




**CODEBOOK**  
For  
**Measuring Populist Discourse**

**Populist Discourse Project at  
Central European University**



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## Introduction

In April-May 2013 we undertook a project at Central European University in Budapest to measure populism among chief executives in Central East Europe, Baltic States and Central Asia. The project used holistic grading to measure the level of populist discourse in speeches

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given by chief executives in CEE and Central Asia. The result is a large dataset covering 80 leader-terms in 28 countries.

Here, we provide a summary of the project, including;

- underlying concepts
- method of measurement
- average values for each leader-term
- the documents used in training the coders

In a separate set of files we provide a complete set of results broken down by coder, the actual speeches coded, and the individual rubrics for each speech and coder.

### **What do we mean by populism?**

We define populism in ideational terms, as a Manichaeian outlook on politics that equates the side of good with a putative “will of the people” and the side of evil with a conspiring elite. Although this definition is only just catching on in Latin America (de la Torre 2010; de la Torre and Arnson 2013), some version of it is common in the study of populism throughout Europe and other advanced industrial democracies (Kazin 1998; Moffitt and Tormey 2013; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Taggart 2000). According to this view, populism is one of several fundamental discourses that emerge in democratic politics (Mudde 2004; Plattner 2010; Hawkins 2009). The others include, though are not limited to, pluralism, which tends to see the good in opponents and treats problems as circumstances rather than the result of a conspiracy; and elitism, which also takes an us-versus-them approach but sees the elite as superior to the people. Thus, populism fits into the realm of political ideas and belongs to the same order as the classic ideologies often studied in political science (liberalism, conservatism, socialism), but it is a different genus, a set of ideas that are less consciously articulated and thus not as easily grasped in standard public opinion polls or content analyses of election manifestos.

### **The project**

A key component of the CEU project is measurement of populist discourse in the speeches of government chief executives. CEU was an excellent environment for this undertaking because of its diverse student body from around the region where all instruction is in English. This allowed us to instruct and train a diverse body of students (here referred to as coders) from all over the region in English. We collaborated with the CEU’s department of political science. The department assisted with soliciting coders for training and workshop participation as well as providing facilities. In the beginning of April 2013 we (Hawkins and Kocijan) held a workshop on populism where we trained coders in three two-hour sessions on how to select speeches for coding and how to perform actual coding. After this initial week of training, the project included another two weeks to collect the sample of speeches (coders collected speeches in their native languages mostly from government websites of their countries; where these were not available they contacted other offices of authority such as political parties). Conversations with student coders continued during the month of May (mostly via Skype since we had already returned to

our home countries). By the end of May 2013 we had completed the project. In total, the project lasted 8 weeks, not including some initial preparations in March to solicit coder applications.

### The coders

We recruited 56 coders to cover 28 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, the Baltic States and Italy. In each country, we coded speeches of the most recent chief executive. In countries where coders could code more, we covered several previous chief executives. In countries where chief executives have been in office consecutively for a long time, if their tenure exceeded 4 years we coded each term as a separate case. Because in our dataset there are different regime types (parliamentary, semi-presidential, presidential) we selected chief executives who in each of these regimes hold true political powers both institutionally and in practice. The result is a dataset of 80 leader-terms from the past decade (sometimes earlier).

### Holistic grading

To measure the populist discourse of political elites, we use a form of textual analysis that educational psychologists call holistic grading (White 1985). Rather than measure rhetorical form or content at the level of words or sentences, as in traditional content analysis, holistic grading asks the coders to read the text in its entirety and then assign a grade based on their overall impression. Holistic grading is best suited for diffuse, latent attributes in a text and was developed by Educational Testing Services for its grading of Advanced Placement essay exams in the United States. Although it looks at broad attributes of a text, holistic grading is a quantitative measure that seeks to determine how much of an idea is present. It requires pairing a coding rubric with a set of anchor texts that match each numerical value or level of ideas so that coders can have a consistent set of reference points.

Coding is based on a rubric developed in previous rounds of measurement (Hawkins 2009; Hawkins 2012) that captures the main elements of populism: a reified will of the people, diabolical elite, a Manichaeon cosmology, systemic change, and an “anything goes” attitude. Because the concept of the “will of the people” is the sine qua non of populist discourse, a speech that refers to a reified will of the people earns at least a moderate score. Populist speeches that do a clearer job of developing the tone that we associate with a Manichaeon outlook, as well as ancillary elements such as the mention of a diabolical enemy, receive higher scores.

### The scale

We use a three-point scale in which 0 means there is no clear reference to the “will of the people”; 1 means there is some clear reference to the “will of the people,” but that it lacks consistency or intensity across the text; and 2 means that most elements of populism are present without any strong, countervailing discourse. Thus, a speech with a strong Manichaeon outlook but *no* clear development of the notion of the popular will is coded as a zero—it is a different discursive framework.

Each of these scores is paired with a couple of sample speeches—the anchor texts—that are used in training.<sup>2</sup>

**Sampling**

As in previous studies (Hawkins 2009; Hawkins 2012), we select four speeches nonrandomly for each leader-term: a *campaign* speech (typically the opening or closing speech of the campaign), a *ribboncutting* speech (always given to a local audience), an *international* speech (given to an international audience outside the country, typically at the OAS or UN), and a *famous* speech (chosen after consulting with the president’s press office or party

headquarters). By selecting a variety of contexts that include obscure speeches and more visible ones, we better gauge the consistency of the leaders’ discourse while still providing opportunities for them to show their populist colors.

As for length, we generally look for speeches that are about 2,000 words long; where multiple speeches are available that fit the category and the length requirements, we choose the most recent one. Sometimes only short speeches are available, in which case we take the longest one that we can find, but coders usually find it difficult to discern a leader’s discourse in anything shorter than 500 words.

**The scores**

Table 1 presents the results of the CEU project. It includes average scores across leader-terms; individual scores for each coder are found in a separate file. Highly populist leaders (>1.0) are shaded dark, while moderately populist leaders (>.5) are shaded light.

**Table 1 Populist Discourse of Central and East European and Central Asian Leaders**

Country	Leader	Term	Type	Score	
				mean	s.d.
Albania	Sali Berisha I	2005-2009	PM	0.1	0.3
	Sali Berisha II	2009-	PM	0.0	0.0
Armenia	Robert Kocharyan I	1993-2003	PRES *	0.0	0.0
	Robert Kocharyan II	2003-2008	PRES	0.0	0.0
	Serzh Azati Sargsyan	2008-2013	PRES	0.8	1.0
Azerbaijan	Ilham Aliyev II	2008-	PRES †	0.0	0.0

<sup>2</sup> As anchor texts we use speeches by Robert Mugabe (Statement on the occasion of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 2 September 2002, scored a 2), Evo Morales (I believe only in the power of the people, delivered in 2003, scored a 2), Tony Blair (Speech on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and EU enlargement, delivered on 19 April 2004, scored a 0), Stephen Harper (The Federal Accountability Act, delivered on 4 November 2005, scored a 1), Barack Obama (President Obama’s State of the Union address, delivered on 24 January 2012, scored between a 0 and 1), Sarah Palin (Sarah Palin Speaks at Tea Party Convention, delivered 6 February 2010, scored between a 1 and a 2), and George Bush (Address of the President to the joint session of Congress, delivered on 20 September 2001, scored a 0).

Belarus	Alexander Lukashenko I	2001-2006	PRES	†	1.5	0.6
	Alexander Lukashenko II	2006-2010	PRES	†	1.3	0.5
	Alexander Lukashenko III	2010-	PRES	†	0.8	0.5
Bulgaria	Simeon Saksoburggotsk	2001-2005	PM		0.1	0.3
	Boyko Borisov	2009-2013	PM		0.6	0.5
Croatia	Franjo Tudman	1992-1997	PRES		0.6	0.9
	Ivica Racan	2000-2003	PM		0.0	0.0
	Ivo Sanader	2003-2009	PM		0.4	0.5
Czech R	Milos Zeman	1998-2002	PM	*	0.0	0.0
	Mirek Topolanek	2004-2009	PM		1.0	0.5
	Petr Necs	2010-	PM		0.1	0.3
	Vaclav Klaus I	2003-2008	PRES		0.6	0.5
	Vaclav Klaus II	2008-2013	PRES		1.0	0.8
Estonia	Andrus Ansip I	2005-2007	PM		0.0	0.0
	Andrus Ansip II	2007-2011	PM		0.1	0.3
	Andrus Ansip III	2011-	PM		0.0	0.0
Georgia	Mikheil Saakashvili I	2004-2007	PRES		0.8	1.0
	Mikheil Saakashvili II	2008-	PRES		0.4	0.5
	Bidzina Ivanishvili	2012-	PM		0.3	0.5
Hungary	Viktor Orban I	1998-2002	PM		0.4	0.5
	Ferenc Gyurcsany	2004-2009	PM		0.0	0.0
	Viktor Orban II	2010-	PM		0.9	1.0
Italy	Silvio Berlusconi I	2001-2006	PM		0.8	1.0
	Silvio Berlusconi II	2008-2011	PM		0.9	0.6
Kazakhstan	Nursultan Nazarbayev I	1999-2005	PRES		0.3	0.5
	Nursultan Nazarbayev II	2005-2011	PRES		0.1	0.3
	Nursultan Nazarbayev III	2011-	PRES		0.0	0.0
Kyrgystan	Kurmanbek S. Bakiyev	2005-2010	PRES	†	0.0	0.0
	Almazbek S. Atambayev	2011-	PRES		1.0	0.7
Latvia	Einars Repse	2002-2004	PM	†	0.5	0.6
	Aigars Kalvītis	2004-2007	PM	†	0.5	0.6
	Valdis Dombrovskis	2009-	PM	†	0.0	0.0
Lithuania	Algirdas Brazauskas	2001-2006	PM	*	0.2	0.3
	Valdas Adamkus	2004-2009	PRES		0.0	0.0
	Andrius Kubilius	2008-2012	PM		0.0	0.0
	Dalia Grybauskaitė	2009-	PRES		0.3	0.6
Macedonia	Nikola Gruevski I	2006-2008	PM		0.4	0.8
	Nikola Gruevski II	2008-	PM		1.0	1.2
Moldova	Vladimir Voronin	2001-2009	PRES		1.0	0.9
	Marian Lupu	2010-	PRES		0.1	0.3
	Vlad Filat	2009-	PM		0.4	0.8
Montenegro	Milo Dukanovic I	2002-2006	PM	*	0.2	0.3
	Milo Dukanovic II	2008-2010	PM		0.0	0.0

	Milo Dukanovic III	2010-	PM		0.0	0.0
Poland	Jarosław Kaczyński	2006-2007	PM	†	0.3	0.5
	Lech Kaczyński	2005-2010	PRES	†	0.8	0.5
	Donald Tusk	2011-	PM	†	0.0	0.0
Romania	Calin Popescu - Tariceanu	2004-2008	PM		0.4	0.8
	Emil Boc	2008-2012	PM		0.3	0.5
	Traian Basescu I	2004-2009	PRES		0.5	1.0
	Traian Basescu II	2009-	PRES		0.0	0.0
	Viktor Ponta	2012-	PM		0.4	0.5
Russia	Vladimir Putin (PM)	2008-2012	PM		0.5	1.0
	Dimitri Medvedev	2008-2012	PRES		0.0	0.0
	Vladimir Putin (PRES)	2012-	PRES		0.5	0.6
Serbia	Zoran Dindic	2001-2003	PM		0.3	0.3
	Vojislav Kostunica	2004-2008	PM		0.5	0.6
	Boris Tadic	2008-2012	PRES		0.1	0.3
Slovakia	Vladimir Meciar	1994-1998	PM	*	1.7	0.3
	Mikulas Dzurinda I	1998-2002	PM		0.3	0.5
	Mikulas Dzurinda II	2002-2006	PM		0.4	0.8
	Robert Fico	2006-2010	PM		0.8	1.0
Slovenia	Janez Jansa	2004-2008	PM		0.8	0.6
	Borut Pahor	2008-2012	PM		0.0	0.0
Turkey	Recep T. Erdogan I	2003-2007	PM		0.1	0.3
	Recep T. Erdogan II	2007-2011	PM		0.9	0.9
	Recep T. Erdogan III	2011-	PM		0.9	0.5
Turkmenistan	Saparmurat Niyazov	2000-2006	PRES		0.3	0.5
	Gurbanguly					
	Berdimuhamedow	2012-	PRES		0.0	0.0
Ukraine	Yulia Tymoshenko	2007-2010	PM		0.8	1.0
	Viktor Yanukovych	2010-	PRES		0.6	0.8
Uzbekistan	Islam Karimov II	2000-2007	PRES		0.0	0.0
	Islam Karimov III	2007-	PRES		0.3	0.3
<u>Average</u>						
					0.4	0.6
	Campaign				0.7	0.7
	Famous				0.5	0.7
	International				0.2	0.5
	Ribboncutting				0.2	0.4

\*only 3 speeches available

†only one coder contributed

## Reliability

In any textual analysis using human coding, a key concern is the level of reliability of scores. The CEU project turns out to have very good reliability that we measure as a raw percent agreement (what percent of the time the coders agreed exactly) and two more sophisticated measures of agreement: Cohen's kappa and Krippendorff's alpha. We get 82 percent agreement, a kappa of .68, and an alpha of .77<sup>3</sup> (Krippendorff 2013, 241-42; Landis and Koch 1977).

To provide a measure of intercoder reliability, we normally have two coders in each country read each speech, with each coder being a native speaker of the original language of the speech. In a few countries, only one coder was available. Scores here are naturally somewhat less certain, although we met with each of these individual coders and validated every one of their rubrics, and the high levels of reliability for other coders suggest that these scores were also accurate. These are noted in Table 1 as well as in the spreadsheet that breaks down individual coders' scores. Hawkins will attempt to fill in these scores using international students at his own university; interested readers should consult his subsequent publications, available at <http://fhssfaculty.byu.edu/FacultyPage.aspx?id=kah224>.

## Validity

Another important aspect of any measurement is validity, or the degree to which data correspond to our definition and other people's understandings of the concept. Here we focus on what Adcock and Collier (2001) call "convergent/discriminant validity," or the degree to which our measure correlates with other measures.

To gauge convergent validity more systematically, we search EBSCO's entire database of peer-reviewed articles for references to each of these chief executives to see if the label of "populism" or "populist" is used in conjunction with their names. We define this as the percentage of all articles that mention the chief executive somewhere in the article—in the text, title or abstract—that also use a cognate of "populism" within 7 words of the person's last name. We double-check all positive references to ensure that the reference is actually to the person named, and to eliminate references that were framed in the negative (as in "Valdis Dombrovskis is not a populist"). Since most of the chief executives have been in office just once or for a single series of consecutive terms, we consider all years together for this analysis. For chief executives in office for nonconsecutive terms, we split the search into different time periods, with the dividing line two years before the beginning of their later term.

We note that there are several potential problems with using a sample of scholarly articles as the source of expert opinion. First, the sample may not capture much of the universe. For English language sources, EBSCO has remarkably good coverage, but for Central and Eastern Europe, let alone Central Asia, the quantity of local publications drops off quickly, and we have little hope that we are capturing cognates for "populism" in publications using non-Latin languages such as Russian, Czech, or Turkish. The second problem is that this technique isn't a direct

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<sup>3</sup> Cohen's kappa was calculated using a score matrix of [1 / .5 1 / 0 .5 1]; Krippendorff's alpha was calculated for interval-level data.

measure of scholarly opinion like an expert survey. The adjectives that scholars associate with the names of these leaders is limited to whatever they think is the most relevant word of phrase that describes the leader. For example, the fact that scholars don't use the word "populist" very often in referring to Viktor Orban (0.0 percent of the time in EBSCO, in fact) doesn't mean that they don't think he is a strong populist; it could just mean that other qualities, such as the fact that he is rightist or nationalist, are more salient and deserve first mention.

In any case, the correlation between the EBSCO scores and the scores from the speech analysis is a relatively high  $r = .66$ . This is a very positive result. An extremely low correlation would suggest that our measure is at odds with whatever other scholars are thinking when they say "populist." In contrast, an extremely high score would suggest that the whole measurement exercise was unnecessary, that we could dispense with reading speeches and just do repeated content analyses of the academic literature.

Confidence in our data validity steams also from correlations between the European/Asian scores and Latin American scores obtained in a project Hawkins conducted in at Brigham Young University for 20 leaders elected in that region between 2006 and 2011. The average scores are very similar across the two datasets. Both datasets have the same overall average score of 0.4. The scores for categories are very similar: campaign speeches are 0.8 in the Latin American dataset and 0.7 in the CEU one; famous speeches follow, at 0.5 in both datasets; and ribboncutting and international speeches are weakest, at 0.2 in both datasets (except for ribboncutting speeches in the Latin American dataset, which are at .3).<sup>4</sup> These results should give us confidence to use the two datasets in combination, which will be a tremendous advantage in any large-N study of populism.

As additional checks on reliability and validity, we had coders fill out a detailed response for each speech that included illustrative quotes and a short explanation for their judgment. Coders were not allowed to share their results until we met to discuss their scores. Unless the coders decided they have made an error, we left all scores unchanged and averaged the results for the two coders in the data presented here (Table 1).

### Cautions for Data Users

Readers should be cautious about focusing on the average score of any one leader. Previous work by Hawkins (2009) and others (Sudweeks, Reeve, and Bradshaw 2004) shows high levels of precision and reliability for estimates based on just 4 texts using human coders, but there is still a margin of error around any leader's score. In a project coding 80 leader-terms, the chance that the scores

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<sup>4</sup>These patterns also match the results of Hawkins' original 2006 study (Hawkins 2009), which averaged 0.6 for campaign speeches, between 0.4 and 0.6 for famous speeches, 0.3 for ribboncutting ones, and between 0.3 and 0.4 for international ones; the overall average was again 0.4.

Bear in mind that we expect these similarities across Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe/Central Asia because of their similar trajectories of political and economic development; similarities with Western Europe or other advanced industrial democracies are presumably not as great.



are highly incorrect for at least one of these leaders is quite high. Thus, *the best use for data like these is in large-N, statistical modeling and broad regional comparisons that use all of the data.* If we were to guess about the direction of likely measurement error in estimates, we suspect that it is mostly upward, in the direction of false-positives. Simply put, coders are somewhat more likely to see populism when there is none than they are to miss it when it is present. That said, we have more confidence in the point estimates of leaders with multiple terms (e.g., Berlusconi, Erdogan, or Lukashenko).

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## Appendix

**Name of politician:**

**Title of Speech:**

**Date of Speech:**

**Category:**

**Grader:**

**Date of grading:**

**Final Grade (delete unused grades):**

2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaeian worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

<b>Populist</b>	<b>Pluralist</b>
It conveys a Manichaeian vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, “right” or “wrong,” “good” or “evil”) The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on <b>narrow, particular issues</b> . The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing <b>cosmic proportions</b> to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of “history.” At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to <b>national and</b>	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

<p><b>religious leaders</b> that are generally revered.</p>	
<p>Although Manichaeism, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the “voluntad del pueblo”; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.</p>	<p>Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable “will.” The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.</p>
<p>The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the “oligarchy,” but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.</p>	<p>The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.</p>
<p>Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as “revolution” or “liberation” of the people from their “immiseration” or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.</p>	<p>The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of “differences” rather than “hegemony.”</p>
<p>Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority’s continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.</p>	<p>Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.</p>

**Overall Comments (just a few sentences):**

## **Criteria for Selecting Speeches**

### **April 2013**

Generally, we need a speech that is at least 2-3 pages long, or about 2,000 words, in order to have enough text to analyze. We will use an extremely long speech (>5 pages) if it is the only one available in the category or is clearly the right speech for that category (as in the case of a famous speech), but given a choice, we prefer something shorter to make your work a little easier. We will also use an extremely short speech (1 page or less), but only if it is the *only* one available. Where the leader has been in office several years (say, because this is the last year in a 6-year term) and there are a variety of speeches available for a category, we generally prefer the most recent ones because they are the easiest to find. And to ensure comparability of coding across speeches and leaders, we need to have transcriptions rather than video recordings.

### **Campaign**

Here we ask for a speech given during this chief executive's latest campaign for office. Keep in mind the above criteria, especially length. Campaign speeches are often the hardest to find because they were given before the person was elected, and so they are usually not recorded on any government website. Be prepared to call the political party or the office of the chief executive to speak to someone who was involved in the campaign. If it is impossible to get a speech for the person's own campaign, we will take a speech that he/she gave for some other candidate's campaign (for example, for members of the legislature during a mid-term election). If several speeches are available, we prefer the closing speech of the campaign to the opening speech, and a speech given to a large public audience over one given at a party convention.

### **Ribbon-cutting**

This is a speech given at some kind of public ceremony dedicating a government building or project, typically a road, park, or building. You will probably find a number of these on the government website. Given a choice, look for a speech that is given to a small, local audience rather than a national one, and to a domestic audience rather than an international one—we prefer something obscure in order to see whether the chief executive uses a populist discourse in settings with little apparent significance. If you have a lot to choose from, pick the most recent.

### **International**

Here we are looking for a speech whose primary audience, or a significant part of the audience, consists of citizens from other countries—leaders, diplomats, or even ordinary people. There will be quite a few international speeches available, including on websites besides those of the government. For consistency, we encourage you to look for a speech given outside the country, with as small a domestic audience as possible. UN speeches are especially good as long as they are long enough.

### **Famous or most-popular**

In this category, we seek for a speech that is widely regarded as one of the best-known and most-popular speeches given by this leader. Of course, some leaders don't give very popular speeches, but we at least want one of their best-known ones. As someone who knows this country well, you are in a good position to pick what you think is a particularly appropriate speech here. But as a check on your decision, we encourage you to contact the office of the chief executive or the

political party and ask them for a recommendation. They will often suggest an inaugural speech (when the chief executive actually took office) or an annual report to the nation, but not necessarily, and you should not feel obliged to use one of these particular speeches if you know of another one that is more famous (or notorious). Talk to a couple of people if you feel unsure.