkins et al. (2014) note, in response to threats to one's social values as much as, if not more, than threats to one's material interests (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; McCann 2009; Stenner 2005).

Working in this vein, we theorize that populism arouses the kinds of emotions and latent attitudes that disrupt democracy's fragile equilibrium. Namely, we expect populist messages activate a noxious mixture of authoritarian values that shape citizens' evaluations of populists and, ultimately, their willingness to vote for them. We test these expectations using an experimental approach fielded among a national sample of Chileans. The results suggest that populist discourse triggers authoritarian attitudes that alter individuals' evaluations of the leadership of and affect towards a populist candidate. In turn, leadership evaluations and affect are strongly associated with electoral support for a populist candidate. These findings have key theoretical and political implications. By understanding some of the micro-processes that produce populism in Latin America, we begin to flesh out major linkages between political communication and self-governance more broadly. Politically, both would-be populists and non-populist candidates ("elitists" and "pluralists") can learn how to tailor their message in order to activate (and deactivate) populist attitudes.

The rest of this study is organized as follows. First we develop theoretical expectations about the activation of populist attitudes based on the literature on authoritarian values. Next we describe the contours of our case selection. Then we

explain our experimental methods and data collection. After reporting the findings of the analyses in light of our expectations, a final section concludes.

Authoritarianism, Normative Threat & Populist Support

In order to understand how populists garner political support, we must consider the interplay of populist messages and the attitudes and behaviors they encourage. Work by Hawkins et al. (2014) suggests otherwise dormant populist attitudes can be awakened and harnessed for political means by message frames that credibly equate policy failures to elite failures and champion a leader to act according to the people's will. Specifically, populist attitudes spike in the presence of populist rhetoric that emphasizes the societal or normative threat that reigning elites represent. Building on this insight, we focus on a psychological construct theoretically linked to the creation and maintenance of social norms: authoritarianism. We posit that authoritarian predispositions shape how populist discourse is processed and, in turn, alter evaluations and probability of supporting populist leaders.

The nature, origin, and consequences of authoritarianism have fueled many studies. In their seminal study, Adorno and his colleagues (1950) conceived of an authoritarian personality as one that shows a high degree of cultural conformity, a need for situational structure, and find appealing passionate leadership. To measure the level of authoritarianism, and to test their theory of authoritarian fascism, the author created the F scale of authoritarianism. The F Scale measured individuals' conventionalism, propensity of submission, superstition, propensity of stereotyping, authoritarian aggression, cynicism, among other traits that the authors argued predicted authoritarianism. In this way, authoritarianism is related to a conservative

ideology that might predict voting for right-wing conservative candidates (Higgins 1965). The F scale has since been critiqued on several grounds. Namely, that it measures old-fashioned Victorian values rather than authoritarian ones; that because the direction of the questions always aim at what the authors consider to be authoritarianism there is a bias towards over-representing the authoritarian personality of the respondents; and that some respondents can guess the concepts the scale measures and lie when answering it (Gul and Ray 1989).

Further work on authoritarian personality developed improved measurements but kept thinking of authoritarianism as a type of personality linked to right-wing or political conservatism. For example, Altemeyer (1996) conceptualizes right-wing authoritarianism as a personality trait, and those who exhibit high levels of this trait need little pressure to submit to authority and attack others. Accordingly, his Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale seeks to measure right-wing authoritarianism based on three attitudinal clusters. The first includes orientations that measure authoritarian submission, whereas the second cluster measures levels authoritarian aggression, and the third measures conventionalism. Altemeyer's instrument questions tapping each of these attitudinal clusters worded in different directions, sometimes agreement with the question would depict an authoritarian attitude sometimes it would not. Critics note that the questions load on more than one dimension, thus measuring something else besides authoritarianism (Duckitt and Bizumic 2013). Researchers have proposed newer versions of the scale but the issue of multidimensionality persists.

Feldman (2003) and Stenner (2005, 2009) see authoritarianism as a predisposition to favor obedience and conformity, which represent oneness and sameness, over freedom and difference. As such, they identify an authoritarian predisposition by gauging childrearing values; those people who believe *good manners* and *obedience* are

the most important values to teach children score high on the authoritarian predisposition, while those who choose *imagination* and *independence* score at the libertarian end of the scale (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, 2009). Thus these scholars depart from ideological-laden questions to measure authoritarianism, so authoritarians can be left or right-wing ideologically speaking. They also disagree with Altemeyer's (1996) contention that authoritarianism is a salient trait. Although Stenner (2005, 2009) finds authoritarian attitudes are key drivers of intolerant attitudes across domains and cultures, since it is a predisposition, highly authoritarian individuals do not always act in an authoritarian way: a normative threat is required to trigger the authoritarian predisposition. The most effective normative threat is one that endangers the feeling of oneness and sameness.

In the political sphere, researchers theorize that people with authoritarian predispositions derive the feeling of oneness from a common authority and the feeling of sameness from common values (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, 2009). Authoritarians might feel normative threat in the political arena from questionable or questioned authorities, as well as disrespect for leaders or leaders unworthy of respect. Therefore, when the majority of the citizenry is content with the institutions and political leaders, voicing a populist discourse might trigger authoritarians to react more strongly against such speech because they perceive it as a threat to their accepted authority and political values. Conversely, populist rhetoric that links the political class to a corruption of authority and common values might spur authoritarians to support leaders who promise to restore a more harmonious status quo ante.

Case Selection

We test this argument with an experiment that features a known but not very popular presidential candidate from Chile's most recent election, Roxana Miranda, who ran a populist campaign. Our timing was propitious: at the time we fielded the study, April 2015, Chilean elites had become embroiled in a corruption scandal whose breadth and gravity are without precedent in the country's post-authoritarian era. Thus we have the advantage of a real populist, conveying a populist message, in a context ripe for populism (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).

Miranda based her campaign on criticizing the political elite and the government while idealizing the role of the people to rule better than the current elite. Thus, it would be credible for voters to have listened to her giving a populist speech. Moreover, although not popular as she obtained 1.24% of the valid votes, Miranda's speech could be perceived as a threat against the Chilean political system by citizens with authoritarian predispositions.

Assumptions and Expectations

As we have already said, we depart from an ideational definition of populism (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Hawkins 2010). In terms of authoritarianism we base our study around Feldman and Stenner's framework, in which individuals are considered to hold different levels of an authoritarian predisposition that, when interact with their environment, trigger actual attitudes. A predisposition is "any preexisting and relatively stable tendency to respond in a particular way to certain objects or events or events" (Stenner 2005, 14). Stenner's definition of authoritarianism has different appeals. First, if we consider

authoritarianism a predisposition then we can have a reasonable expectation of the circumstances that can turn on and off such predisposition. Second, the measurement of the authoritarian predisposition is non-political, but it is based on child-rearing principles. Thus when we look at the political consequences of authoritarian attitudes we can explain political attitudes and behavior with a nonpolitical variable, avoiding endogenous relations between the phenomena we are trying to explain and the factors we use to explain it.

Authoritarianism is distinct from status quo conservatism, as authoritarian citizens might endorse change if they are disillusioned with the current political leaders and/or if public opinion is polarized. Conservatives do not like change, while authoritarians do not like difference (Stenner 2005, 2009).

According to Stenner, people's authoritarian predisposition responds to a normative threat to what makes us "us." Therefore, whether authoritarians will follow a populist discourse depends on the political context, specifically of the occurrence of either one or both of the following situations. The first situation is when citizens with high levels of authoritarian predisposition feel disillusioned with mainstream politicians who they think are responsible for dividing their own group or society as a whole. In such a context, there is a high probability that these individuals would feel attracted to a populist discourse. The second situation is when authoritarians perceive a polarized public opinion within their group or across society. A divided public is likely to make them feel uneasy, since it would show the danger of division within their own group. In this context we conceptualize two possible outcomes. In the first, authoritarians would follow a populist politician who promises the unification and prevalence of their group. In the second, authoritarians would react against the populist candidate that is threatening the "sameness" of their

society. The main reactions among authoritarians are social and political intolerance to those who they perceive as threats to their group. In that way, authoritarians can be, as populists, right or left-wing oriented.

In terms of the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and populist discourse the experiment we ran is a hard test for the effect of populism on authoritarian attitudes because, as we have said, the candidate we chose, Roxana Miranda, received only 1.24% of the valid votes. In other words, Miranda's electoral standing was not a threat to anyone, as she could not really aspire to win the presidency. Miranda's discourse pitted "the people", more specifically the working class, against the ruling elite.

In spite of Piñera's low approval ratings, only 32% of the citizens approved his performance as president in 2013 (Latinobarómetro 2013), voters were not completely dissatisfied with the political elite as the majority voted in the first round for two established female candidates: Michelle Bachelet (left-wing coalition) and Evelyn Matthei (right-wing coalition). Bachelet, who had previously been president, won the second round. Therefore, one could argue that there were not the contextual conditions for authoritarians to feel persuaded towards a populist discourse at the time of the presidential election in Chile. Nevertheless, we fielded this study in a more toxic political atmosphere. Political elites from across the political spectrum and within the government have been implicated in a series of campaign finance and influence trafficking scandals. By April 2015, then, the conditions that nurture populism – a systematically corrupted ruling class that has violated long-standing social norms, in this case transparency, honesty, and rule of law – are present to a far greater extent than at the last elections. For her part, Roxana Miranda has kept a relatively low profile during the political crisis, confining herself largely to criticizing

incumbents, big business, and banks on Twitter rather than taking to the airwaves or newspapers.

We believe that if authoritarians react to the populist discourse of Roxana Miranda in our video they would do so in two ways: evaluating Miranda more negatively while expressing a lower tendency to vote for her. There are a couple of reasons for this negative reaction. Most voters, except probably the less advantaged, would not identify with Miranda's discourse because it targeted members of lower social classes exclusively, stressing differences in society. As a consequence, authoritarians would not support a populist leader who threatens the unity of their group in such an unstable time. We test this hypothesis by including a measure of authoritarian attitudes, as well as asking respondents to evaluate Miranda's leadership and the probability of voting for her.

The measure of authoritarianism follows Feldman and Stenner's model by including questions related to child rearing values (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, 2009). We asked respondents to choose and order in level of importance five traits that are important for children to learn in their homes. Among the seven traits that the respondents could choose from we included obedience and good manners, the two traits that Stenner theorized and found mapped on an authoritarian predisposition across countries.¹ We also included a question related to the probability of voting for Miranda and respondents answered a question related to

¹ The question in Spanish reads: "Pensando en las cualidades que se pueden fomentar en los niños en el hogar, si tuviera que escoger ¿cuáles considera usted que son las 5 cualidades más deseables que deberían de tener los niños? Y de esas cualidades que son deseables por favor enumérelas en orden de importancia donde 1 es la menos importante y 5 es la más importante." Options: Buenos modales, independencia, sentido de responsabilidad, imaginación, obediencia, que sean limpios y ordenados, curiosidad.

whether she was a good leader.² The answers to both leadership evaluation and probability of voting were arrayed on a 7-point Likert scale.

Research Design and Measurement

Turning to the analysis of the data, recall that subjects were randomly assigned to view either a non-populist or a populist message presented in a one-minute video clip of Roxana Miranda, candidate for the Chilean presidency in 2013, taken during a televised candidate debate. We classify subjects who viewed the populist video part of the treatment group and those who view the non-populist clip as part of the control group. . In total 302 were in the control group and 303 subjects in the treatment condition.³ A manipulation check showed that subjects who viewed the populist frame video rated Roxana Miranda's message significantly more critical of Chile's political elites than those who viewed the control message. Spanish transcriptions of the videos are provided in the appendix, English translations of the clips are provided below.

Control Group: Non-Populist Message Frame

“It is super simple to fix this. Look, I have here a tool [plastic pipe] that I brought to demonstrate this disposable system. This disposable system is plastic, disposable, it breaks. This contaminates. This [copper pipe] is what we need. This is ours. By recovering copper we are going to have free education, housing, health, and all the rights that have been

² The questions in Spanish read: “¿Qué tan acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con la siguiente afirmación: Roxana Miranda es una buena líder?” And “Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales y Roxana Miranda estuviera compitiendo para la presidencia ¿qué tan probable sería que votara por ella?”

³ The randomization worked as both conditions are balanced in relevant sociodemographic characteristics: age, gender, and income.

privatized. Only with this. And this is what they are selling today. We have to buy, on top of all that, this pipe from abroad. It is simple what we are proposing. To recover our strategic resources is key. And not only in economics. We need to recover the communications media in order to educate our people. Today our people are dis-informed and that is why we have the reality of the regions, the impoverished regions. Look at Calama, I just traveled to Calama, where they extract the income of Chile, one of the most impoverished regions, the water contaminated for 40 years with arsenic.”

Treatment Group: Populist Message Frame

“I want to address my people. If God left us, or gifted us, the land, the cordillera, the fields, the fish and the fruits, the rivers, who gave authorization to five families to do or undo what they want with our rights? Who gave them permission to leave my unborn grandchildren nothing to eat? We are the ones who work. We are the ones who clean their toilets. We are the ones who are working in the mines. We are the ones who work for this country. How long will they trample us? For the first time in Chile we have risen up from below, from all the public policies without common sense. For the first time a popular candidacy of the poor people, of the nobodies, of the landless, of the homeless, of the toothless, of my neighbors who clean toilets, of the thousands of Chileans who are trampled. And do you think that I’m going to believe today that they are going to change my life? If they have never done it in history?”

Variables

In the analyses below, the dependent variable is evaluations of Roxana Miranda as leader. Namely, subjects were asked, “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Roxana Miranda is a good leader.”⁴ Responses are recoded so that (1) indicates the most disagreement and (7) indicates the most agreement.

In terms of an authoritarian predisposition there are two factors that measure it according to the theory of the authoritarian dynamic: obedience and good manners. Feldman and Stenner argue that people who consider these two concepts important for children to learn over other have an authoritarian predisposition (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, 2009). Therefore, we created an authoritarian predisposition scale by putting together those respondents who chose and ranked good manners and obedience as the first or second values that children should learn at home.⁵ The measure takes three values; the highest value meaning the highest level of authoritarian predisposition. The sample distribution across the authoritarian scale is as follows: 48% in the lowest value, 45% in the middle, and 7% in the highest. Thus, 52% of our sampled showed some level of authoritarian predisposition.⁶

⁴ In Spanish this item reads, “¿Qué tan acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con la siguiente afirmación: Roxana Miranda es una buena líder? (1) Muy en desacuerdo to (7) Muy de acuerdo.


⁵ Surprisingly these two items do not go together. The correlation between good manners and obedience is negative and statistically significant ($\rho = -0.15$, $p = 0.00$). Principle components analysis (PCA) shows that both items load on different components. Therefore, we ran all the analysis on the scale and the individual factors. The results are similar between the Authoritarian Scale and the good manners variable, while there are not significant results in the models ran with the obedience variable. Therefore, it seems that the effect of the scale is mostly driven by the good manners factor.

⁶ The relationship between the two variables included in the scale do not relate to each other in the expected direction. The correlations between “good manners” and “obedience” is -0.15 , but we created the scale following Feldmann and Stenner’s model. Stenner tested the model using

Results

First of all, we looked at the relationship between leadership evaluations and vote intention and find that, as the literature establishes, people significantly tend to vote for a candidate whom they consider to be a good leader (Funk 1999; Kinder 1986; Mattes et al. 2010; Pierce 1993).

Figure 1. Vote Intention and Candidate Leadership Evaluations



Note: Line represents predicted values of voting for Miranda at different levels of leadership evaluation; $b = 0.085$, $t(603) = 2.04$, $p < 0.05$. Leadership explained a proportion of the variance in the probability of voting for Miranda, $R^2 = 0.01$; $F(1,603) = 4.15$, $p < 0.05$.

We turned to look at the effects of populism and the authoritarian predisposition on the probability of voting for Miranda (Table 1). Model 1 examines possible treatment effects of populist discourse on vote intentions and finds none. Model 2 adds our index

the World Values Survey and found a positive relation between these values across countries. The negative relation among these values in Chile might be due to idiosyncratic social factors.

of authoritarianism to the equation. The results show that there is not a direct effect of authoritarianism on the vote intention for Miranda. And according to the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term of authoritarianism and the experimental condition⁷ in Model 3, authoritarianism does condition the effects of populism on the likelihood of voting for the populist, Miranda. From this analysis we can conclude that authoritarianism does not bear directly on vote intentions for populist candidates.

Table 1. Effects of Populism and Authoritarianism on Vote

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Populist Discourse	0.051 (0.252)	0.058 (0.247)	0.103 (0.259)
Authoritarian Predisposition		-0.233 (0.167)	-0.188 (0.220)
Populist Discourse × Authoritarian Predisposition			-0.088 (0.182)
Constant		2.869* (0.172)	2.846* (0.181)
N	605	605	605
R²	0.00	0.005	0.005

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

* p < 0.05

Finally, we tested for the effect of authoritarian predispositions on the evaluation of Miranda as a good leader (Table 2 and Figure 2).

⁷ The marginal effect of the interaction is not statistically significant.

Table 2. Effects of Populism and Authoritarianism on Candidate Evaluation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Populist Discourse	0.131 (0.179)	-0.134 (0.181)	0.133 (0.214)
Authoritarian Predisposition		0.075 (0.110)	0.343* (0.143)
Populist Discourse × Authoritarian Predisposition			-0.522* (0.197)
Constant		3.555* (0.131)	3.421* (0.181)
N	605	605	605
R²	0.001	0.002	0.008

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.


*p < 0.05

Here, we get a little more traction. Although we do not observe any treatment effects – leadership evaluations are unaltered by populist discourse– and we do not see a direct effect of authoritarianism on leadership evaluations, we do see a moderating effect. Namely, populism affects candidate leadership evaluations differently depending on one’s level of authoritarian predisposition.

Figure 2 helps explain better the results of the effect of the interaction term on respondents’ evaluation of Miranda. The graph shows that at higher levels of authoritarian predisposition voters tend to evaluate Miranda more poorly as a leader in the populist condition than in the control one. In other words, authoritarians react negatively at Miranda only in the populist condition, probably because they perceive her as a normative threat. It is possible that in the control condition, they might not remember her populist discourse or might remember that she did not get many votes. Finally, we could expect that authoritarians’ probability of voting for Miranda in the

populist condition be mediated, in a negative way, by their evaluation of her leadership.⁸

Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Populism and Authoritarianism on Candidate Leadership Evaluations



Conclusion

In this paper we wanted to explore the effect of different levels of authoritarian predisposition on the reaction to a populist discourse. In order to assess the effect of a populist discourse in the citizenry it is not sufficient to assess the political and social contexts where the populist politician evolves but the psychological attributes of the citizens that might make them more or less prone to support a populist discourse.

The test for our hypotheses was a hard one, as we used a former presidential candidate in Chile who did not obtain many votes so her popular support is low. In

⁸ We base this argument on the evidence we found of the positive effect of respondents' evaluation of Miranda's leadership capacity on the probability of voting for her.

spite of the political turmoil that was taking place in Chile in terms of corruption scandals among the political elite at the time we ran the experiment, Miranda kept rather a low profile away from the mainstream media. Her low profile affected us in two ways. First, people in general would not consider her a serious threat to the establishment, so they might have dismissed her in the populist condition, minimizing the chances of finding an effect. Second, respondents in the *control* condition might have had lingering memories of her populist discourse that influenced their responses to questions about vote intention and leadership qualities beyond the reactions we sought to prime in the video.

The results of our analysis show that taking into account citizens' authoritarian predispositions can be relevant when assessing the effect of a populist discourse. People with an authoritarian predisposition tended to give Miranda significantly lower evaluations as a leader after viewing the populist video than those with the same predispositions in the control group. We have to take this finding cautiously, as the factors in the scale of authoritarianism in this sample do not go well together, contrary to previous research in other countries (Stenner 2005, 2009). It is likely that the effect is driven by one of the components, the value of teaching children good manners at home. In spite of this cautionary note, it is noteworthy that, using this measure, authoritarians reacted significantly more harshly against Miranda in the populist condition. The populist video could represent a threat for authoritarians' in-group, as it attacks directly the political elites, triggering the authoritarian predisposition. At the same time, Miranda's message posits the one group of society, the lower class, against the rest, thus threatening society's unity. While we did not find any direct relation between the authoritarian predisposition and the experimental conditions on the probability of voting for Miranda, we think that the probability of voting for her

might be mediated by the effect of the populist discourse on people's evaluation of her leadership.⁹

This is a first approach looking at the effect of populist discourse on people's reactions mediated by their authoritarian predisposition. We think this is an exciting new area of study of the causes of populism, and that by varying political, social, and economical contexts we will be able to learn more about the differentiating effect of populism on voters' behavior.

⁹ Under a one-tail test people who score in the middle of the authoritarian scale tended to vote less for Miranda in the treatment condition compared to the control group ($dy/dx=-0.37$, p -value=0.10)

Appendix

Here we provide the original Spanish transcriptions of the video clips we used in our experiment.

Control Group: Non-Populist Message Frame

“Es súper simple resolver esto. Mire yo tengo aquí una herramienta que traje para demostrar este sistema desechable. este sistema desechable, es plástico, desechable, se rompe. Esto es contaminante. Esto es lo que nosotros necesitamos. Esto es nuestro.

Recuperando el cobre vamos a tener educación gratuita, vivienda, salud y todos los derechos que han sido privatizados. Sólo con esto. Y esto hoy en día lo están vendiendo. Tenemos que comprar, más encima, esta cañería en el extranjero. "Es simple lo que nosotros estamos planteando. Recuperar los recursos estratégicos es clave. Y no solamente es lo económico. Necesitamos recuperar los medios de comunicación para educar a nuestro pueblo. Hoy en día nuestro pueblo está desinformado y por eso es que tenemos la realidad de las regiones, las regiones empobrecidas. Mira Calama, yo acabo de viajar a Calama, donde se saca el sueldo de Chile, una de las regiones más empobrecidas, el agua contaminada hace 40 años con arsénico.”

Treatment Condition: Populist Message Frame

Quiero dirigirme a mi pueblo: Si Dios nos dejó o nos donó la tierra, la cordillera, los campos, los peces y las frutas, los ríos ¿Quién les dio autorización a cinco familias para que hicieran y deshicieran con nuestro derecho? ¿Quién les dio permiso para dejar a mis nietos no nacidos sin comida? Somos nosotros los que trabajamos. Somos nosotras las que les hacemos el aseo. Somos nosotros los que estamos en la minera. Somos

nosotros los que trabajamos por este país. ¿Hasta cuándo nos pisotean? Por primera vez en Chile nos hemos levantado desde abajo, desde todas sus políticas públicas sin sentido común. Por primera vez, una candidatura popular del pueblo pobre, de los nunca, de los nadie, de los sin tierra, de los sin casa, de los sin diente, de mis vecinas que hacen aseo, de los miles de chilenos que estamos pisoteados. Y ¿ustedes creen que yo les voy a creer hoy día que van a cambiar la vida mía? Si no lo han hecho por historia.

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