

## Using Surveys to Measure the Populist Attitudes of Political Elites

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**Abstract:** Research on the phenomenon of populism has a long history in Europe and Latin America. Most studies up to now have focused on the clarification of the concept of populism as well as on explaining the success of populist contenders. Recently, empirical research has also advanced in the task of measuring the complexities of populism, e.g. through textual analysis of political speeches or public opinion surveys to measure populist attitudes of voters. However, with the exception of key political figures like presidents, prime ministers and political parties in general, the inclination of political elites towards populist attitudes has yet to be explored. This paper sets out to close this gap and presents a first glance on two genuine datasets measuring populist attitudes through both candidate and parliamentary elite surveys.

## **1. Introduction**

The phenomenon of populism poses many challenges to comparativists around the world. Due to different perspectives on the topic, researchers have especially struggled with conceptual clarity. In recent years, however, they have come to more agreement on how to define populism (e.g. Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, Panizza 2005). The emergence and success of populist parties is associated with some sort of economic or political crisis, which comes along with the dealignment of partisan attachments. This allows populist contenders to attract discontented voters with an anti-establishment appeal (Barr 2009). It is this kind of rhetoric – usually articulated around a discursive claim to represent ‘the people’ against a hostile establishment frustrating their demands – that seems to unite populist parties (Laclau 2005). In this paper we present the findings of two research projects designed to test if and how populist attitudes among political elites can be measured. Studying populist attitudes may enhance our ability to assess the position of each political candidate within the political system. To do so, we define populism – in line with ideational and discursive approaches – as a “thin-centred ideology” (Freeden 1998: 750), a formal discursive articulation, dividing society into two relatively homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the people versus the elite (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). The exact content of this ideology depends on secondary elements that may be combined with such an appeal. From this perspective populism may be related to many contents, structures, and strategies and thus acquire antithetical political connotations.

One major advantage of such an approach is that it lends itself well to measuring populist phenomena in a comparative way. Based on this approach, empirical research has recently advanced in the task of measuring the complexities of populism, e.g. through textual analysis of political speeches or public opinion surveys to measure populist attitudes of voters

(Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012, Hawkins 2009). However, with the exception of key political figures like presidents, prime ministers and political parties in general (Wiesehomeier 2015), the inclination of parliamentary elites towards populist attitudes has yet to be explored.

This paper sets out to close this gap and presents two new datasets measuring populist attitudes through candidate and parliamentary elite surveys: the Greek Candidate Survey from 2015 and the Parliamentary Elites Survey from the University of Salamanca in Panama and Uruguay in 2015. Both datasets asked respondents (candidates and elected parliamentarians) to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements on a five point Likert scale, which was used to create an index of populist attitudes. In what follows we shall provide first preliminary descriptive evidence on the distribution of this index of populism and its components among different political parties in these countries and its relationship with the ideological left-right divide. In analysing the data, this paper also seeks to investigate populist attitude patterns and link them to other relevant aspects. At any rate, our central aim is to answer the following research question: Can we use a theoretically informed battery of survey items and the resulting populism index to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties?

The paper is structured as follows: in the following section we elaborate on the definition of populism. In the third section we discuss measurement followed by a description of the two datasets. We provide first descriptive empirical evidence on Greece, Panama, and Uruguay in section four. Section five concludes.

## **2. What is Populism?**

As mentioned above, for decades populism posed a conceptual challenge to comparative researchers. It has been largely defined along the lines of phenomenological typologies based on feature lists or core characteristics (e.g. organizational structure, social base) which led to many versions of populism distinguished by a series of adjectives or prefixes (Schedler 1996:292) and finally to different case selections (see especially Weyland 2001). In recent years, however, researchers aiming at cross-regional comparisons have come to more agreement on how to define populism (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Instead of focusing on narrow and region specific definitions of populism, they follow a broader conceptualization based on an ideational approach. In line with the common reference to an anti-elite, anti-party, or anti-establishment discourse, and with an orientation charted by earlier definitions put forward by Canovan and Laclau (Laclau 1980, Canovan 1999), populism is defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543, italics in the original). This approach, nevertheless, is open to use narrower definitions of the concept to distinguish subtypes of the phenomenon. For example, the contents of the such an, often, vague discourse do not form part of its conceptual kernel to the extent that they are determined through its articulation with other ideological, programmatic or personalistic elements (e.g. socialism, neo-liberalism, or charisma). Only the combination of a populist discourse with specific other ideological contents can determine the exact nature of the antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ in a particular political setting and historical conjuncture. Thus, the recurrence of an anti-elite rhetoric and the central location of claims to be the party or the leader truly representing ‘the good people’ in terms of their general will seem indeed to unite all populist orientations. At the same time, other ideological elements articulated around this formal framework help to distinguish different forms of populism – such as left- or right-wing

populism, neo-populism, or indigenous populism (Abts and Rummens 2007, Mudde 2004, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).

Such a definition of populism lends itself very well to a systematic measurement of populist phenomena. Based on this definition populism has been measured using several techniques of content analysis, e.g. holistic grading of speeches, sentence coding of party manifestos, or computerized content analysis of media texts (e.g. Hawkins 2009, Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2015, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). While these studies focused mainly on the supply side of populism – political parties and party leaders – other studies use the ideational approach to measure populist attitudes within the citizenry as a means to explain the rise and mobilization potential of populist parties in different regions of the world (see Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012). We combine the insights from these latter studies that measure populist attitudes on the individual level with the focus of the former studies on the supply side of populism and measure populist attitudes within political elites.

Only recently have researchers begun to transfer the items from public opinion surveys on populism to political elite surveys (Andreadis, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2015, Rovira Kaltwasser and Hawkins 2015, Ruth and Ramírez Baracaldo 2015). This approach has significant potential advantages, namely that if we use comparable items to inquire after populist attitudes within the political elite we will be able to compare them to survey data measuring populist attitudes within the citizenry. This opens up the space for exploring several highly relevant questions, for example, do parliamentary elites share the same attitude patterns with their constituencies? The comparison of elite and public opinion surveys would enable us to test if elites engage in relations of *polarizing trusteeship* or *moderating trusteeship* with their constituents (see Kitschelt et al. 1999: 309-10), thereby either increasing or decreasing the importance of populism within political representation.

### **3. Research Design**

#### State of the Art: Measuring Populist Attitudes with Surveys

Survey items to measure populist attitudes within the public have been developed and tested recently by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) to analyse populism in the United States as well as Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) to analyse populist attitude in voter in the Netherlands. These authors developed a set of survey items that incorporate both the ideas and the language in which statements of the core ideas of populism are expressed. The first battery of these populist attitude items was included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. The questionnaire included six items asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with expressions that reference a struggle between the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt’ elite. Additionally, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) use the same battery of survey items in a subsample of 1,000 respondents from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES), an Internet survey conducted by Yougov/Polimetrix and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP), a sample of 950 respondents that was collected during the November 2008 general elections.

Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data set of 586 Dutch respondents. This battery consists of three types of questions with a target to measure (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. Based on the findings of this paper a group of scholars has proposed six populist attitudes items for the CSES Module 5 (2016-2021).

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**Populism Statements**

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POP1 The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people

POP2 The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions

POP3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.

POP4 I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician

POP5 Elected officials talk too much and take too little action

POP6 What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles

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Sources: Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012:8-9) and Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014:1331)

To adapt these item lists to the purpose of elite surveys we consulted with several colleagues from the Team Populism project supervised by Kirk A. Hawkins from Brigham Young University (<https://populism.byu.edu>). A final list of six populism items were deployed in both the present wave of the Greek Candidate Survey (CCS) and the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey managed by the University of Salamanca (USAL). The only item that had to be changed because it was not suitable for candidates or parliamentary elites was the question: ‘I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician’ that was changed to ‘People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician’.

### Greek Candidate Study (CCS 2015)

The Greek Candidate Study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) which is a joint multi-national project with the goal of collecting data on candidates running for national parliamentary elections in different countries using a common core questionnaire in a post-election candidate survey conducted in each country. CCS is conducted after the elections in order to collect data at the same period that data on voters are collected as part of national election studies. This means that in order to understand the findings presented in the following sections of this paper, we should take into account that the candidates give their answer when they already know the electoral outcome and whether their political parties are in government or not.

In Greece the CCS is usually run as a mixed-mode survey and the first mode is always a web-survey (Andreadis 2010). The data of these studies is available from the website of the Hellenic National Election Studies (<http://www.elnes.gr>) and has been used in many national and international publications (e.g. Andreadis 2012, Freire et al. 2014, Teperoglou, Chadjipadelis and Andreadis 2010, Teperoglou et al. 2014). For the Greek part of the study we used 6 items that were included in the battery proposed to CSES.

### Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA 2015)

Since the late 1990s the PELA team conducts representative surveys of parliamentary elites in 18 countries in the region at the beginning of each legislative period. The surveys are based on structured, face-to-face interviews including questions about the values of legislators, their behaviour, as well as their opinion on concrete issues of the region and the socio-political panorama of the respective countries. PELA includes questions on issues related to the quality of democracy, the ideological orientation of lawmakers and the position of their political parties and party leaders, their attitudes towards representation, democracy, and the economy.

Moreover, the surveys include items on the organization of legislative parties and their social base.

The dataset has been used to study a wide range of topics like the ideological structuration of party systems and political competition along the left-right divide (Alcántara Sáez and Rivas 2007, Alcántara Sáez 2008, Kitschelt et al. 2010, Wiesehomeier 2010), the congruence between political elites and their constituents with respect to political issues or political values (Hawkins, Kitschelt and Llamazares 2010, Ruiz Rodríguez and García 2003, Saiegh 2009), the quality and structure of political representation (Carnes and Lupu 2015, Luna and Zechmeister 2010, Marengi 2011), the nature of the executive-legislative relationship (García 2009), as well as legislative career paths and intra-party behaviour (Alcántara Sáez 2012, Carnes and Lupu 2015, Inácio and Magalhães Araújo 2011, Martínez Rosón 2012). Hence, the PELA surveys provide a valuable dataset with which we can explore the relationship between populist attitudes and several other aspects of interest.

The first two rounds that included the six populist attitude items were conducted in Panama in Spring 2015 and Uruguay in Summer 2015. Moreover, the PELA team has just concluded the field research in Bolivia during November and December 2015.

#### **4. Preliminary Descriptive Evidence from Greece, Panama and Uruguay**

The Greek CCS survey was conducted from mid-February to end of July 2015 and its initial target was to collect data from candidates of the seven parliamentary parties. Unfortunately, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has never agreed to participate in the Greek Candidate Study. Golden Dawn (GD) usually replies that all candidates share the same opinion, that of its leader, along the lines of the *Führeprinzip*. For the Greek Candidate Study 2015 we were able to find the email addresses and send invitations only to a very limited number of

candidates running with KKE and Golden Dawn. As a result we only have one completed questionnaire from KKE and five completed questionnaires from Golden Dawn candidates. Since these figures are not adequate for any statistical processing we have excluded these parties from our analysis. This is not anticipated to create substantial problems for our analysis to the extent that these two parties articulate discourses that escape the populism/anti-populism axis: although they both endorse an antagonistic confrontational discursive schema (fulfilling the first criterion of a discursive approach to populism), the role of the ‘people’ is only secondary in their discourse as it stands as a convenient synecdoche of an essentialized trans-historical notion of ‘class’ (KKE) and an ethnically and racially pure conception of the ‘nation’ (Golden Dawn).

At this point we should clarify that the Greek dataset is based on responses by candidates. It should be noted, in this respect, that all major Greek political parties have the same number of candidates. Thus, a representative sample of the candidates should include almost the same number of candidates from each party. The distribution per party is presented in Table 1.


**Table 1: Distribution of Respondents per Party, Greek CCS 2015**

Party	Frequency	Candidates (%)
SYRIZA	115	21.9
ND	102	19.4
RIVER	108	20.6
PASOK	98	18.7
ANEL	102	19.4
Total	525	100.0

Before we continue with the analysis of the results we need to verify that the six items we have used are closely related to each other. We need to test the internal consistency of the items mainly because the items have only been tested so far only on voters. Indeed this is the first time these items are used on candidates or parliamentarians, thus we need to check if the reliability of the scale when applied on voters remains intact when the scale is applied on candidates. Cronbach's alpha for the six items included in the Greek Candidate Study gets the value of 0.75, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency. This value is similar to the value that Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) have found in their study (0.82).

Following the example of previous studies, our populism index is constructed as the mean value of the six populist attitude items. As Figure 1 indicates, according to the populism index the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER – parties generally assumed to be non-populist, something also consistent with our discursive/ideational framework – score below 3.5 while the candidates of both SYRIZA and ANEL – parties generally assumed to be populist, something also consistent with our framework – score over 3.5. As their 95% confidence intervals indicate, ANEL candidates score higher than SYRIZA candidates on the populism index. PASOK, ND and RIVER candidates do not differ significantly on the same index and they form a common group. But this group (the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER) scores significantly lower on this scale and it is significantly different from the groups of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates.

**Figure 1. Populism Index by political party**



Greece is not only one of the few countries with both significant left-wing and right-wing populist parties. In addition, it currently has a coalition government formed by a left-wing and a right-wing populist party. This allows for very interesting comparisons of left-wing and right-wing populist candidates. In order to study if there are differences between the (assumed) left-wing populism of SYRIZA candidates and the (assumed) right-wing populism of ANEL candidates we have run a t-test for each of the items to compare between the candidates of these parties.

As Table 2 indicates, the significance value  $p$  of the mean comparison between the candidates of SYRIZA and ANEL is less than 0.05 for four out of the six items. The item with the largest difference between SYRIZA and ANEL candidates is the item: 'What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles'. In this respect, SYRIZA candidates' score is 2.83 and ANEL candidates' score is 3.59. The  $p$  value of the t-test is less


than 0.001. This finding is consistent with Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) who find a similar distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism. In particular, they have observed that the voters of the left-wing SP are more willing to listen to the opinions of others and they argue that this finding is consistent with the idea that right-wing populism is exclusionist, while left-wing populism is more inclusivist. Another – supplementary – explanation here is that the differing views on ‘compromise’ stem from different political cultures that have developed in different circumstances and along different time-spans. SYRIZA’s officials have a longer history within party politics and other forms of representative institutions (like trade unions) within a larger and more coherently organized structure (around 80% of SYRIZA’s cadres come from Synaspismos, which was founded in 1992, while a lot of them also originate from the Greek Communist Party / KKE). Thus they have been accustomed with the internal processes that one usually finds in the contemporary radical left, where different factions (from social-democrats to Trotskyists) have to deliberate in internal bodies and make certain compromises in order to reach a commonly accepted decision. On the other hand, ANEL constitute a considerably leader-centric party that was practically built around the persona of their leader, Panos Kammenos, a former ND MP, in 2012, and exhibits practically no substantive internal organization and democratic procedures. Its cadres have not thus developed the type of militancy that the cadres of SYRIZA have built within the party.

**Table 2. SYRIZA/ANEL differences**

Item	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	t	p
POP1	110	4,15	0,64	98	4,40	0,65	-2,71	0,007
POP2	109	3,92	0,85	98	3,91	1,04	0,07	0,944
POP3	109	4,03	0,88	90	3,90	0,91	1,00	0,317
POP4	112	3,07	0,86	98	3,38	1,09	-2,24	0,026
POP5	104	3,37	0,88	95	4,04	0,77	-5,78	<0.001
POP6	105	2,83	1,00	98	3,59	1,07	-5,24	<0.001

Figure 2 shows an interesting relationship between populist attitudes of candidates and how they position themselves on the left-right scale. The maximum value of populist attitudes is observed among the candidates who position themselves on the left edge of the axis. Almost all candidates who have positioned themselves at the left have scored high as far as the populism index is concerned. Centre-left candidates are exactly the opposite: almost all of them have low populism index scores. The less homogenous group is the group of right candidates. This group includes both candidates with low populism scores (most of them are ND candidates) and candidates with high populism scores (most of them are ANEL candidates). Finally, the high populist scores among centre candidates is explained by the fact that many ANEL candidates (with high populist scores) have classified themselves as centrists.

**Figure 2. Populism and Self-Positioning of Candidates on the Left-Right Scale**



Turning to Latin America, Panama was the first country within the PELA survey that included the new items on populist attitudes. Although the country is not one of the usual suspects when it comes to the study of populism in Latin America, charismatic and personalist leaders dominated the history of the country over a long time (e.g. Singer 2005). Especially two family clans were highly influential in politics in Panama: the clan of Arnulfo Arias and the clan of Omar Torrijos (Pérez 2011). The legacy of these personalistic leaders is still present in the party system of Panama since each clan founded its own political party: the *Partido Panameñista* (PA) was founded by Arnulfo Arias in the 1930s and the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (PRD) was founded by Omar Torrijos in 1978 (see Scranton 1995). Both parties were continuously represented in the Congress since the return to democracy in 1989 and were the main competitors for the Presidency until 2009. Since 1989 only one presidential campaign led to allegations of populist rhetoric used by one candidate,

i.e. Mireya Moscoso, the widow of Arnulfo Arias (Navarro 1999, Ruth 2015). The third major party in Panama is the *Cambio Democrático* party (CD) which was founded in 1998 in opposition to the two traditional parties just mentioned. The CD is located in the centre of the ideological spectrum and declares itself to be a pluralist democratic party that aims at national unity (Pérez 2011). The last general elections that filled the 71 seats in the national legislature as well as the presidency were held on May 4 2014. Due to presidential term limits the then incumbent President Ricardo Martinelli from the *Cambio Democrático* party (CD) was not allowed to run again. Instead the former Vice-President Juan Carlos Varela from the PA won the race with 39.1% of the votes. The electoral alliance between the PA and the *Partido Popular* (PP), however, only managed to gain 18.3% of the seats in the present legislative period.

The second country that was covered by the PELA survey in 2015 was Uruguay. This small country in South America is one of the most stable democracies in the region when it comes to both the support for established political parties as well as the political system in general (e.g. Altman 2010, Altman and Buquet 2015). The party system consists of three major party blocks: the Frente Amplio (FA) a center-left alliance that challenged the two other traditional parties since the return to democracy and gained the presidency in 2004 for the first time. Opposing the FA on the center-right are the Partido Nacional (PN) and the Partido Colorado (PC). The last general elections that filled the 99 seats in the lower chamber, 30 seats in the Senate as well as the presidency were held on October 26, 2014. The former President from 2005-2009, Tabaré Vázquez, from the FA won the race with 53.5% of the votes in the runoff election. The party of the president, the FA, won 50.5% of the seats in the lower legislative chamber.

**Table 3: Distribution of Respondents per Party, PELA Survey 2015**


	<b>Panama</b>				<b>Uruguay</b>		
Party	Freq.	Respond.	Seats	Party	Freq.	Respond.	Seats
		(%)	(%)			(%)	(%)
DC	15	46.9	42.3	FA	37	56.1	50.5
PA	4	12.5	16.9	PN	21	31.8	31.3
PRD	13	40.6	35.2	PC	8	21.1	13.1
Total	32	100	94.4		66	100	94.9

Source: PELA 2015.

The PELA survey has been conducted in Panama in spring 2015 and covers the legislators who serve in the legislative period from 2014-2019, the one in Uruguay was conducted in summer 2015 and includes legislators from the 2015-2019 period. Legislators have been randomly sampled and stratified by political party (see Table 3). For the Panama survey the sample includes 47 legislators which equal 66% of the legislature; the Uruguayan survey includes 69 legislators which equal 70% of the lower legislative chamber. The survey items on populist attitudes, however, have only been included in a subsample of 32 legislators in Panama (which decreases the coverage of the sample to 45% of the legislature). The survey is based on face-to-face interviews.


With respect to the populism index Cronbach's alpha for the six items included in the Panama survey only gets the value of 0.38, suggesting that the six items have relatively low internal consistency in this sample. The internal consistency is considerably higher for the Uruguayan sample, here Cronbach's alpha is 0.60.

**Figure 3. Populism Index by political party**



As Figure 3 shows, the overall level of populist attitudes within parliamentary elites is higher in Panama with a mean of 3.52 (standard deviation = 0.47) than in Uruguay with a mean of 2.81 (standard deviation = 0.63). According to this first descriptive look at the dataset we find no clear party differences in the populism index between political parties in Panama. With respect to Uruguay we find an interesting pattern at least with respect to two political parties. On the one hand, legislators from the centre-left party FA, on average, report more populist attitudes than legislators from the two opposition parties PC and PN. On the other hand, legislators from the centre-right party PN, on average, are less populist in their attitudes than the average parliamentarian in Uruguay as well as the mean legislators from the other two parties. However, we need to be careful in interpreting these results since the sample for Panama is particularly small with only 32 respondents to the populist attitude items.

**Figure 4. Populism Index by left-right category**



## Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to investigate if the measurement of populist attitudes in citizens may travel to political elites as well. In line with earlier studies on populist, elitist and pluralist attitudes in voters (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012) we adapted a set of survey statements to deploy them in the Greek module of the CCS and parliamentary elite surveys in Latin America. This paper presented a first glimpse at these emerging datasets on populist attitudes in Europe and Latin America. With the completion of more datasets more substantive comparisons will become possible and more conclusive support for what seems like a promising avenue for future research will hopefully be established.

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## Appendix – PELA Questionnaire

### *Pregunta 1: (Actitudes Populistas)*

¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo se encuentra usted con las siguientes afirmaciones? Por favor utilice la siguiente escala: **LEER FRASES**

Frases	Muy en	En	Ni de	De	Muy de	(No leer)	(No leer)
Los políticos en al Congreso tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Las decisiones más importantes deberían ser tomadas por el pueblo y no por los políticos	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Las diferencias políticas entre la elite y el pueblo son más grandes que las diferencias que existen en el pueblo	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Es preferible ser representado por un ciudadano común que por un político experimentado	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Los políticos hablan mucho y hacen muy poco	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
En política se llama consenso a lo que realmente significa renunciar a los propios principios	1	2	3	4	5	88	99

*Pregunta 2: (Actitudes Elitistas/ Pluralistas)*

¿Cuán de acuerdo o en desacuerdo se encuentra usted con las siguientes afirmaciones? Por favor utilice la siguiente escala: **LEER FRASES**

<b>Frases</b>	<b>Muy en</b>	<b>En</b>	<b>Ni de</b>	<b>De</b>	<b>Muy de</b>	<b>(No leer)</b>	<b>(No leer)</b>
A la gente común no se le puede confiar el tomar las decisiones correctas sobre los problemas del país	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Nuestro país funcionaría mejor si las decisiones importantes fueran tomadas por expertos independientes	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Los políticos deben guiar al pueblo antes que seguirlo	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
En una democracia es importante lograr consensos entre distintos puntos de vista	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
En una democracia es importante escuchar la opinión de todos los grupos	1	2	3	4	5	88	99